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PREFACE
The electric co-op system in Louisiana had its start
as a New Deal agency, as a direct result of the legisla
tion passed in 1936 to establish the Rural Electrification
Administration which was to bring lights to rural America.
But like several other New Deal programs, the REA had its
roots early in the twentieth century,

Gifford Pinchot,

who, as governor of Pennsylvania in the mid-Twenties, saw
how an electrified rural population would benefit the
entire nation, had advocated the idea since 1910.

But

Pinchot, in this and other ways, was before his time.

It

would be his young assistant, Morris Llewellyn Cooke, who
would transfer Pinchot’s dream into reality as FDR's first
REA Administrator.

None of this may seem to have a direct

effect on Louisiana, but without the dreams of these early
idealists, no rural electrification system could ever have
gotten off the ground in Louisiana--or probably anywhere.
Cooke is the obvious link between Pinchot's dreams
of the Twenties and the REA legislation of 1936, but there
was a similar link between that legislation and the rural
co-op system in Louisiana.
easily documented.

Unfortunately, it is not as

There was no one man, such as Cooke,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to connect both parts.

Of course, there were connections ;

someone had to discover that there was money available,
that it all could work.

In most areas of the state, that

was usually a county agent.

He may have been informed of

the program through the state university system, or through
government publications.

These men were not much more

than administers of the information.

The real initiative

came from prominent local citizens, usually police jurymen.
They set up the organization, borrowed the money, and, most
importantly, took on the responsibility.

They were the

Morris Llewellyn Cookes of the local co-ops ; they were the
connection between one facet of the program and another.
But these local men were not dreamers, they were doers.
They had been doers all their lives.
with pragmatic goals.

They were pragmatists

Many of them were pragmatic to the

point that they were motivated to get electricity for them
selves.

But they all realized that electricity connected

to their farms meant electricity for others, and that their
ability to pay for it meant that those who could not would
also receive it.

Furthermore, many of them must have seen

that the future would eventually bring electricity to every
one.

They were not dreamers, but they were idealists.
It is difficult to know if these men saw the economic

importance of what they were doing.

Did they see that

lights in the countryside would bring prosperity in the
form of increased agricultural production, industry, jobs.
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and activity where there had been virtually none before?
Did they see that this economic activity would bring on
more economic activity, and then still more?
they did, to some extent.

Possibly

Certainly they saw that elec

tricity would make farm life easier, even desirable for
those who were leaving the farm, scrambling to the cities
for jobs.

There was a great fear in the Thirties that

dwindling rural populations would somehow cause America
to go hungry.

But Louisiana advocates of rural electrifi

cation probably did not know that this electrification
would be one of several factors that would lead to the end
of farm tenancy in the South by making it possible for
just a few men to farm a large plantation.

By the time

World War II had begun, tenants were no longer needed on
the farms, while at the same time, war industry jobs in
the cities pulled them away even faster.

But, of course,

because of increased mechanization, no one starved, and
production soared.

These men were not seers, but some of

what the future held for a rural population with electric
ity at its fingertips must have been apparent.
There were thirteen co-ops in Louisiana that began
operations between early 1937 and 1940.

Each one began

in a very similar way, but each had unique characteristics,
as well.

Many of those who organized these programs are

still around today, still active, able to see what has
become of a plan some forty-five years ago to bring lights
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to a few people here and there.

The passage of the REA

bill in 1936 would have had no significance for Louisiana
had it not been for these people.

They made it work, and

they influenced what has transpired since the formation
of these groups.

The formation of these thirteen groups

is the basis of the history of rural electrification in
Louisiana.

Everything else is either a foundation for,

or a creation of, that group.
A few years after their organization, it became ob
vious that these thirteen co-ops needed, in some manner,
to consolidate their interests.

Just as they could not,

as individual farmers, get electricity, as individual co-ops
they were not powerful enough to do the things that needed
doing, everything from buying trucks at group prices to
having needed legislation passed.

So, they simply formed

a statewide co-op of their individual co-ops.

That group

was immediately successful, and it became apparent that
organization meant power.

When they felt it was time to

generate their own electricity, to get out from under the
private utilities that sold them the power they distributed,
they again organized.

They found that alone, the individual

co-ops could not stand up to the private utilities, but
together, they were strong enough.
In the early period of the program in Louisiana, say
up to 1950, the goal had been to make the idea work, to
put into practice what many had longed for for years—
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rural electrification.

To achieve that goal, the rural

co-ops needed the cooperation of the federal government
and the state government, and, most of all, they needed
the cooperation of the state's private utilities to sell
them the power they would distribute.

But these organizers

were the quintessence of the conservative, rural farmer.
They were independent in every way, in politics, in economics,
in character.

When the programs were on their feet, when

these men felt that they could stand without the props of
the government and the utilities, they began to consider
making the co-ops independent of those groups, to make them,
in fact, free enterprises.

Much of this feeling began to

be expressed in the early Fifties when REA and the local
co-ops became the objects of conservative fingerpointing
by those who found socialists and communists under every
bush.

To them, co-ops were the seed that would grow into

something anti-American.

It is difficult to tell whether

these local co-op organizers were reacting to this national
wave of insecurity, but by the mid-Fifties, they were look
ing to become free of all constraints.

For the next three

decades they would do what was necessary (everything from
removing "REA" from the co-op buildings to generating their
own power) in order to achieve independence from the
federal government, from state regulations, and, most of
all, from the private utilities.

The enemy became anyone

who opposed them; and anyone who opposed them became the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

subverters of free enterprise, the ones who would end
competition, the ones who were un-American.
of independence became a crusade.

The pursuit

By the late Sixties,

it looked like the crusade would succeed, but within ten
years, it was apparent that it could not.

Their power

system, so they found, could not operate independently of
private power and keep prices reasonable.

It also became

apparent that consumers wanted their utilities (whether
they owned them or not) to be regulated by the state, and,
lastly, taking "REA" off the buildings did not automatically
make the co-ops independent of that group.

Washington was

still there, and is still very much a part of the system.
The quest for independence was definitely a failure,
but the program was not— by any means.

Rural Louisiana

has lights today because of the co-ops, because of those
men who first took the responsibility, and they will have
lights in the future because of the co-ops.

This work is divided into three parts.

The third part

deals with these statewide groups from their inception in
1950 until 1983.

The second part is a history of the

formation, growth, and development of each of the thirteen
co-ops in the state from their beginnings to 1983.

The

first part deals with the national program from the early
dreams of rural electrification, to the realization of
those dreams, to 1983.
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The Rural Electrification Administration was created
by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936.

There were attempts at

rural electrification prior to that date, but FDR's program,
as part of the New Deal, was the beginning of the modern
system.

The REA was put into operation by Morris L. Cooke,

and expanded by John Carmody and Harry Slattery through
1944.

The Fifties ushered in a conservative presidential

administration that opposed organizations such as co-ops,
and, consequently, funds were cut.
co-ops continued to grow.

But on the local level,

The Sixties brought with it

financial cooperation from Washington, and many co-ops
around the country found that there was enough money avail
able to begin generating their own power.
In Louisiana, the REA came not as a government organi
zation, but as a generous banker--a lender of low interest
money.

The co-ops began in Louisiana in late 1937 at Teche

Electric, and developed to a total of thirteen individual
groups through the late Forties.
During the War, the thirteen co-ops in the state organ
ized a statewide association, the purpose of which was to
lobby and to promote the idea of rural electrification
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In the early Fifties they founded a newspaper and threatened
to generate their own power in the face of excessive fuel
costs from the private power companies in the state.

In

1962, prices again rose and the state's co-op leaders,
through their statewide organization, began a serious move
to generate their own power.

After a hard-fought struggle,

a loan was finally approved in 1964.

But it was not until

four years later, after extensive compromise with the
private utilities, that the money was finally granted for
the construction of the first plant.

It was also at this

time that the group fought battles over right-of-way regu
lation and Public Service Commission regulation.
Between the completion of the first plant in 1972 and
today (1983) Cajun Electric has completed three other
plants, all coal.
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CHAPTER 1
VISIONARIES; GIFFORD PINCHOT TO MORRIS L. COOKE
Today, through the REA, nearly every rural American
who wants electricity can get it; nearly all the loans
granted to REA have been paid on time; and now generation
and transmission plants and a new loan system have made
the program nearly self-sufficient.

The result has been

a marked uplifting of rural life and important changes in
agriculture and in demography.

The Rural Electrification

Administration has helped give rural America a new look.
The founding and development of the program is often
referred to as a movement.
described.
leaders.

It could not be more aptly

Financial gain did not motivate the movement's
On every level of the program— federal, state

and local--men and women worked tirelessly, often without
pay, to make this program work, and work it did.

The story

of the movement is the story of its leaders.
Many of these leaders became involved because of a
personal incident that forced them to realize how badly
rural Americans needed electricity and what wretched treat
ment they were receiving from the private utility companies.
Reflecting on the early days of the REA, Clyde T. Ellis, a
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leader in the movement, states: "I am convinced the treat
ment which the power companies handed out to so many people
has been one of the prime reasons the rural electrification
program has had so many great leaders.

In a now famous

incident, Franklin D. Roosevelt experienced just such treat
ment.

Roosevelt traveled to Warm Springs, Georgia, in 1924,

to seek a miracle cure for his crippled legs.

The electric

bill for his "little cottage," as he called it, was eighteen
cents per kilowatt hour, "about four times what I pay at
Hyde Park."

He saw the incident as the beginning of REA:

"That started my long study of public utility charges for
electric current and the whole subject of getting electricity
into the farm home.

..."

So, it was, he continued, "that

a little cottage in Warm Springs, Georgia, was the birthplace
of the Rural Electrification.
FDR was the present-day movement's founding leader.

He

brought to realization the hopes and plans of a few dreamers.
Through his power and leadership a solvent social program
developed that uplifted the lives of millions during his
twelve years in office.
Rural America needed federal assistance for electricity,
but in the South there was a need for focused attention, as
FDR had recognized at Warm Springs in 1924.

By 1938, two

^ Clyde T. Ellis, A Giant Step (New York, Vintage Books,
1966), 29.
2

Ibid., 34.
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years after the REA was underway, he expressed his thoughts
on the economic situation in the South: "It is my conviction
that the South presents right now the number one economic
problem--the nation's problem, not just the South's.

For

we have economic imbalance in the nation as a whole due to
the very condition of the S o u t h . R u r a l electrification,
FDR hoped, would at least partially bridge the gap between
urban and rural dwellers, but also between what was quickly
becoming the urban North and the rural South.
FDR's affection for the South came from other than his
love for the area.
him wholeheartedly.

The South's political leaders supported
At the 1928 convention, a poll of

southern delegates revealed that every southern state, ex
cept Arkansas, had supported his nomination.

By 1932, he

had the support of every southern delegation except two
that had supported favorite sons.^

As an important factor

in FDR's victory, the South could look forward to assistance
from the new president--a New Deal.
It is difficult to imagine the conservative, plebian
South taking to its heart this Duchess County, New York
patrician, but it did.

Throughout the Twenties the South

"A Message to the Conference on Economic Conditions
of the South," The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.
Roosevelt (13 vols.. New York, Random House, 1941), VII, 42l.
^ George B. Tindall, The Emergence of the New South,
1913-1945 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press,

T9F7TT3ÏÏ7.
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had supported its favorite Democratic son, William Gibbs
MeAdoo, the heir-apparent to Wilsonianism.

In 1928, Texas,

Florida, and the border states, unable to accept A1 Smith,
the wet. New York Catholic, defected and voted for Herbert
Hoover.

But by 1932, FDR was able to stitch together the

wet-dry, urban-rural, North-South split that had plagued
the Democrats since the end of Wilson's presidency.

The

mending was easy; the Depression monster loomed larger
than those petty squabbles of the past decade.

The South

was at the end of its economic rope and easy pickings for
a political ally.

It would get behind FDR.

after his election he would boast: " . . .

Six years

let us rejoice

and take pride in the undoubted fact that in [the] past
six years the South has made greater economic and social
progress up the scale than any other period in her long
h i s t o r y . T h e REA had played a large part in this progress.
It was the South that was to benefit most from the REA
and other New Deal legislation.

It needed help desperately.

In fact, even before the 1929 crash, the section was so
economically destitute that the effects of the Depression
were barely visible.

Despair was only added to abjection.

The one-crop system and farm tenancy had already prostrated
the section.

And with no real tax base, local and state

assistance was either inadequate or non-existent.
In 1929, the average American made $703 per year.

But

^ pie Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D .
Roosevelt, VII, 100.
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in the South, the average was about half that--and this at
the end of the so-called boom decade of the T w e n t i e s I n
Louisiana at that time, the average income was a lean $415.^
But it was the rural income in the South that was the most
revealing.

The average southern farmer in 1929 made only

$183 a year.^

Difficult as it is to imagine, the situation

worsened as the Depression deepened.

In 1932, the farm

income fell to thirty-nine percent of the 1929 level.^
Louisiana average was a measly $239.^®

The

Certainly, despair

had been added to abjection.
There were, of course, reasons for the poverty.
1927, cotton had reached a high of twenty cents.

In

Five

years later, the price at New Orleans had plummeted to 5.6
cents, the lowest since 1894.^^

Louisiana's sugar prices

Paul Mertz, New Deal Policy and Southern Rural Poverty
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 3;
Charles F. Schwartz and Robert E. Graham, Jr., ed. Personal
Income by States Since 1929: A Supplement to the Survey of
Current Business (Washington, USGPO, 1956), 142-143; Calvin B.
Hoover and B. U. Ratchford, Economic Resources and Politics
of the South (New York, MacMillan, 1951), 50.

Mertz, New Deal Policy, 3. The per capita income
ranged from a low of $129 in South Carolina to $419 in
Florida.
Ibid., 3.
^ Hoover and Ratchford. Economic Resources, 53. In the
agricultural non-South, income fell to 33 percent of the
1929 level. Ibid., 3.

U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics of the
United States (Washington, USGPO, 1975), 5l7.
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dropped below three cents in 1930 from a post-war high of
$8.50 per t o n . T o b a c c o farmers suffered similar thrash
ings.^^

The combinations of bad weather, overproduction,

crop disease, and the general state of the national economy
sent prices to the rock bottom.
of.

Diversification was unheard

Southern farmers had put all their eggs in one basket,

and the bottom had fallen out.

There was nothing to fall

back on.
The most poverty-stricken groups in the South were the
agricultural workers : the tenant farmers, sharecroppers,
and farm laborers.

At the beginning of the Depression,

55.5 percent of southern farms were operated by tenants,
1.8 million of the 3.4 million farmers in the South— one out
of every four southerners.
Nearly half of all southern tenants were sharecroppers,
the lowest rung on the ladder.

They subsisted by farming

small plots of their landlord's property.

They were paid

at the end of the season with a portion of the crop they had
raised.

The landlord normally supplied the house and mule,

but often fertilizer and even some hand tools.

The landlord's

Joseph Stitterson, Sugar Country : The Cane Sugar
Industry in the South, 1753-1950 (Lexington, Kentucky7
University of Kentucky Press, 1953), 353.
Joseph C. Robert, The Story of Tobacco in ^ e r i c a
(Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1967),
207.
Emergence of the New South, 409.
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role was also to pay in advance for the projected crop,
which was, of course, deducted from the tenants' share.
The cropper's only contribution was his and his family's
labor.

The scheme had a wealth of disadvantages.

James

Agee, a unique observer of the sharecropper system in the
mid-Thirties, reported on its unreliability:
It can be enough to tide through the dead months
of the winter, sometimes even better : it can be
enough to spread very thin, to take through two
months, and a sickness, or six weeks, or a month:
it can be little enough to be completely meaning
less : it can be nothing: it can be enough less
than nothing to insure a tenant only an equally
hapless lack in the way of good luck, there is
never any reason to hope that that luck will be .c
repeated in the next year or the year after that.
If the cropper did not make enough to tide him over
he could look for an outside job--a scarce commodity in the
Depression years.

Failing that, he could draw on a line of

credit with the local merchants.

Indebtedness was the

cropper's way of life.
The southern farmer in the Thirties had very few con
veniences .

Most of his work was done by hand, with the aid

of only a few simple tools and a mule.
and the land was poor.

The work was hard

In some parts of the South the soil

is good, but most areas have poor to medium grade soils,
kept fertile and protected against erosion only through con
siderable effort.

The practice of growing row crops in a

James Agee, and Walker Evans, Let Us Now Praise
Famous Men (New York, Ballantine Books, 1976; first pub
lished, 1939), 107.
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rainy climate leaves the ground unrpotected in winter, and
most southern soil is sandy and leaches easily.

By the

Thirties, the result was that the top soil had been washed
away from millions of acres of southern farm land.

Compared

to the Midwest, the South had only one-third as much first
quality land.

By 1934, sixty-three percent of the land in

the South had lost twenty-five percent or more of its topsoil, compared to a loss in the Midwest of only forty-five
p e r c e n t . T h e whole area had suffered a tremendous amount
of erosion.

"I was utterly amazed and appalled at the red

gashed hillsides," wrote FDR's Secretary of Agriculture,
Henry Wallace.

"It was a situation that was almost unbe

lievable."^^
The one-crop economic system, farm tenancy, and poor
land provided a tax base that was not large enough to allow
state and local governments to give any real assistance to
the downtrodden southern farmer.

Worse, southern politicians

often steered their states into an economic policy of re
trenchment ; what little money that came in was sparingly
spent.

It was often an unstated policy that the poor were

not thought to be worthy of assistance: they were lazy, un
able to cope with the system, unable to lift themselves up.

Frank Freidel, FDR and the South (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana State University, 1965), B.
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Whatever the cause of the rural South's economic
debility, the region's hopes rested in electricity which
would bring new life, convenience and facility to rural
life in the South.

FDR recognized this in Warm Springs

in the mid-Twenties.

But the idea for a government agency

to advance rural electrification was first conceived near
the turn of the century.

Visionaries such as Gifford

Pinchot had then concluded that there was a direct connec
tion between electricity and prosperity.
contemplated electric cooperatives.

establish them were won, some were lost.
some did not.

A few had even

Some early fights to
Some succeeded,

But all attempts laid a foundation that the

REA was able to build upon--and upon that foundation a firm
institution was built.
Rural electrification had its beginnings in the North
west, not the South.

In 1909, Puget Sound Power and Light

Company began to distribute power to a few rural residents
near Seattle.

Five years later, near Granite Falls, Minne

sota, the nation's first rural electric co-op was formed.
In 1919, eight co-ops were set up around Webster, Iowa,

tion (Washington, USGPO, 1944), 131 Some rural electrification did exist prior to 1909, but it was mostly confined to
irrigation and not residential or farm areas. Mark Cordell
Stauter, "The Rural Electrification Administration, 19351945, A New Deal Case Study" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Duke University, 1973), 4; Jerry Voorhis, American Coopera
tives (New York, 1961), 55.
Harry Slattery, America Lights Up (Washington,
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10
It was not a heralded beginning, but it was a beginning.
The rest of the western world outside the U.S. had,
by the mid-Twenties, made a more positive step toward
providing electricity to rural areas.

Rural Sweden was

fifty percent electrified; France, seventy-one percent ;
Finland, forty percent; Denmark, fifty percent ; and in
Czechoslovakia, seventy percent of the farms had received
electricity.^^

The European countries obviously felt more

of a social responsibility to extend electricity to their
rural areas than America did at that time.

By as late as

1935, when REA was just getting under way, only one in ten
rural Americans had electricity and most of those lived on
the urban fringe.

The 1920 census listed six and one half

million farms in America.

Only 552,620 had electric lights.

Only 643,899 had running water.
If the market was there, why was rural America denied
electricity?

Why could not, or would not, the private

utilities run lines to America's farms?

Private power

companies often received the brunt of criticism in this

National Home Library Foundation, 1940), 7 ; Ellis, Giant
Step, 33.
D. Clayton Brown, Electricity for Rural America:
The Fight for the REA (Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood
Press, 1980), 16.
The census reported 6,448,343 farms in 1920. De
partment of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Fourteenth Census
of the United States: 1920. Farm Population of the United
States (Washington, D.C.,USGPO, 1926), 183; ibid.. Agri
culture (Washington, USGPO, 1922), V, 512.
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period for not providing electricity to rural areas.

Their

inability to do so was usually attributed to greed and
social irresponsibility.

Of course, their costs were high,

from $2,000 to $5,000 per mile.^^

But it was the desire

for big profits that kept the private companies in the
cities and out of the rural market.
The free market simply could not accomplish rural
electrification.

The profits did not exist for the compa

nies, and until there were profits they would have no in
centive to supply power to the countryside.

Farmers used

only small amounts of power for the first years of service,
making for low revenue to offset a large capital investment.
A comparable investment in urban lines would bring five
times the profit,

^fter the first few years of service,

farmers would usually buy enough appliances and use enough
electricity to make the investment worthwhile, but the
elapsed time did not produce a quick return.

In the

Depression South, where even less electricity was used.

It is difficult to show that the private companies
thought that costs were this high. Clyde Ellis cites the
above figures. Ellis, Giant Step, 33. See, also, Deward
Clayton Brown, "Rural Electrification in the South, 19201955" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 1971), 95;
Marquis Childs, The Farmer Takes a Hand (Garden City, New
York, Doubleday, 1953), 49-50. For another opinion on the
social responsibility of the private companies, and their
various attempts at rural electrification see Edward Venard,
The Deviation of REA (Washington, n.p., n.d.), passim.
This work is published by the Edison Electric Institute,
a lobby group for private utility companies.
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The private companies did make some early efforts,
even if the motive never went beyond immediate profits.
That farmers were traditionally conservative consumers of
electricity kept them from getting power from the private
companies.

The Depression kept farmers from buying the

appliances that would use enough power to make it worth
while for the private companies to service their area.
Farmers, the companies felt, would use little power because
of high rates, and, of course, they had high rates because
they used little power.

To make service profitable in the

average rural area of between two and five houses per mile,
the companies demanded about $2,000 per mile.

They usually

demanded, in addition, between $500 and $1,000 per farmer
as a deposit, and charged between nine and ten cents per
kilowatt hour.
cents.But

In the city the price was as low as four
to most farmers, even the option of electric

ity was not there; the private companies were just not
interested in the rural American market.
There was one exception.

In 1922 the National Electric

tration in Perspective," Agricultural History XXIV (April,
1950), 77. Person was the consulting economist to the REA
in the Fifties. See, also, Brown, Electricity for Rural
America, 4.
For another opinion, see Venard, Deviation of REA,
pass
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Light Association,^^ together with the American Farm Bureau
Federation, the National Grange, and other groups represent
ing rural America, met in Chicago to look at the possibili
ties of rural electrification.

The meeting was led by

Grover C. Neff, the President of Wisconsin Power and Light,
an early leader in rural electrification in that part of
the country.

The meeting created the Committee on the

Relation of Electricity to Agriculture which was officially
established in September, 1923.

By the mid-Thirties, CREA

committees had been established in twenty-seven states.
CREA had little success in bringing electricity to
rural America; it could not solve the problem of high ex
pense.

It was still impossible for the farmer to pay for

construction of lines, and that was CREA's only solution
to the problem of rural electrification.

As always, the

private companies assumed no public responsibility.

Either

the extension of electricity to rural areas would be profit
able, or there would be none.

It had become increasingly

evident that rural electrification would not occur if left
in the hands of private utilities.

By 1930, only 9.5

percent of America's farms had received central station

The National Electric Light Association became
Edison Electric Institute in 1933.
Slattery, America Lights U p , 15-17; Venard,
Deviation of REA, 9.
Electrical World stated in 1935 that 10.4% of
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and the National Grange withdrew from the organization in
1934.

A year later, the Departments of Agriculture, Com

merce, and Interior also withdrew.

In 1939, in the face

of REA's humiliating success at achieving CREA's objectives,
CREA accepted failure and disbanded without a whimper.
The path of rural electrification divided in the
Twenties.

One path led to what proved to be the dead end

of private power and CREA.

The other, moving" slowly at

first, led ultimately to REA and to the success of rural
electrification.

America followed that path led by men

who saw the need for electricity in the rural areas, who
saw it as the responsibility of the federal government to
aid in the fulfillment of that need: men such as Gifford
Pinchot, Morris L. Cooke, and George Norris.

But the real

credit goes to the men who made the visionaries' ideas
work, the men who set up the co-ops on the local level,
found the subscribers, and ran the lines.

They all chose

the second path, and they all made REA a success.
The first great leader of the rural electrification
movement was Gifford Pinchot.

From him all else grew.

As

America's farms were electrified in 1930. Electrical World
105 (January 5 , 1 9 3 5 ), 45.
The census reported 13.47o for
the same year. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census,
Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930. Agriculture
(Washington, USGPO, 1932) , 5 6 . D. Clayton B r o ^ cites 9.5%
for rural customers receiving central station service as
opposed to other systems such as home generation. Brown,
Electricity for Rural America, 10.
Slattery, America Lights U p , 21.
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Morris Llewyln Cooke, the first REA administrator, put it,
"the shadow of the Great Forester was looming o'er the
l a n d . H e

meant, of course, that Pinchot was about to

marshal his strength behind rural electrification.
Pinchot served as governor of Pennsylvania from 1923
to 1927, and again from 1931 to 1935.

In his first year

as governor he appointed the young Morris L. Cooke to head
his Giant Power Survey.

The Survey looked at the feasibility

of rural electrification and set up guidelines for its ad
ministration.

The plan was to cancel private company char-

ers in unserved areas and set up local co-ops there.

The

co-ops could borrow money, finance construction, and dis
tribute electricity.

The Giant Power Board was to have

authority over all electrical power in Pennsylvania, not
unlike public service commissions today.

But the proposal,

plagued by the politically conservative Twenties, was de
feated in the Pennsylvania legislature.

Despite its defeat,

the plan received widespread attention and became the basis
for the REA a few years later.
Probably the most important outcome of the survey was
that rural power was shown to be financially feasible;

Morris Llewellyn Cooke, "The Early Days of the Rural
Electrification Idea," American Political Science Review
XIII (June. 1948), 438.
M. L. Cooke and Judson C. Dickerson, Report of the
Giant Power Survey Board to the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,
Telegraph Printing Co., 1925), passim.
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farmers were greater potential users of electricity than
city dwellers, and as long as there were at least three
farms per mile, rural service could be self-supporting.^^
The Giant Power Survey was published in 1925 as a
proposal to the people of Pennsylvania and their legisla
tors.

Cooke compiled it and Pinchot wrote the introduction.

Several of Pinchot's comments looked to the future: rural
electrification was to bring "cheaper and better electric
service to all those who have it now, and to bring good
and cheap electric service to those who are still without
it.

It is a plan by which most of the drudgery of human

life can be taken from the shoulders of men and women who
toil, and replaced by the power of electricity."^^

He

added a prediction: "I venture to say that if the United
States ever turn to the nation-wide public ownership of
electric utilities, it will be because the companies have
driven them to it."^^
From Pinchot, the lineage leads directly to the New
Deal.

In 1931, FDR, as governor of New York, set up the

Power Authority of the State of New York.
chief assistant, Morris L. Cooke.

He chose as his

The story of Morris L.

Cooke is the story of the early years of REA.

Cooke began

his distinguished career in 1911 as Philadelphia's Director
of Public Works.

From that position he defeated the

Philadelphia Electric Company in 1915 in a rate battle

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and won.
down.

The victory forced Philadelphia's utility bills

But more importantly, the victory established the

precedent of public control over private monopolies.
After FDR's innaugurat ion in 1933, Cooke headed the
Mississippi Valley Committee, George Norris's plan for a
Mississippi Valley Authority similar to the Tennessee Valley
Authority.

He also worked as a consultant for the Public

Works Administration,

This position put Cooke close to

FDR for whom he acted as the President's advisor on power
matters.
Cooke suggested to Harold Ickes, head of the PWA,
that a commission be set up to study the problem of rural
electrification.

Cooke wanted to work with the private

utilities, lending them money to serve the rural areas.
The government would then act as a giant regulatory agency,
keeping the utilities in line.

Cooke's "old progressive"

ideology was showing through here.

A Republican weaned on

the liberal progrèssivism of the Republican Roosevelt, his
aim was a private-public coalition.

Harold Ickes, a "new

Progressive," would have nothing to do with such a plan.
He promptly told Cooke to put aside his idealism.

"I

honestly thought we could work out something with the
private people," Cooke later told his biographer, "but

Kenneth Trombley, The Life and Times of a Happy
Liberal, Morris Llewellyn Cooke (New York, Harper and
Brothers, 1954), 43-44.
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[Ickes] said it was a waste of time."

Cooke, though,

could compromise to achieve his goal.

When he asked Ickes

if he might consider a plan for rural electrification ex
cluding the private utilities, Ickes responded: "Shoot.
The Executive Order creating the REA was issued by
the President on May 3, 1935.^^

That same day Cooke wrote

to Roosevelt: "This is to advise you that the rural elec
trification unit is a going concern."
time.

Cooke wasted no

The REA was officially in existence on May 11, eight

days later.

FDR commented at a press conference that Cooke

had things going even before the Executive Order was signed.^®
The President was delighted with the plan and looked to
the future with hope : "We are going to see, I believe,
with our own eyes, electricity and power made so cheap that
they will become a standard article of use, not only for
agriculture and manufacturing, but also for every home
within reach of an electric line.
Cooke told reporters that there were four ways to
distribute the $100 million he had at his disposal: 1) aid
private utilities, 2) depend on municipal power groups,
3) assist co-ops, and, as a last resort, 4) build and

38
39

Ibid., 144-145.
Executive Order 7037.

Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin
D . Roosevelt (12 volumes, New York, DaCapo Press, 1972), V,

imr.

Ellis, Giant Step, 38.
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operate plants and lines.

Although he had succeeded in

selling Ickes on the program by promising that the private
companies would be left out of the deal, he still groped
for the "old progressive" coalition of public and private
interests.

On May 19, he told the New York Times : " . . .

the program is intended to . . . aid the farmers and the
utilities.

. . . [no] greater opportunity has ever been

presented to private industry in recent y e a r s . B u t

the

private companies, the only potential borrowers, would not
be interested.
On May 20, 1935, the executives from the largest com
mercial utilities met with Cooke in Washington to survey
the new situation.

The companies reported to Cooke in a

fourteen-page letter whose tone would set the stage for
years to come.

The report stated that "there are few farms

requiring electricity for major farm operations that are
not now served," and that "additional rural customers must
largely be those who use electricity for household purposes."
But the companies would cooperate only under the right con
ditions : Cooke was to hand over his $100 million to which
they would add $13.5 million.

With this money, the companies

would agree to connect 351 consumers.

The federal government

would then lend $125 million to these new customers for

New York Times, May 14, 1935.
Ibid., May 19, 1935.
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wiring and appliances.

An REA official's later comment

on this letter was certainly a mammoth understatement:
It was "not met by enthusiastic response on the part of

REA."^^
In November, 1935, in Kansas City, Cooke looked to
the second option: he met with 152 representatives from
municipally owned companies.

The result was not much bet

ter than the outcome of the Washington meeting.

The

municipals had no concern for the farmer and feared higher
rates in the cities if they connected the rural areas.
Most were less interested than the private companies.
Cooke felt he had only one viable option left.

By December,

he had decided on the co-op system.
The private utilities were not without their reasons
for snubbing Cooke and the REA.
new and uncharted.

They saw the concept as

Also, they expected the New Deal to

be overthrown quickly and they wanted to avoid boarding a
dinking ship.

Furthermore, the utilities expected soon to

fight the federal program in the courts— where its in
evitable demise would probably come.

They could hardly be

1935; Rural Electrification News 1 (September, 1935), 18.
Person, "REA in Perspective," 74.
Cooke, "Early Days," 446; Trombley. Dife and Tiiaes,
149; Brown, Electricity for Rural America, 5Y
Trombley, Life and Times, 147; Childs
a Hand, 57; Slattery, America Lights U p , 109.
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recipients of the program's money while trying to make a
case that it was unconstitutional.

Besides, if the whole

New Deal program did not fail, they thought, certainly REA
would, and any construction that it completed would be
taken over by the private companies.

Twenty years later

they would still be hoping to take over the nation's co-op
system.
But it was the issue of area coverage that really
turned the private companies away.

Area coverage means

simply that all who want electricity in a given area should
have it.

Not only were the profit-making consumers to be

served, but also poor farmers— the tenants and sharecroppers
of the South who stood to gain the most from electricity,
the ones least capable of paying.

But while area coverage

was the nemesis of the private companies, it was the obses
sion of Morris Cooke : ". . . i n the past the electric in
dustry has skimmed the cream and left the milk.
must take the milk with the cream.

. .

Today it

He would stand

by his word.
By December, 1935, Cooke had given up all the options
except co-ops.

The die had been cast by default.

In REA's

first annual report he stated that it has become "apparent
that the industry was not going to use even a substantial
portion of the funds available for rural electrification.
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and farm organizations of a cooperative nature [have]
forged to the front as the principal borrowers under the
REA p r o g r a m . R E A began setting up co-ops and supporting
those already operating.

One reason Cooke shrank from

co-ops at first was that he felt they would be difficult
and slow to form.

But the co-op way was familiar to farmers,

and they wanted electricity.
slowly began to organize.

Under REA's direction, co-ops

But despite REA's direction and

the huge demand, the program lagged behind other New Deal
programs.

Norris, FDR, and Ickes were dissatisfied with

the progress of REA by the end of 1935, and pushed Cooke
for a more aggressive a t t i t u d e . C o o k e ,

in a radio speech,

expressed his anxiety at the program's lack of an explosive
New Deal-like character: "Farmers have not seen the way
clear to overcome the obstacle presented by the necessity
of an organization for financing, promoting, construction,
and operation.

One doesn't go into a retail store and buy

a package of electricity.

. .

Changing legislation

into electricity, it turned out, was not an easy matter.
By October, 1935, Cooke wanted REA to be made a per
manent agency.

Norris agreed, and in January, 1936, he

introduced a bill in the Senate to achieve that end.

Sam

50 Rural Electrification Administration, First Annual
Report (Washington, USGPO, 1936), 5.
51 Person, "REA in Perspective," 74.
Ibid., 76.
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Rayburn of Texas sponsored the bill in the House; it thus
became the Norris-Rayburn Bill.

In April, Rayburn silently

slipped the bill through the House on a voice vote, but in
the Senate there was pandemonium.

Norris would not accept

a House amendment to end REA money to private companies.
"The big power systems," he said, "which have been holding
up rural electrification ever since they had a grip on the
country are in no position now to come to the government
of the United States and ask it to loan them money.
The discussion became deadlocked, and Norris walked out.
John Rankin of Mississippi, Norris's chief ally and one
of the most important supporters of REA, finally coaxed
him back.

A compromise was reached.

Loans would be made

to power companies, but co-ops would receive preference.
The bill established REA as a permanent agency.

Loans

would be repaid over twenty-five years, with interest rates
set to the federal government's long-term securities.
Norris wanted a one-billion-dollar appropriation over a
ten-year period, but he had to settle for less than half
that.

A provision was included to channel the money into

the less electrified areas of the country, particularly the
South.

FDR signed the bill on May 20, 1936.

Cooke was

Congressional Record, 74th Congress, 2d session
(February 26, 1936), 2826.
Ibid., 5273-5318; See also, George ¥. Norris, Fighting Liberal; The Autobiography of George W. Norris (New
York, Macmillan, H1945), !H-32T:
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named to head the "new" REA, and the bill went into effect
on July 1, 1 9 3 6 The REA was here to stay.
The story of the early years of the REA is therefore
the story of Morris Cooke.

He bridged the gap of rural

electrification from the dreams of Gifford Pinchot to the
reality of a permanent institution.

But Cooke was an in

novator, an idea-man, not an administrator— and he knew it.
After he had done his job of setting up the program he
felt it was time to bow out.

He twice tried to resign in

1936, but FDR would not accept his resignation.
in 1937, he simply quit.

Finally,

"The thing has become routine,"

he told a friend, "and you know how I feel about that.
feel the challenge is gone.
of papers.

. .

achievement.

I

Now it will be so much shuffling

Cooke saw the REA as his greatest

He can rightly be called the father of rural

electrification.

Congressional Record, 74th Congress, 2d session
CMay 21, 1936), 7675; New York Times, May 22, 1936.
Trombley, Life and Times, 173.
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CHAPTER 2
DOERS; THE REA UNDER CARMODY AND SLATTERY
From 1937 to 1944 nearly one and a quarter million
Americans received electric service from REA co-ops.^
During the terms of John Carmody and Harry Slattery, the
REA administrators during these years, American farmers
finally achieved rural electrification.

The farmers

organized, loans were granted, lines were run, and kero
sene lanterns were put away as the lights came on.

The

private companies rallied in opposition, putting up some
of their biggest fights.

World War II nearly halted REA

growth, but the post-war years would see a boom that would
make up for lost time.

These were the flowering days of

REA, and there was a brightness in the rural American sky.
When REA began in 1935, the new office was flooded
with requests from rural Americans : "How can I get elec
tricity?"

Many organized and applied for loans even before

procedures for doing so were established.
organizing varied from place to place.

The method of

Usually co-ops had

Electrification Administration, Annual Statistical Report,
1950 (Washington, USGPO, 1951), viii.
In 1937, the number
of consumers connected was 255,961. By 1944, 1,484,417
had been connected.
25
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their beginnings where farmers met: churches, courthouses,
meeting halls.

A few local leaders would start the ball

rolling with the assistance of a county agent.

Although

these local leaders were usually farmers, it was not un
common for local businessmen to be a part of the Initial
effort.

They were often the same men who served on the

local farm bureau, or the soil conservation committee, or
the school board— they were the community's most active
members, the accepted leaders.

These men (they usually

became the board of directors once the cooperative was set
up) went from house to house signing up members--getting
pledges of interest and collecting membership fees.
became the real heroes of the co-op movement.

They

They did the

hard work, and asked nothing in return.
The membership fee was usually $5.00.

In the South,

the fee came hard to tenant farmers and was often paid by
the local leaders to boost membership and make organization
possible.

Near New B-oads, Louisiana, one organizer found

that only one of twenty-five families in his area was able
to afford the fee.^

Either the fee was paid for them, or

they were allowed to pay when they could.

Only three

customers per mile at $1.00 per month had to be guaranteed
to make the program work.

It cost, then, $10.00 to wire

the house, which could be paid with an initial $1.00 down

Interview with A. A. Robinson, New Roads, Louisiana,
September 11, 1980.
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payment.

This gave a family two or three bulbs.

down payments could be made for appliances.

Other

For some there

was the "Arkansas Plan": twenty cents down and ten cents
per month to eventually pay off the membership fee.

And

all of this could be paid "in kind" by working on the
co-op crews.^
Once the corporation was set up, enough members signed
on, and a source of electricity found, an application was
made to REA in Washington.
was not always easy.

But getting the plan accepted

It had to show promise of success.

Harry Slattery, the REA administrator from 1937 to 1944,
wrote that the plan "must be approved by our engineers.
It is not a matter for novices.

But once the application

was accepted and the loan made, work could begin.

And

again, it was the board of directors--the local leaders—
who organized, supervised, and often participated in,
construction of the lines.
In Washington, the connection was usually the Congres
sional Representative, or even the Senator.

He might help

or he might not, depending on his sympathies toward the
program.

But in the Thirties assistance was usually forth

coming ; the New Deal bandwagon was in high gear, and

South, 1920-1955" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA,
1971), 175.
^ Harry Slattery, Rural ^ e r i c a Lights Up (Washington,
National Home Library Foundation, 1940)7 58.
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assistance to a local co-op allowed a Congressman to receive
a good deal of credit (and votes) for bringing the miracle
of electricity home to the farmers,
the people; it made him electable.

It made him a man of
This factor may have

done as much to boost rural electrification as anything

If an area could not generate enough interest, REA
might send in what was called the "REA circus," a demonstra
tion caravan complete with big top.

On display was every

manner of electrical equipment that could aid the farmer's
tasks: grinders, hoists, pumps, heaters, refrigerators.
But the emphasis was usually on home appliances.

The display

was invariably a regional hit— and a successful sales pitch
for the program.
"I just turned on the light and kept looking at Paw.
It was the first time I'd ever really seen him after dark.
It is hard for those of us who have never lived without
electricity to understand what it was like to turn on lights
for the first time.

"I'll never forget that day," one farmer

recalls of his youth, "it was late on a November afternoon
just before dark.

All we had was wires hanging down from

the ceiling in every room, with bare bulbs on the end.

Dad

turned on the one in the kitchen first, and he just stood
there holding onto the pull-chain.

He said to me, 'Carl,

^ Clyde T. Ellis, A Giant Step (New York, Vintage Books,
1966), 59.
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29
come here and hang onto this so I can turn on the light
in the parlor.'

I knew he didn't have to do that and I

told him to stop holding it, that it would stay on.
finally let go, and then looked kind of foolish."^

He
Flip

ping the switch in a newly serviced area for the first
time excited local leaders and REA officials.

They would

often drive out to the area about to be energized just to
witness the excitement of the event.

The night's fascina

tion and thrill were occasionally followed the next day by
a symbolic funeral for the kerosene lamp.^
After lights, most farms acquired an iron, then a
radio.

It is difficult to measure what percent of energy

was used for what function, but one author estimates that
as much as ninety percent was at first used for household
chores.^

This was particularly true in the South, where

planting, cultivating, and picking cotton depended only on
tractors (or more commonly, mules) and hand labor.

Ginning,

the only process using electricity, was usually done at a
community gin.
tion needed.

There was no grinding, threshing, or refrigera
The most popular household convenience was in

door plumbing, but it was expensive and often had to wait

Ibid., 58-59.
^ Interview with E. E. Taylor, Farriday, Louisiana,
December 14, 1981.
^ D. Clayton Brown, Electricity for Rural America;
The Fight for the REA (Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press),
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for better times.

Many farmers were able to install plumb

ing with an individual REA loan.
Lights did more than let rural Americans see better
at night.

It protected their eyes, promoted cleanliness,

prevented accidents, and had various psychological benefits.
One REA official in Louisiana recalls that the first thing
recipients did after receiving electricity was to paint
the inside walls of their house--usually white.^
also saved time.

Electricity

The TVA estimated that two to four working

hours were added to the farmer's day.

Inside the house, the

time spent washing and ironing, a two-day job without elec
tricity, was cut by as much as seven hours.

In one recipient's

calculations, the time spent on maintaining kerosene lamps
and other lighting equipment alone totalled two days per

year.^®
Refrigeration ended the need for gardens, smokehouses,
and cold storage, while it improved the farmer's diet.

The

southern diet was heavy on salted fatback, cornmeal, and
molasses, products that required no refrigeration.

The re

sult was often pellagra, a chronic disease caused by a niacin
deficiency and characterized by skin eruptions.

This disease,

along with hookworm and malaria, accounted in part for the
reputation of southerners as shiftless, lazy people.

But

1980.

10 Brown, "Rural Electrification in the South," 2.
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with refrigeration, farmers could keep a variety of foods
on hand.

Refrigeration also lessened the chance of food

poisoning and staphylococcus,
Of all the conveniences made possible by electricity,
radio opened the most doors.

The farmer could reach out

and touch the rest of the world.

He could listen to Edward

R. Morrow from London, FDR from Washington, the commodity
prices from Chicago, or the weather report from the local
station.

Through the miracle of radio, he was privileged

to have the same information as other Americans,

And if

he wished he could tune in to Major Bowes, Fibber McGee
and Molly, or listen to the "songbird of the South," Kate
Smith, every Thursday night at eight— "Hello everybody,"
Through the radio, the American farmer was becoming a part
of mainstream American life, where he belonged, and where
he remained,^^
The outhouse was a plague on rural life.

When elec

tricity came, the bathroom moved inside, and health condi
tions in the rural areas improved markedly.

This was

particularly true in the South where outdoor toilets were
the cause of many health problems.

Frequently the water

supply would become contaminated, causing typhoid, dysentary.

Rupert B. Vance, Human Geography of the South: A
Study in Regional Resources and Cultural Adequacy (Chapel
Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1932), 437-438,
Brown, Electricity for Rural America, 118.
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and various other gastrointestinal disorders.

Hookworm,

a parasite causing anemia and loss of energy, inhabited
the damp sandy soils of the South, but it most often in
fested the vicinity of outdoor toilets.

Writes one observer

of this illness, "Their skin is yellow, wrinkled and waxy;
their hair, dry and lustreless ; their eyes without color
or sparkle; their expression, dull, stupid, and intensely
melancholy.

In the South the disease became known as

the "big lazy," or simply "the lazy sickness," and was,
with pellagra, generally responsible for creating the
stereotype of southern shiftlessness.

In 1924, the Inter

national Health Board reported that hookworm infection was
most severe in rural white school children of the southern
s t a t e s . T h e r e were attempts to halt hookworm, such as
placing outdoor toilets on concrete slabs, but it was rural
electrification, making indoor plumbing possible, that
finally curbed the debilitating infection.
Once the farmers began using their newly acquired elec
tricity, private companies began to see more profit in rural
electrification than they had first thought possible.

They

were still not willing to accept area coverage, nor were
they willing to bring prices down, but they wanted the new

Vance, Human Geography of the South, 381.

Ibid., 389.
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lucrative rural market, and they would fight for it, fight
to keep REA out.
The private companies complained that the low rate of
interest that REA received was an unfair advantage.

REA

borrowed its money from the federal government at about
three percent interest.

The going rate in the open market

in the mid-Thirties, the amount the companies had to pay
for their money, was about four p e r c e n t . W h e n REA was
established. Congress' justification for lending money below
the prime rate was that several handicaps were intrinsic
to bringing electricity to rural areas.

There was low con

sumer density, the customers were usually of low income and
would not use much power, rural lines were more expensive
to build than urban lines, and there were few large loads.
The subsidization was intended to offset these disadvantages.
The private companies screamed of unfair competition, and
they screamed loudly through their lobby groups.
The first strong stand made by the private companies
was against the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.

Between 1936 and 1940, REA paid an average interest
rate of 2.81 percent. The private companies paid an average
of 3.68 percent, a difference of .872 percent. National
Rural Electric Cooperative Association, Rural Electric Pact
Book (Washington, n.p., 1965), 99.
YEAR

REA INTEREST

UTILITY INTEREST

1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

3.00
2.77
2.88
2.73
2.69

3.88
3.93
3.87
3.48
3.25
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The Wheeler-Rayburn Bill, as the act was most commonly
known, was aimed at regulating the utilities by breaking
up profit-draining holding companies.

The bill passed

despite strong lobbying attempts by the private companies,
and was declared a victory by the trust-busting progressives
in the administration.

The defeat stung so badly that the

utilities temporarily abandoned the Congressional fight.
The battle in Congress seemed over, a decisive defeat for
the utilities, but they were not finished yet.

The battle

ground simply moved to the countryside.
As co-ops began to form, the movement became more and
more of a threat to the private companies.

REA officials

reported such unscrupulous activities as "spite lines"—
the practice of running electrical line into an area simply
to gain possession of it so that the co-ops could not build
there.

Often lists of the most lucrative rural areas were

covertly passed to the private companies so that they could
move into these areas ahead of the co-ops.

Spite lines were

often constructed out from urban areas in a pinwheel pattern
along main roads in the lucrative outlying areas, leaving
to the co-ops the poor isolated houses between the spokes.
The result was that co-op formation was difficult or impos
sible.

In some areas raging battles occurred where co-op

workers and company construction crews literally raced into

William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Robsevelt and
the New Deal, 1932-1940.
(New York, Harper and Row, 1963)
156-157.----
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areas.

Other company tactics included sending men into

rural areas to spread false rumors about the co-ops.

Com

mon stories were that their electricity would not be as
"hot" as the electricity the company could provide or that
if the co-op failed the farmers would be held financially
liable, and that if the Republicans won in 1936, power
would be cut o f f I t

was also not uncommon for the

companies to refuse to sell electricity to the co-ops who
were at that time totally dependent on outside sources of
power.

Often the prices charged by the companies were

prohibitive--well above what the co-ops were capable of
paying.

Much of this activity, writes one past REA leader,

caused the resentment and hard feelings that exist between
the two groups even today.
This sort of activity became worse as the REA program
began to grow and threaten the potential expansion of the
companies.

But not all private company expansion into

rural areas was spite lines. When it became apparent that
there were profits in rural electrification, many companies
entered the rural market in a significant way.

With co-op

competition spurring them on, they electrified a sizeable
portion of rural America.

tration in Perspective," Agficultural History XXIV (April,
1950), 78; Brown, "Rural Electrification in the South," 179.
Ellis, Giant Step, 45.
Edwin Vennard, The Deviation of REA (Washington,
n . p ., n.d.), 14-15.
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If FDR was the REA's creator and preserver, and Cooke
was the movement's father, then John Carmody was its motivat
ing force— he was the man who made things happen.

Never

under Carmody's administration would there be difficulty in
spending Congressional appropriations.
to the farmers.

He got the money

He turned the money into electricity.

Carmody's beginning in rural electrification was as
Cooke's right-hand man.

When he took that position, Cooke

told him that he would be the next administrator.

So, it

was no surprise when FDR nominated him to the post in
February, 1937.^^

His administration lasted only two and

one half years, but his impact was great.
short, Carmody was long.
Cooke could not.
idea man.

Where Cooke was

Carmody could deal with politicians,

He was an administrator ; Cooke was an

Carmody was a Democrat ; Cooke was a Republican.

But their objectives were the same : to electrify rural
America.
Clyde T. Ellis, an important figure in the rural elec
trification movement, liked Carmody.

He saw him as "one of

the most brilliant men and one of the toughest administra
tors I ever k n e w . B u t

Harold Ickes and Hugh Johnson

did not like him, and they made no secret of it.

Ickes

felt that the REA should have been under his direct control
as administrator of the Public Works Administration.

When

New York Times, February 16, 1937.
Ellis, A Giant Step, 54.
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Carmody was appointed, thereby taking the REA out of Ickes'
reach, Ickes felt that the reason was that the REA under
Cooke had not spent enough money, and that under him it
would spend
appointment:

even less.

Ickes wrote FDR just after Carmody's

"Ifthe agency which spends its appropriation

the fastest is the one that is considered the most success
ful, then I admit that PWA is not in the running with some
others.

But quick spending of Federal funds has never been

our g o a l . B u t

FDR knew that the only way rural America

would get electricity was to distribute the money to the
farmers as quickly as possible, and Ickes' past record was
one of moderation.

Johnson, head of the National Recovery

Administration, agreed with Ickes.

He saw Carmody as a

stuffed shirt, "a fat toad sitting on the wet end of a
log. . . .

But there is no evidence that this dislike

for Carmody

ever adversely affected his work with the REA,

or that FDR ever lost confidence in him because of it.
The statistics of Carmody's brief administration are
impressive.

By the time he left in 1939, 417 co-ops had

been formed, and twenty-five percent of all farms had service.
In 1938 alone, 168,000 farms received electricity.^^

Under

Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes,
Vol. II, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 Ç3 vols.. New York,
Simon and Schuster, 1954)7 665.

Rural Electrification Administration, 1939 Annual
Report (Washington, USGPO, 1940), 3; Slattery, America Lights
UR, 76.
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Carmody, innovations made construction easier and cheaper.
Longer spans between poles were used, with the line mounted
on the poles, one above the other, instead of on cross-arms.
Hardware was standardized, and purchased in great quantities
at the lowest possible price.

The price of construction

came down as a result— by one estimate, from $2,500 to $941
per mile.^^
Under Carmody, FDR placed the REA in the Department of
Agriculture,

"I know, it bothers me too," FDR told Ellis,

"but there's so much trouble in the world now and there are
so many demands on me that I just can't have all these in
dependent agencies reporting to me.

I have to have some

relief from these administrative matters.

As long as I am

President, you need have no w o r r y . B u t Ellis did worry,
and rightly so.

The reorganization was ambiguous and would

cause conflict later.

Carmody's reaction to the reorgani

zation was decisive and swift.

He would have none of it.

He quit in June.
Carmody later reflected on the condition of things when
he came to EŒA: "It was almost dead when I went there.

The

few projects were small and c r e e p i n g . H e took hold of
a program that had been born of idealism and turned it into

Person, "REA in Perspective," 77-78; Brown, Elec
tricity for Rural America, 69; Ellis, Giant Step, 57.
Ellis, Giant Step, 63.
Brown, Electricity for Rural America, 68.
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a realistic one that brought light, instead of dreams, to
rural Americans.
Carmody remained in FDR’s favor.

He was appointed to

head the Federal Works Administration just seven days after
his resignation.
Commission.

Unitl 1946, he served on the Maritime

He died in 1963 after a distinguished career.

Within two months of Carmody's resignation, Harry
Slattery was named to head the REA.

There was not much

excitement surrounding his appointment.

Like Cooke,

Slattery's political initiation had been at the feet of
Gifford Pinchot.

As Pinchot's personal secretary, he be

came deeply involved in the early conflicts with the power
companies.

He was a part of the Ballinger-Pinchot Affair

in 1911 which contributed to the Taft-Roosevelt split.

He

was best known for his uncovering of the Teapot Dome oillease scandals.

In 1932, with the rise of FDR, he came to

Washington as Ickes’ personal assistant, later to become
Undersecretary of the Interior.

At first, he refused the

REA post, evidently seeing it as a step down, but FDR per
sisted and Slattery finally accepted.

He took office in

September, 1939.^*^

Maxine Block, ed., Current Biography: Who's Who and
Why CNew York, W. H. Wilson and Company, 1940), 141-142;
t^o Was Who in America with World Notables IV, 1961-1968
(Chicago, A. N. Marquis Co., 1968).
30
Who Was Who in America II (Chicago, A. N. Marquis
Co., 196ÏÏT7
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Slattery's administration was stormy.
flict from within and without.

There was con

He proved to be a poor

administrator; some have even questioned his sanity.

He

left in disgrace, but the REA under his direction grew
rapidly.
FDR's reorganization of the Department of Agriculture
did not specify whether or not the REA administrator was
subordinate to the Secretary of Agriculture.

This was

not an immediate problem when Slattery came in.
Wallace got along well.

He and

But when Wallace left to be FDR's

third-term Vice-President, Claude Wickard took the post.
By 1941, Wickard had decided that his plans for REA did not
include Slattery; he wanted him out.

The subsequent fight

drew in the biggest names of the day.
The conflict began over how to manage the co-ops.
Slattery wanted them to be nearly independent, private
businesses, in the hands of the people.

Wickard wanted a

hand in their affairs, even to the point of overseeing
the selection of co-op officers.
did not concern Wickard.

But Slattery's objections

To him the REA and Slattery were

his to direct.
Slattery's ability to run the REA was encumbered by

Mark Cordell Stauter, "The Rural Electrification
Administration, 1935-1945: A New Deal Case Study," (unpub
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 19731, 143.
32 Brown, Electricity for Rural America, 78-79.
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Wickard's continued needling.
REA personnel investigated.
to urge FDR to fire Slattery.

At one point, Wickard had
He asked Rankin and Norris
Slattery tried to fight

back by building his own coalition, but Wickard was too
s t r o n g . T h e fight would not end until Slattery fell
from Presidential grace.
REA's problems were compounded by World War II.

Co-op

construction material was restricted by the war effort.
Cooper, in particular, was scarce, and almost all construc
tion ceased.

Any copper that remained on the market was

quickly bought up by the private companies.

Finally, the

War Production Board put a freeze on nearly all construc
tion materials.

In addition, the loan allocation for 1943

was slashed to a thin $10 million, and that was to be used
for defense purposes only.
To many public power supporters, there was another side
to the wartime curtailments.

They felt that REA increased

farm productivity, eased food shortages, and allowed farmers
enough free time to work in defense plants.
labor needed, more men could join up.
agreed, but he did not press the point.

With less farm

Slattery may have
Many began to see

the need for a more active REA spokesman than Slattery.

probed. Newspaper columnist Drew Pearson picked up the
story and printed it. Ibid., 78.
Person, "REA in Perspective," 79-80; Cohgressional
Record, 77th Congress, 1st session (October 27, 1941),
8240-8242.
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In late 1941, the REA was accused of hoarding copper in
Texas for its own use.

A congressional hearing was held

and REA was easily and quickly e x o n e r a t e d . B u t ,
there was no one to speak for REA.
silent.

again,

Slattery had been

Several public power advocates got together to

establish a voice for REA that would be heard on Capitol
Hill.
In March, 1942, this group met in Cincinnati and the
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association was born.
The organizer and first manager was Clyde T. Ellis of
Arkansas.

Slattery got along well with the NRECA, but not

with Ellis.

At the first annual convention in January,

1943, Slattery called the new organization "the beginning
of another stage in the progress of rural electrification
in the United States.

But he and Ellis would soon lock

horns, and the conflict would make the Slattery-Wickard
hostility seem mild in comparison.
The NRECA's strength grew enormously during the war
years.

In Congress its biggest support came from the

biggest names— George Norris, John Rankin, Robert Poage-and it won every early fight.
construction materials.
the co-ops.

It got the freeze lifted on

It set up an insurance plan for

By its first annual meeting 175 co-ops had

Congressional Record, ibid. (December 2, 1941),
9312-9316; New York Times, December 2, 1941.
New York Times, January 20, 1943.
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had j o i n e d . T h e power of NRECA was growing, and Ellis'
power grew with it.
Like so many other public power enthusiasts, Ellis
lived most of his early life without electricity.

He

recalled unsuccessful attempts by his father to get elec
tricity for their home, and by his principal to get lights
for the schoolhouse.

He was born near Pea Ridge, Arkansas,

where the backward way of life was the only way.

When he

went to Washington in 1939, he took with him memories of
his early life without electricity, the hard life of handpumped wells, wood stoves, and dark nights.

The rest of

his life, as a Congressman and then as NRECA manager, would
be devoted to rural electrification.^^
Ellis was elected to the Arkansas state legislature
at age twenty-three on a public power platform.

Six years

later, in 1938, he was elected to the House of Representa
tives, again as a supporter of public power.
there only four years.

He served

In 1942, he lost a bid for the

Senate to John McClellan.

In order to run for the Senate,

he turned over his seat in the House to his protege William
Fulbright.^^

In 1943, a public power enthusiast without

a job, Ellis was in a prime position to organize and then
head the NRECA.

Brown, Electricity for Rural America, 87; Ellis,
Giant Step, 75-81.
Ellis, Giant Step, x, 28-29.
Ibid.,

X,

30-31.
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From his position at the NRECA, Ellis soon gained
enough power to take on Slattery.

Slattery was generally

thought incompetent, even mentally i l l . H e was chronically
ailing, always absent from his desk.

At the REA office,

there was constant bickering between Slattery and Carmody's
heir apparent, Robert Craig.

Craig constantly chomped at

the bit as number two, always regarding Slattery as an inter
loper.

The result of this interior squabble and Slattery's

administrative intertia was, as might be expected, poor
morale at REA top l e v e l s . A n d these internal problems
made Slattery vulnerable to attack from Ellis.
All of these conflicts resulted from a changing of
the guard which was taking place not only within the REA
in the mid-Forties, but throughout national politics.
new was replacing the old.

The

The new liberalism of the

Roosevelt Administration was replacing, and often clashing
with, the old liberalism of the Progressive Era, and nowhere
was it more strongly felt than at REA.

This new group had

no illusions of cooperating with the private sector; the
companies were viewed with disdain, and for the most part
excluded from future plans.

Ellis led the new Young Turks.

They would not be satisfied with simply serving rural
America with electricity bought from the private companies.

Brown, Electricity for Rural Aiaefica, 8S.
Ibid., 87-90.
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They would generate it themselves, removing themselves
from under the thumb of private power, and never look
back.

The fight over electrical generation would be

fought on the battle grounds of the states until the midSixties when the new liberals would finally come away with
all the cards--bloody, but victorious.
Slattery was the focal point of the opening battled.
He was the last administrator to oppose electrical genera
tion.

His species was becoming extinct.

He was unable to

adapt, and was pushed aside by a stronger, new breed.
Ellis was, of course, the leader.

But the first skirmishes

were fought between Slattery and Craig.

Craig had approved

a Texas plan for generation during one of Slattery's ex
tended absences in 1941,

When Slattery tried to stop it,

the wrath of Sam Rayburn came down on him like a ponderous
weight.

Rayburn called for Slattery's immediate resignation

and accused him of being "mentally ill, incompetent and
ruining the program.
The differences between Ellis and Slattery were dif
ferences in philosophy— two clashing ways of thinking
about rural electrification.

They were brought to combat

over how co-op liability insurance should be provided.
Insurance problems had plagued the local co-ops from

42
43

Ibid.,
Ibid., 92.
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the beginning.

Private insurance companies were gouging

them, citing the inexperience of REA linesmen as a high
risk.

Ellis wanted the NRECA to set up an insurance

company for the co-ops out of surplus REA funds.
killed the plan.

The fight was on.

plaining of Slattery's incompetence.
letters to co-ops.

Slattery

Ellis wrote FDR com
He sent anti-Slattery

On July 10, 1943, Businessweek reported

that the end was near for Slattery; he was expected to
resign soon.^^

Rankin defended Ellis in the House.

FDR,

wanting to end the embarrassing controversy, offered the
REA job to Norris, hoping that Slattery would get the hint
arid step down.

Norris refused, and so did Slattery.

FDR

tried again, this time using an emissary to bring down
Slattery.

He would not budge.

Slattery hoped to get a Senate investigation of REA
underway.

In May, 1944, he succeeded.

The report from

the hearings exonerated him, while criticizing FDR, USDA,
Wickard, NRECA, and Ellis.

The committee even commended

Slattery for his obstinence in not resigning.
Slattery had been victorious against Craig, Wickard,
Ellis, and even FDR.
won.

He had fought the powers that be and

But he was isolated in a political world.

He would

Businessweek (July 10, 1943), 27-28.
45 Stauter, "Rural Electrification Administration,"
239-240.
240.
46 Corigressiorial Record, 78th Congress, 2d session
(June 23, 1944), 6591-6594.
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soon wither and die.

In 1944 he supported Dewey,

A few

days after the election, he resigned.
The Slattery-Wickard feud could have been avoided had
the 1939 reorganization of REA been clear.
with Ellis was a fight waiting to happen.

But the fight
The conflict

between these two men was a conflict of basic philosophies
over how the REA would be run in the future.

Had the ques

tion not been insurance, it would have been something else.
Slattery was the REA's tragic character.
from an old mold.

He was cut

To him, the ideas of generating elec

tricity and setting up an insurance company were moving
too far from the public-private coalition that was the
foundation of progrèssivism.

When the fight was at its

peak, Slattery sought counsel from his mentor, Gifford
Pinchot, by then certainly the last of the Progressive
Era's great leaders.

Pinchot characteristically advised

Slattery to fight it out to the very end.

David Lilienthal,

director of the TVA, saw Slattery as "highly deserving as
an old progressive."^^

Lilienthal might as well have

characterized Slattery as obsolete.
During Slattery's administration, the number of con
sumers jumped from just over 800,000 to 1.5 million.

47 David Lilienthal, The Journals of David Lilienthal,
Vol. I, The TVA Years, 1939-1945 (New York, Harper and Row,
1964), 280.
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1950, viii. In
1939, 849,588 consumers were connected. By 1944, that
number was up to 1,484,417.
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It is difficult to see how such growth could come out of
such chaos.

But the growth can be attributed to the capable

leadership of the local co-op managers, not to Washington,
In the last few months of Slattery's administration.
Congress passed the Pace Act, the most significant piece
of legislation affecting the REA since the program's in
ception in 1935,^^

It fixed interest rates at two percent

and extended the amortization period to thirty-five years.
It was a significant liberalization of the program, and it
showed the willingness of Congress to see REA's objectives
through to the end.

When FDR signed the bill on September

21, 1944, he called it "a great step forward in achieving
the ultimate objective of the rural electrification program
. . . ."

The NRECA led the fight, and Slattery, by then out

in the cold, opposed it.
In that same year, Congress continued to show its
support of rural electrification by approving the formation
of the Southwest Power Administration.

In the early years

of the war, several dams were built in the Southwest to
bring power to military installations there.

In 1943,

these projects were consolidated into one program under
Ickes' direction.

As the war drew to a close. Congress

stipulated in the Flood Control Act of 1944 that the

introduced February 29, 1944, hy^
Stephen Pace of Georgia as the "Omnibus Agriculture Bill,"
H.R. 4278.
Brown, Electricity for Rural America, 95-96.
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electricity generated at these projects was to be sold
to co-ops.

Today, twenty-five dams generate electricity

for co-ops and private companies in Texas, Oklahoma,
Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas, and Louisiana.
With the passage of the Pace Act and the formation
of SPA it looked as though Congress was planning a bright
future for rural electrification.

Despite the hindrances

of severe internal strife under Slattery, his apparent
incompetence, and the wartime slowdown, REA was enjoying
a resurgence in the post-war era, and about to move ahead
into the period of its greatest growth.

National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,
People— Their Power: The Rural Electric Fact Book (Washington,
n.p., 1980), 66.
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CHAPTER 3
POWER TO THE RURAL PEOPLE; WORLD WAR II TO PRESENT
At the end of World War II, over half of America's
rural population was still without electricity; within
twenty years, almost no one would be without it.

These

twenty post-war years were a period of phenomenal growth
and expansion for rural electrification.

The Pace Act

allowed co-ops enough financial independence to move into
even the most remote areas.

As the co-ops expanded, they

grew in strength and as a result, conflicts with the
companies grew more fierce.

In the face of this, an in

creasing number of public power supporters began to follow
Ellis' lead in the direction of generation and transmission-in the direction of total independence from the companies.
By the mid-sixties the Republicans in Congress and a few
conservative southerners had adopted the ideas of Cooke,
Carmody, and Slattery; the ideas of the old progressives
had become the ideas of the post-war conservatives.

The

liberals, led by Ellis, came to dominate the power platform
of the Democratic Party.

They opposed cooperation with the

private companies ; generation of their own power was the
only way for them.

New battle lines had been drawn, new

sides were chosen, an old conflict was renewed.
50
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The war slowdown had created a logjam of applications.
Construction began slowly.

Hardware, poles, and trained

technicians were hard to find, and it was not until 1948
that construction got into full swing.

By that year, over

40,000 customers per year were being connected.

By June,

seventy-eight percent of America's farms were receiving
REA service.^
Just when REA was about to shift back into high gear,
the program was nearly blocked by the 1947 Republican cut
backs in the House.

Everett Dirksen. Chairman of the Sub

committee on Appropriations, tried hard to have REA funds
cut, but the Senate, still in the hands of the Democrats,
restored the appropriation to its original level of $250
million.

The 1948 request, higher still, was passed with

out a fight.^
By 1948, it was no secret that rural electrification
had become a big success.

But the comforts of electricity

could not compare with the access to communications net
works in bringing rural America into the mainstream of
American life.

In 1949, only thirty percent of the rural

population had telephone service--the twentieth century

United States Department of Agriculture, Rural
Electrification Administration, Rural Lines--USA: The
Story of Cooperative Rural Electrification (Washington,
D.C., USGPO, 1981), 19.
^ Deward Clayton Brown, "Rural Electrification in the
South, 1920-1955" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA,
1971), 258-261.
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link to the rest of the world.

In that year. Congress

amended the REA Act to lend money to telephone co-ops in
rural areas.

The program was sponsored by the NRECA, and,

as might be expected, was opposed violently by AT&T.
Nevertheless, by 1959, there were 679 telephone co-ops in
the country.^

Rural Americans took another step out of

the non-electric past.
REA's growth in the post-war period had the full sup
port of President Harry S. Truman.

In a time when many

members of Congress were beginning to look over their
shoulders for a socialist bugaboo and to imagine they had
found it in such programs as REA, Truman, characteristically,
defended it.

"The power companies, who said the dams are

socialism, are not passing power along to their rural
customers.

Power ought to go to the farmers, and as long

as I have anything to do with it, that's where the power
will go,"^— this remark, coming in 1952 at the height of
the red-baiting, from a President commonly known for not
provoking the red-baiters.

He w a s , said Ellis, "a genuine

tion. Rural Electric Facts : American Success Story (Washing
ton, D.C., n.p., 1970), 27, 170; See also, ibid., The REA
Rural Telephone Loan Program (Washington, D.C., n . p ., n.d.),
passim.
^ Rural Electrification 10 (August, 1952), 26.
^ Clyde T. Ellis, A Giant Step (New York, Vintage
Books, 1952).
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Truman appointed Claude Wickard to head the REA.
Wickard had been FDR's Secretary of Agriculture, and had
submitted his resignation after Roosevelt's death.

As

administrator, he began a policy of bringing independence
to the co-ops, of letting them run their own affairs in
dependent of the Washington office.

Many of the co-ops

had seven or eight years' experience by this time, and
some had even grown to resent federal interference.

During

Wickard's administration, cries of socialism grew louder.
He answered by emphasizing that co-ops were not governmentowned agencies, and that there was nothing socialistic
about the programs.

"REA borrowers are private enterprises,"

he said, "just as much as are the commercial companies
The Washington office put the previously mandatory services
of audits, advice, and assistance on a voluntary basis.
Thus, these independent businesses were thrown more and
more on their own.
The Democratic hold on the Presidency ended with
Eisenhower's election in 1952.

The ascension of a Repub

lican to the White House was accepted with some anxiety by
REA officials.

The REA program had been created by Demo

crats, it was a Democratic triumph, and, by the early
Fifties, a Democratic sacred cow.

There was a fear that

^ H. S. Person, "The Rural Electrification Administra
tion in Perspective," Agricultural History XXIV (April,
1950), 83.
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Eisenhower would try to kill it, even the entire New Deal.
But Eisenhower accepted the New Deal, and by doing so, he
cemented the New Deal programs into the American economic
system.

Nevertheless, public power did not fare well

under Eisenhower.

Although much of Eisenhower's wrath was

directed at TVA, in the minds of many of his supporters
REA was somehow lumped together with TVA; consequently,
REA suffered.

"Those were hard years for us," said Ellis

of the Eisenhower Administration.

He "just never did seem

to comprehend what rural electrification was all about.
Eisenhower mildly endorsed REA in 1952.

But when he

came to Washington, big business came with him as Douglas
McKay, Eisenhower's Secretary of the Interior, boasted:
"We're here in the saddle representing big business.
The National Chamber of Commerce and the National Associa
tion of Manufacturers supported private power in their
fight against REA.

And soon, public power became the

target of a large propaganda campaign.

In 1953, Eisenhower

stated his dislike for TVA, and the "creeping socialism"
of public power in general: "By God, if we ever could do
it before we leave, well I'd like to see us sell the whole
thing, but I suppose we can't go that far.

Ellis, Giant Step, 105,122.
^ I ^ . , 105.
^ Quoted in Emmet John Hughes, Ordeal of Power : A
Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years (New York, Antheneum,
1962), 152.
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Appropriations— and therefore electrical connections-were extremely low during Eisenhower's Administration.

In

1950, before Eisenhower's election, REA appropriations had
jumped to $470 million, the highest ever.

By 1953, REA

money was cut by three-fourths, just above the 1937 level.
The program had nearly been stopped dead in its tracks.
One of the greatest challenges to REA in the Eisenhower
years, and for that matter throughout the program's exist
ence, was the reorganization of the Department of Agriculture
in 1953.

The power to make REA loans was taken from the REA

administrator and given to the Secretary of Agriculture, then
Ezra Taft Benson.

Immediately, Benson began reviewing and

restricting REA loans over the head of REA administrator,
David Hamil.

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Democrat from

Minnesota, and Representative C. Melvin Price, Democrat from
Illinois, introduced a bill to return the loan-making powers
to the REA administrator.

A classic partisan battle began

over the Humphrey-Price Bill.
Much of the fighting went on in Senate and House Sub
committees.

Homer Capehart of Indiana led the fight against

the bill in the Senate, where Humphrey was flanked by John
Kennedy and Frank Church.

The bill passed easily, reflecting

trification Administration, Annual Statistical Report, 1953
(Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1954), xv.
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,
People--Their Power : The Rural Electric Fact Book (Washington, D.C.. n.p., l980), 31; Ellis, Giant Step, 3~23.
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a grassroots desire to keep the program in full swing.
The Senate passed it on April 8, 1959, with a vote of
sixty to twenty-seven.
to 131.

In the House, the margin was 254

A few days later, to no one's surprise, Eisenhower

vetoed the bill.

The Senate voted to override with six

votes to spare, but the House fell short by four.

Presi

dent Eisenhower's opinion would stand,
The REA was damaged during Eisenhower's Administration,
but despite appropriations cuts and other hindrances, local
co-ops for the first time managed to boost the number of
electrified farms to over ninety percent.

In the South,

eighty-six percent were finally receiving p o w e r . T h e r e
were actually few local setbacks.

The program had marched

on during the war; it would march on under Eisenhower.
It "was the good rain that ends a long drought.
That was how Ellis characterized John F. Kennedy's election
in 1960.

Kennedy's Vice-President, Lyndon B. Johnson, had

been, as Rayburn's protege, one of REA's most avid supporters.
He had even been a co-op organizer in Texas, and had directly
supported the formation of NRECA.
bright for the program.

The future again looked

But the political atmosphere was

not, at first, as favorable as it might have seemed.

First

Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 1st session
(April 28, 1959), 6919; ibid., (April 30, 1959), 7207.
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1953, 14-16.
Ellis, Giant Step, 145.
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of all,, Massachusetts was one of four states that had been
taken over by the power companies; there were no co-ops in
the President's home state.

And secondly, Kennedy had a

nasty habit of talking as a liberal and acting as a conserva
tive.

Not long after the inauguration, Ellis, along with

many other liberals, quickly became disenchanted with JFK.
"As time passed after the inauguration," Ellis remembered,
"it became increasingly clear that while the new President
might be sympathetic to resource development, he did not
intend to lead any crusade for it."

The President made

sympathetic recommendations to Congress, "but in most cases
there was no concentrated administrative effort.

. .

This was not an uncommon feeling among New Deal liberals
when JFK came to office.

They had been stifled by the War

and then by Eisenhower, with only a short interlude of
social program growth under Truman.

Many of them expected

more from JFK than he was willing to give— Camelot was not
utopia.
JFK finally did support public power, but more because
of a desire to aid rural America, particularly the South,
than truly to carry on FDR's legacy.

His Area Redevelopment

Administration, set up in April, 1961, was aimed at reversing
the decline of the rural South.

Of course, it was not so

much a decline as it was the South's age-old problem of

Ibid., 160.
Ibid., 160-161.
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consistently lagging behind the economy of the rest of the
country.

The rural standard of living was much lower than

that of urban areas.

Rural southerners received little

or no health care, and their educational level was well
below that of the rest of America.

For most, rural life

offered only one alternative to living in poverty: moving
to the city where better jobs might produce a better
standard of living.

The result was that JFK's "war on the

poverty of opportunity" spilled over into REA coffers, REA
loan allocations were raised back to their pre-Eisenhower
levels, and rural Americans could again hope to achieve
parity with the rest of the country.
By the 1960s, it had become apparent that the New Deal
and the War had remarkably changed the face of rural America.
But to those who felt an attachment to ruralism, the change
was not necessarily good.

The most obvious phenomenon was

migration; much of rural America had moved to the city since
the War, to the land of opportunity.
had its greatest effect.

In the South, migration

It chnaged the character and even

the meaning of the American South.
What had caused the exodus?

Southern blacks had been

George Tindall, The Emergence of the New South,
1913-1945 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press,
1967), 432; Robert Coles, Farewell to the South (Boston,
Little, Brown and Company, 1963), 60, 63, 100, 371, 130.
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the first to leave.

They saw opportunities in urban

factories during World War I and in the Twenties and stormed
the cities, particularly in the North, to find a better
life.

The Depression worsened the problems that had plagued

southern agriculture throughout the Twenties, and when World
War II came and defense plants called for workers, southerners
responded with a mass migration.
The New Deal programs had much the same effect.

Al

though there might be some question as to whether the New
Deal brought the nation out of the Depression, there is no
doubt that the millions of dollars pumped into the rural
economy resulted in an uplifting of rural America.

Much of

this money was directed toward the South, making farming
profitable.

Profitability led to mechanization, and mechani

zation pushed the tenant farmer, sharecropper and farm
laborer off the land and into the city.

The overall effect

was good for all involved; the surplus manpower was absorbed
by the wartime factories, but the traditional character of
the South was lost to memory.
REA, of course, was one instrument in this change.
It made farming easier and more profitable.

It was at

first thought that the program would make rural life pal
atable, that it would keep another generation of youth down

Tindall, Emergence of the New South, 432; Coles,
Farewell to the South! 130.
Tindall, Emergence of the New South, 432; Coles,
Farewell to the South! 130.
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on the farm, keep the bright lights of the city from luring
the kids away.

REA pamphlets often reported: "We have

noticed that these boys become more enthusiastic about
agriculture as a means of earning a living when they come
to realize that electricity means more profits and less
work.

. . .

But the mechanism and profits that came as

a result of REA and other New Deal programs allowed for a
rural-to-urban migration that was beneficial to all involved.
An equilibrium was reached in the American economy whereby
factories received much needed labor at the same time that
less farm labor was needed.
A direct result of REA was rural industry.

This

phenomenon barely existed before the 1930s, and if it did,
it generated its own power.

By the 1950s and 1960s, the

small farmer, now with less to do because of mechanization,
could complete his chores in the morning (or leave them to
a son or even a farmhand) and work a later shift at a
nearby factory.

The standard of living of this part-time

farmer quickly jumped from poverty to middle class.

And

his money was circulated into the rural economy, benefitting
everyone who came in touch with it.
But where did the factories come from?

By the 1960s,

profits in the northern urban, industrial complex were

Rural Electrification Administration (Washington, B.C.,
ÜSGPO, 1939), 50.-------------------D. Clayton Brown, Electricity for Rural America : The
Fight for the REA, (Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1980),
120, 129.
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being cut drastically by high labor demands and high taxes.
Rural America, but particularly the South, quickly became
a haven from these profit-cutting demands.

An exploitable

labor supply, low tax rates and, now, cheap power brought
industry to the S o u t h . I t

is ironic that while southerners

were flocking to the North to work in factories, northern
factories were moving to the South for cheap labor.
Despite the economic advances made during the New Deal
and the War, the South remained the most poverty-stricken
section of the country until the recent r e c e s s i o n . T h e
War on Poverty programs during the Kennedy-Johnson years
were, above all, directed toward the South, but even more
specifically at Appalachia, where the inhabitants had
barely risen above Thirties Depression levels.

They be

came the symbol of the War on Poverty programs and personi
fied the liberal doctrine that pervaded the Sixties of the
perfectability of man.
was opportunity.

All they needed, it was thought,

Attempts to give that opportunity brought

REA increased appropriations.
The decade of the Sixties was a time of change for the
rural electrification program.

With over ninety percent of

World War II (Lexington, Kentucky, University of Kentucky
Press, 19757, 11-18, 55.

Eric F. Goldman, The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson (New
York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 55; Arthur Schlesinger, A
Thousand Days ; John F. Kennedy in the Whitehouse (Boston,
Houghton Miflin, Co., 1965), 1009-1014.
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rural America receiving electricity, local co-ops turned
their attention to the generation and transmission of their
own power.

As long as they depended on private power com

panies for power, their very existence was threatened.
After all, the private companies were doing everything they
could to destroy the entire program.

Placing the fate of

the co-ops in their hands was like depending on the wolves
to assist the sheep.
Of course, the co-ops were too small to set up their
own generation and transmission plants.

They would usually

join with several other co-ops setting up a "super co-op,"
and then apply for loans to build two or three plants.
The local co-ops that set up the program would then, of
course, buy their power from the super co-op.
REA was well within its rights to lend money for these
G&T facilities.

The REA Act stated that loans might be

made "for the purpose of financing and construction and
operation of electric generating plants, electric transmission
and distribution lines.

. . .

Loans could be made for

generation and transmission when there was not an adequate
available source, when unreasonable conditions or limita
tions were demanded by private sources, when wholesale
rates were unreasonably high, or when a savings could be

Congress, May 20, 1936.
Power, 176-187.

Act cited in NRECA, People— Their
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these criteria.

Usually, the ability to produce electricity

at a substantial savings to the consumer was reason enough.
But power companies, even in the Sixties, still saw co-ops
as rivals and often charged them unreasonable rates.

Fre

quently co-ops were burdened with dual rates : a regular
rate for residential rural customers and a much higher rate
for industrial users.

This, of course, was simply another

attempt by the private companies to force the co-ops into
the less lucrative markets while keeping the most profitable
loads for themselves.

By the Seventies, power outages

across the country forced many co-ops to begin G&T plants
simply to have enough electricity to serve their members.
Understandably, the main opposition to the G&T's came
from the private companies.

Not only did the G&T's mean

stiffer competition from the co-ops, but the private com
panies stood to lose the income from power purchased by the
co-ops.

To fight the G&T's, the private companies employed

delaying tactics to hold up construction.

In Louisiana,

for example, private power halted G&T construction for over
a decade.

By the time they had run the full gambit of

court delays, the costs had shot up so dramatically that a
second REA loan had to be obtained before the project could

(February 26, 1936) 2823.
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64
even begin.

Unfortunately, the consumer on both sides of

the fight bore the brunt.
In many cases, simply the threat of building a G&T
plant became a successful bargaining tool.

The private

companies often lowered their prices in hopes of making
G&T construction less attractive to the co-ops.

Keeping

costs down allowed the co-ops to supply low-cost power to
their consumers, thereby removing the most common incentive
for building G&T plants.

Both sides benefitted as a result.

But where the G&T plants were needed, REA was willing
to lend the money.

In 1940, only 1.8 percent of REA power

was

self-generated. By 1965, 18.3 percent of REA power

was

self-generated. By 1965, 18.3 percent came from their

own plants.

In that same year, sixty percent of REA loan

money was used to construct G&T facilities.

By the mid-

Sixties rural electrification had shifted its direction
toward self-sufficiency--always a mainstay of American rural
philosophy.
The Sixties was a comfortable time for REA.
LBJ

did not use JFK's liberal

Although

rhetoric, he

turnedout to

be far more liberal than his predecessor, and rural elec
trification benefitted from the liberalism.

Hubert Humphrey,

now the Vice President, was one of REA's most avid supporters.
The program was well represented in the White House.

REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1965, 7.

R
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On Capitol Hill, the Republicans, who had generally
opposed the program from its beginning, were joined by
several southern Democrats to oppose generation and trans
mission.

This group of southern conservative Democrats

was led by the all-powerful Chairman of the Agricultural
Committee, Allen Ellender of Louisiana.

They were instru

mental in slowing down several G&T programs, not only in
Louisiana but throughout the nation.
The only substantial threat to REA in the Sixties
was the 1964 election.

Goldwater vowed to kill the program:

"When the local companies can move in and find it profitable,
then the REA should move out.

America, of course, was

not listening to the Republicans in 1964, and for the most
part, Goldwater's right-wing tirades went unheard.
But four years later things were different ; America
was listening to the Republican Party.

When Richard Nixon

came to office, he re-appointed Eisenhower's REA administra
tor, David Hamil.

Hamil immediately ended loans for wiring,

plumbing, appliances, and electrical machinery.
for G&T programs were severely curtailed.

Then loans

On December 29,

1972, with the stoke of a pen, Nixon killed the REA program.

NRECA, People— Their Power, 58-59; Interview with
Hamil, May 31, 1983.
Ellis, Giant Step, 224.
NRECA, People--Their Power, 32; Interview with Hamil,
May 31, 1983.
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The death came hard to Congressional Democrats.
Humphrey called the act "a complete violation, distortion,
and ultimate repudiation of the Acts of C o n g r e s s . B u t
Congressional Democrats acted quickly, and on May 11, 1973,
they had a new bill on Nixon's desk for his approval.

He

willingly signed it because the new program was not sus
tained from the federal treasury.

Most of the money for

future projects would come from the private sector, guaran
teed by the federal government.
raised to five percent interest.

The new rates would be
There would still be some

two percent money available to co-ops that served sparsely
populated, unprofitable areas, but that money would come
from a revolving-type fund that was to accumulate from
payments on existing loans, and not from the treasury.

The

purpose of the bill was to make REA self-sufficient.^^

It

succeeded in that, but it also made more money available to
co-ops through banks who were eager to loan all the money
that the government would guarantee.

The result has been

more and more construction of G&T systems throughout the
nation, and a larger, stronger national and local program.
In the REA's history since World War II, several themes
have been evident: 1) greater assistance to the South than
to the rest of the country ; 2) in general, rapid growth

NRECA, People--Their Power, 33.
United States Department of Agriculture, Rural
Electrification Administration, Rural Electric Fihahcing
Today (Washington, D.C., USGPO, n.d.), passim.
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under Democratic administrations, followed by stifling of
that growth under the Republicans; and 3) the new tack
toward G&T programs.
trends.

There have also been some minor

Five of six new connections after 1965 have been

in suburban areas that have spilled over from rural areas,
There has also been a general decline in the number of
farms.

That is, as America has moved from the farm to the

city, REA has come to serve the rural areas around these
cities.

Some co-ops, such as South Louisiana Electric

Member Corporation, have even moved into small suburban
towns.

This, of course, must be done with money from sources

other than REA.
Nuclear power appears to be the trend of the future
for REA.

The great expense of nuclear power plants has,

ironically, brought public and private power together.

In

most cases, neither the co-ops nor the private companies
can justify the entire expense of a nuclear plant, so they
have reluctantly shaken hands.

Unfortunately, the price of

the plants is rising so rapidly that, in many cases, neither
side will benefit for a long time.

Nevertheless, this

public-private power cooperation in the nuclear field is a
situation that would have brought smiles to the faces of
Cooke, Pinchot, and other old Progressives of the Thirties.
From the time of these Progressives up through today,
REA followed a path of growth that brought electricity to
rural America.

There were, as we have seen, conflicts from

within and without: internal conflicts over cooperation
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with private companies, and later, the development of G&T
programs; and external conflicts— the constant threat from
the strong private companies and their political allies.
But these conflicts were not restricted to the national
level.

In fact, the national experience is only a small

part of the story.

It was on the state and local levels

where the real skirmishes, the real hand-to-hand combat
took place--where the war was really won or lost.

Local

lenders fought over many of the same issues, and the private
companies infringed on co-op rights at the state and local
levels as well.

And Louisiana was, and is, a perfect

example of these conflicts, both from within and without.
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CHAPTER 4
LOUISIANA'S THIRTEEN CO-OPS
Development of the federal program, followed by the
establishment of the individual co-ops, may seem to have
left a gap in the growth of the system.
the REA program developed.

But that is how

Once it became law, and once

the funds were allocated, the next step was for the infor
mation to filter down to the grassroots, to the farmers
and rural leaders, who would trans form ideas into reality—
electricity.

Once the local programs were set up and on

their feet, once they were large enough to need advice and
to have common problems, only then did they collaborate
and consult each other and set up statewide organizations,
thus filling the gap between the federal and local programs.
These grassroots beginnings became the real heart of
the movement.

Here was a true frontier, where the leaders

were true pioneers, who took the initiative, sacrificing
time and money to bring electricity to people who had never
had it--to the areas that would prosper because of it.

As

electricity moved into these areas, as the poles and lines
went up, lives were bettered in Louisiana.

In some areas,

entire economic systems developed around co-op lines.

It

is difficult to calculate the effects precisely, since the
69
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ten-year period from the mid-Thirtles to the mid-Fortles
was so economically volatile in Louisiana, but the advent
of electricity had a staggering effect on the economy of
rural life in the state.
These Louisianians were as different from each other
as would be expected of a cross-section of Louisiana rural
people.

Many were the wealthy planters, farmers, and

cattlemen of the state, while others were small-town
businessmen, political leaders, and lawyers.

They were

as different from each other as Terrebonne Parish is from
Webster Parish, as different as the swamp is from the
Louisiana prairie.

But at the same time, there were im

portant similarities among them.

They were all community

leaders ; uppermost in their minds was the welfare of their
little corner of the world . Most were also in some ways
visionaries ; they saw how electricity would aid the growth
of their community, bring in business and industry, and
upgrade the financial status of the general population.
Everyone in the community would benefit.
These Louisiana men were, of course, southerners.
This, in the Thirties, meant they were Democrats.

And it

meant that they were part of FDR's New Deal coalition, but
it did not necessarily mean that they were liberals.
Southerners had been the conservative arm of the Democratic
Party since the Civil War.
changed.

In the Thirties, little had

These southern conservatives were about as far

removed as possible from the liberal philosophy and
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Keynesian economics of FDR and his Brain Trust.

But politics

had little to do with their attitude toward co-ops and the
co-op movement.

They were almost never moved by political

ideology or rhetoric.

There was no vast economic scheme of

things that motivated them.

Very simply, they wanted lights

for themselves and their communities, and they were willing
to take whatever steps were necessary to achieve that end.
Each co-op had its unique aspects of growth and develop
ment, but as a rule they all began in virtually the same
way.

Usually a wealthy landowner would approach the electric

company in the area and ask to be hooked up to a nearby line.
He was either told that it could not be done, or that he
would have to pay for the lines, poles, and labor to make
the hookup.

The private companies were never of the gambling

sort; either the venture would yield immediate profits, or
it would not be done.

This landowner, then, usually ap

proached some of his friends who formed an informal group
and, through either a local politician, a county agent, or
possibly through the group's own initiative, contacted REA.
The REA typically responded by sending two or three repre
sentatives to survey the area and determine if a co-op was
feasible.

The major criterion was density: were there

enough houses per mile to make it work?

The magic number

was three, but in some parts of Louisiana in the late
Thirties, this was a difficult criterion to meet.

And

each householder had to pay a five dollar deposit in order
to be hooked up.

So, meetings were held, interest was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

drummed up, and if necessary, the applicants lied to REA
about the requirement of three houses per mile.
barns, even unoccupied houses, were counted.

Often

And in nearly

every case, community leaders paid the five dollar deposits
where others could not.
But once REA was convinced, a loan could be obtained,
and usually within a year of application the first lines
were energized.

In Louisiana this process began as early

as 1937 at what became Teche Electric Membership Coopera
tive, and in just five years construction had swept across
the state as quickly as the lines could be built.

In 1942,

when Concordia Electric, the last co-op to organize,
energized its first lines, the organizing was done, but
the program had just started.
The co-ops in Louisiana had an easy birth.

The product

was in demand, the price was low, and both community leaders
and federal officials were eager to cooperate.
private companies were enthusiastic.

Even the

They clearly had no

interest in the rural areas, and they stood to make substan
tial profits by providing wholesale electricity to the co-ops.
But later, in the late Fifties and early Sixties, when rural
Louisiana began to develop, when oil drilling, fishing, and
petrochemical industries began to dominate the state's
economy, and when the cities began to spread out into co-opcontrolled areas, conflicts arose.

As it became increasingly

clear that the investor-owned companies and the consumerowned co-ops were no longer simply supplier and purchaser.
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but competitors for much of the same market, the entire
outlook changed.

Suddenly, the co-ops were under the

thumb of their rivals.

Prices were only as low as the

companies wanted them to be.

A change was in the offing;

the co-ops began moving toward developing their own source
of power and away from their uncertain dependence on the
companies.

It was these years, the Sixties and Seventies,

that would be the hard times.
But the birth and early years were easy.

Each co-op

in Louisiana had a good strong start due mostly to generous
assistance from the federal government and an insatiable
market.

All thirteen state co-ops began life with tena

cious leadership; in nearly every case, one person stands
out as the one who led the co-op from infancy to maturity.
The co-op movement is the story of its leaders, of pioneers
who brought the miracle of electricity to rural Louisiana.

Teche Electric Membership Cooperative
Jeanerette, Louisiana
Teche Electric Cooperative is considered to have been
the first co-op in Louisiana, although it is difficult to
confirm that claim.

One or two other co-ops may have had

earlier meetings, even earlier incorporation, but Teche
was the first to bring electricity to the Louisiana country
side; it was the first to attain its objective.

On April

15, 1938, just three years after FDR signed the Executive
Order creating the REA, Governor Richard Leche pulled the
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74
switch that energized a small rural section of Iberia
Parish.^
That, of course, was the most dramatic aspect of the
birth of the co-op movement in the state.

The real begin

ning of Teche Electric was in a small grocery store in the
Four Corners area of St. Mary Parish, southwest of
Jeanerette on Highway 90.

There A. M. Boudin, the store

owner, collected the five-dollar membership fee from the
prospective co-op members.^

On June 12, 1937, presumably

with all the necessary qualifications met, Teche Electric
was chartered.^

Two days later, the board received a check

plant the poles, string the line, and, finally, with the
help of the governor, bring lights to rural Louisiana for
the first time.

Two hundred and eighty-four houses were

served by 122 miles of line.^

It must certainly have been

an exciting event.
The leaders of the co-op movement in Iberia and St.
Martin Parishes were not really different from those in
any other part of Louisiana: they were big farmers and

July 23, 1982; interview with Edgar Chaney, ibid.
^ Interview with Calvin Boudin, ibid.
^ Interview with Verrett, July 23, 1982.
^ Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.
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community leaders.

They were certainly the ones who stood

to gain the most by having electricity brought to their area.
W. Prescott Foster was the most notable.

He was the

son of Murphy J. Foster, governor of Louisiana from 1892
to 1900 and later United States Senator.

Foster's holdings

included the largest sugar cane plantation in the state.
He had 20,000 acres under cultivation, with another several
hundred in cattle and dairy farms.

He owned the Alice C

and Maryland plantations near Franklin in St. Mary Parish.^
He became the first president of the board of directors of
Teche Electric.

It was his prestige that lent credence to

the local organization, and it was his influence that
brought Teche to Jeanerette in April, 1938.^
Another important figure in the history of Teche Elec
tric was Leon Landry.

He was elected the co-op's first

vice-president and later president.

He was a West Point

graduate and, like Foster, a large sugar cane planter in
St. Mary Parish.^

Another board member was Howard Olivier.

He was also a successful planter.^

Alexander V. Allain,

also on the first board, owned Marguerite Plantation seven

^ Ellis Arthur Davis, ed., The Historical Encyclopedia
of Louisiana (2 vols. New Orleans? n.p., 194?), I, 956.
^ Interview wi
with Chaney, ibid.
^ Interview with Verrett, July 23, 1982; interview
with Boudin, ibid.
^ Davis, Historical Encyclopedia of Louisiana, I, 511.
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miles south of Jeanerette.

He was on the Police Jury in

St. Mary Parish, and was President of the Board of Direc
tors at Teche Electric during the 1960s.
But among all the people who got Teche Electric
started and of those who later watched it grow, Edgar
Chaney has had more influence over the co-op than anyone
else over the years.

Just released from the Army in 1945,

Chaney came to the co-op to replace his brother, John, as
manager.

His brother had been killed in an automobile

accident just a few months before, and the co-op was
desperate for a replacement.

Chaney was not an engineer,

and, at first, REA would not approve his appointment.

But

after Prescott Foster placed the weight of his influence
behind Chaney and made some Washington contacts regarding
the matter, Chaney was approved.
He went on to serve the co-op as manager for by far
the longest period of any other manager there--until 1978.
He saw the co-op through most of its lifetime, and he
built it to its present position on an exceptionally
strong foundation.
Chaney was asked to retire in 1978 in the midst of
somewhat hushed surroundings.

A new board of directors had

been voted in, and, evidently unhappy with Chaney, they

Ibid., I, 487.
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voted him out.

After over thirty years of service, Chaney

was out of the picture.
Although Teche Electric has the distinction of being
the first co-op in the state, it also remains the smallest.
It serves fewer than 7,000 members in only three small
south Louisiana parishes: Iberia, St. Mary, and St. Martin.
The rural population in these parishes is generally densely
settled— there are nearly twelve electrical meters per mile
of co-op line, by far the highest density in the state.
But the population as a whole in these parishes is sparse,
only 79.6 per square mile.^^
This is because the majority of the population is
located along the area's bayous (specifically Bayou Teche)
that connect the small urban settlements.

The rest of the

land, mostly swamp, is virtually uninhabited.

This phenomenon

has allowed Teche to serve a large population with a small
amount of line.

The result is that Teche Electric has

grown to be a wealthy concern, so much so that the statis
tics should be preceded by fanfare.

In 1980, the co-op

1982; interview with Chaney, July 23, 1982.
United States Department of Agriculture, Rural
Electrification Administration, ^ n u a l Statistical Report,
1980 (Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1980), 68.
James Calhoun, et al., Louisiana Alnlanac, 19791980 (30th ed., Pelican PuETishing Company, Gretna,
Louisiana, 1979), 128-29. This is particularly true of
St. Martin Parish with only 44.1 per mile.
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boasted owning a whopping eighty-five percent of its
system.

The only co-op in Louisiana coming close to this

figure is SLEMCO, reputedly the largest co-op in the
country, with sixty-five percent equity ; the next in line
drops to thirty-one percent.
Some critics have spoken out against the Teche
management for not having been more aggressive in the
early years, for not having taken in more territory, for
not having taken more r i s k s . B u t Edgar Chaney's sound
management with an eye toward financial solvency has
allowed Teche Electric to remain economically the strongest
co-op in the state.

Concordia Electric Cooperative
Farriday, Louisiana
Everyone in the co-op movement has heard numerous
stories of how the private utilities would not serve a
certain farmer, who then joined with others who had had
the same experience and formed a co-op.

The story is al

most as apocryphal as that of the worker who becomes able
to buy out his uncaring employer.

But Tam Winston was one

of those farmers ; he lived that experience, and he remem
bers it well.

The result was the organization of Concordia

Electric Cooperative.

REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 68.
Interview with Mark Bonner, July 29, 1982.
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Winston is an old southern gentleman who still dis
plays photographs in his study of his two indomitable
heroes, Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee.

For a man ob

viously steeped in the southern political tradition, he
is curiously reluctant to talk about politics.

Those

pictures might say something about his political philosophy.
He says he has none, only that he is from the "old school.
In the late Thirties, Winston was without electricity.
In those days, he recalls, "farmers worked from can't to
can't: from can't see in the morning to can't see in the
e v e n i n g . B u t he saw an opportunity to get electricity
when Louisiana Power and Light built a line to a Mississippi
River levee construction project in his area.

The line was

to pass by his house:
I got two or three people . . . to refuse to give
them right-of-way unless they would put a permanent
line out. And they built the line three miles
out of their way . . . because we refused to give
them right-of-way.19
As the levee construction project grew and moved along
the river bank, LP&L built a second line, and then a third.
The three lines, says Winston, were built on simple willow
poles and torn down when the project was completed.

"They

wouldn't serve us electricity," Winston remembers, "because

Interview with Tam Winston, Vidalia, Louisiana,
December 14, 1981.

Ibid.
Ibid.
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they said it was too sparsely settled.

They wouldn't serve

anybody; they wouldn't listen.
Not long afterward, Winston was approached by Sam
Calvert and L. F. Marks, two local leaders like himself.
It was Marks, according to Winston, who had first received
information from REA.

He and Clavert told Winston that if

they could get a five-dollar deposit from each person in
the area, with an average of at least 2.5 people per mile,
REA would consider granting a loan to the group.

They had

little trouble arousing interest, but, Winston recalls,
many could not pay the five-dollar deposit.

Thus they

lacked the needed amount to make the loan application.
"So my father, Mr. Cliff Godbold, and I all went in on a
note and borrowed the five dollars membership at the bank
and put up the five dollars membership for I think some
thing like fifteen or twenty additional, so that we could
go on and get our loan application in. . . . "

There was

considerable urgency; they feared that the coming war
would end the loan program from REA.
The first meeting was at the courthouse in Vidalia,
but to centralize the location, the office was moved to
Ferriday.

Winston was elected president, a position he

holds today, and Edward Barnett was hired as manager.

20

21

Ibid.
Ibid.

22 Ibid.
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On April 11, 1941, these pioneers in rural electrification
received $120,000 from REA for construction of 140 miles
of line to serve 344 rural members.

On January 29, 1942,

after nine months of construction, the last co-op in
Louisiana to organize energized its first lines.
The co-op began in parts of Concordia and a small
piece of Tensas Parish.

Today Concordia Electric serves

about 10,500 members in those two parishes, in addition
to all or parts of Catahoula, LaSalle, Franklin, Caldwell,
Grant, and Rapides parishes.
Concordia Electric was the last co-op in Louisiana
to organize mainly because it is located in one of the
most sparsely populated areas in the state.

The co-op

serves an average of only 4.78 consumers per mile, by far
the lowest density in Louisiana.

This condition has brought

financial hardship at times,but it is one of the few co-ops
in the state still making loan payments to REA in advance
of schedule.
Many co-ops in Louisiana had a leader who brought it
from birth, through adolescence, to maturity— as did
Concordia Electric.

After Barnett died in 1948, E. E.

Taylor took the job, and remained there for thirty years.

Louisiana, December 14, 1981.
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 70.
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Before he came to Concordia, Taylor worked for nearly ten
years as a field man for REA, stationed in Louisiana for
awhile, and then later in the Kansas-Nebraska-Colorado
area.26

Taylor has an attitude toward rural electrification
that is shared by many pioneers in the field, but it is
seldom expressed as well:
There developed a kind of spirit of. I'm going
to call it pioneering.
I didn't realize it at
the time, that that was what it was. Many,
many times I have dropped what I was doing to
go watch the turning on of the lights in a
particular area. The thrill in seeing the ex
pression on their faces just did something to
people like me, to see the changes in those
people's lives. . . . It became almost a religion
to people like me to try and see that everybody
had electricity. You kind of caught the feeling
of wanting to see that they had it
Taylor fulfilled his idealistic goals : by 1960, vir
tually everyone within the boundaries of the Concordia
Electric service area had electricity, and in 1978 when he
left, there were over 10,000 c o n s u m e r s . T a y l o r was more
instrumental than anyone else in seeing that the program
was complete--that the dream was fulfilled for both himself
and the recipients.
Taylor's influence on the growth and development of
the co-op system in Louisiana was not limited to his
Interview '
December 14, 1981.
27 Ibid.
Interview with Taylor, December 14, 1981; REA
Statistical Abstract, 1978, 97.
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pioneering work at Concordia Electric.

He had a signifi

cant hand in the birth and growth of the statewide movement,
and later in the movement to begin generation.

In the

Sixties, when it became apparent that local co-ops would
no longer be able to borrow two percent money from REA,
Taylor assisted on the national scene in the development
of the Cooperative Finance Association, a co-op bank that
remains an important source of funds for most local co-ops
t o d a y . T a y l o r ' s assistance in the development of rural
electrification has been unique.

He has had influence on

all three levels : state, local, and national.
Taylor's successor at Concordia was Albert Forrester.
He had been Taylor's right hand man since 1948.

He retired

in 1982 after only four years as manager, but his influence
as Taylor's assistant goes beyond his short time as manager.
Forrester's successor was Ben Chance.

Jeff Davis Electric Cooperative
Jennings, Louisiana
The Jeff Davis co-op had an inauspicious beginning.
Most co-ops were able to get their systems on line before
the war began, but Jeff Davis was not so lucky.

The co-op

Statistical Abstract, 1978, 97.
Rural Louisiana, January 1982, n.p.; interview
with Taylor, December 14, 1982.
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was chartered on September 17, 1941, but due to wartime
delays it did not receive its first loan until May 15,
1944.

With the exception of some existing lines that

were energized almost immediately, it was not until
December, 1946, over six years after the co-op was organ
ized, that the Jennings area finally received electricity.^^
The problem, of course, was that the materials used in
building electrical lines were also important to the war
effort.

Without wire, insulators, transformers, and man

power, .line building was impossible.

While the Jennings-

area co-op was just beginning, a second attempt at co-op
formation was beginning near the town of Cameron, Louisiana.
Cameron is isolated, even today.

But in the early

Forties, the only access to it was by way of a shell-top
road from Lake Charles, and a ferry crossing at the inter
coastal canal.

The town's isolation made for a unique

problem that led local leaders to look to REA for assist
ance in obtaining electricity.
Cameron, for years before the war, had received elec
tricity from the Grant Utility Company.

It was a local

operation owned by the Zetman family of New Orleans, and
was more concerned with making ice than electricity.

The

Grant Utility Company had built a short line to the com
munity of Cameron, but when the war broke out and the
company could not get enough fuel to keep the operation

Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.
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profitable, it simply shut down the plant and walked off,
leaving Cameron in the dark.

Joe Docksey, secretary of

the police jury and a prominent local citizen, knocked the
lock off the building, started up the generator, and got
the lights back on.

Docksey paid for the service by

collecting ten or fifteen dollars from the townspeople.^^
Cameron again had electricity, but obviously this
situation was inadequate at best, so some of the town's
leaders began working on the more permanent solution of
organizing a co-op.

They wrote REA, which responded in

the usual manner by sending a field team to Cameron to
determine whether or not a co-op was feasible.

The team

decided it was not: the area simply lacked the necessary
population density to support a co-op.

But the REA repre

sentatives did suggest that the Cameron group join with
the new, but as yet unlighted, Jeff Davis co-op.
On May 15, 1944, the Jeff Davis group purchased the
Grant Utility Comp'any of Cameron and the two were merged.
But even this merger would not assure electricity for
Cameron.

The community still had to meet REA's requirement

of three houses per mile of line, and in Cameron that would
not be easy.

J. S. Robbins, the manager at Jeff Davis,

August 9, 1982.
Ibid.
34 Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.
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recalls : " . . . they had to count every little house that
had a cow as a dairy, and I don't know what all, to do the
paperwork to get the m o n e y . B u t

they did get the money.

The co-op operated Grant Utilities for awhile, but
the facility was far from adequate.

It would be necessary

to construct a permanent line to Cameron.

This line, which

was finally completed in 1946, ran from the Gulf States
facility on the east side of Lake Charles, extending to
Holmwood, across the Intercoastal Canal to Creole, and
then west sixteen miles to Cameron.
According to Robbins, who came to Jeff Davis in 1947,
the year after the Cameron line was completed, the line
should have never been built.

It was only a three-phase

line, not at all adequate to carry a load forty-six miles.
Robbins said that "when you got to the end of the line,
you didn't have any power left.

It was a terrible mess,

people'd burn out motors ; everytime it thundered the line
went off, fuses were off, and the boys [the linemen working
for the co-op] were either here in Jennings or in Cameron.
They'd have to drive forty miles to find the trouble.
had a hell of a time."

We

One of the first things Robbins

did as manager was to build a high capacity transmission
line to Cameron.^ ^
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Robbins was not the first manager at Jeff Davis; that
distinction goes to W. J. Purvis,

Purvis had been trained

as a lineman, a background which did not quite qualify him
for the manager's job.
in 1947.

He yielded the position to Robbins

Robbins, an engineer, who graduated from Louisiana

Tech in 1936, worked for Gulf Oil Corporation for six years,
then entered the Navy during the war.

After working for

General Gas after the war for one year, he was offered the
manager's job at Jeff Davis.

He was thirty-two when he

accepted the position, remaining there until just recently,
nearly thirty-five years at the helm.^^
Robbins is generally noted for pursuing commercial
and industrial loads, which often brought him head-to-head
with the private companies: "We fought, and fought.

Un

fortunately, a lot of times they'd win the battle."

One

major battle that Robbins lost concerned a Phillips Petro
leum plant that was to be built at Lake Arthur in south
western Jeff Davis Parish.

The co-op had the only source

of power in the area; in fact, the plant was to be built
near a co-op line.

Robbins had negotiated the contracts

and even designed the substation.

"And doggone, if they

didn't give that load to Gulf States," Robbins recalls,
"and they used my substation design.

It's still there to

day, with a 300 horsepower load.
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Like so many of the early leaders of Louisiana's co
op system, Robbins has retired--possibly for the same
reason that so many others left, Robbins says he was
"tired of the rat race, tired of fighting the battle.
It is not quite clear what battles Robbins is tired of
fighting.

He fought hard against the utilities in the

Sixties, but he was also an antagonist within the state
wide organization.

He is often criticized as difficult

to get along with, opinionated, even rebellious.

He still

feels that some things at the co-op's generating facility
are not being done correctly, and he voices his opinions
loudly from his ivory tower of retirement.

His voice

seems to ring in the ears of many of the present co-op
leaders--a topic to be taken up later.
Jeff Davis is not a large co-op.

Today it serves

only about 8,000 members, the second smallest membership
in the s t a t e . I t

serves Jeff Davis, Cameron, and

Calcashieu parishes and has extended lines into Vermillion
and Allen p a r i s h e s . R o b b i n s '

successor at Jeff Davis

is J. H. deCordova.

Ibid.
Interview with Mark Bonner, July 29, 1982; inter
view with Chaney, July 23, 1982; interview with Scott
McVea, Baton Rouge, July 13, 1982.
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 70.
Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.
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Southwest Louisiana Electric Membership Corporation
Lafayette, Louisiana
Louisiana has some very small co-ops.

Teche, Jeff

Davis, and Pointe Coupee, for instance, have under 8,000
members each.

But among Louisiana co-ops is one of the

nation's largest. Southwest Louisiana Electric Membership
Corporation.

In 1980, SLEMCO was serving nearly 70,000

m e m b e r s . I t is not only big, it is growing.

In that

year, it began serving the entire city of Opelousas.
SLEMCO's size has led to an independent attitude, a tend
ency not to cooperate (or possibly a lack of need over
the years to cooperate) with the other co-ops in the state.
Tliis has led to resentment, rivalry, and even animosity
among other co-op managers that exists even today.

Much

of this difficulty concerns the development.and growth of
the generating facility, and will be dealt with later.
SLEMCO had a fragmented beginning that eventually
ended in a united effort.

In the Acadian parishes in 1937,

the population seemed dense enough that each parish could
set up its own co-op.

So, four co-ops were organized:

Lafayette, St. Landry, St. Martin, and Acadia.
agents took the lead in organizing all four.

County
The agent in

Lafayette Parish was Sidney Bowles, in Acadia it was Lloyd
Bruitt, in St. Landry it was A. K. Smith, and in St. Martin
the agent was Stanley Angele.

REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 68.
Interview with U. J. Gajan, Lafayette, Louisiana,
November 16, 1981.
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When it soon became apparent that the four co-ops
could not do the job as well as one, they merged to form
SLEMCO in 1937.

Vermilion and Evangeline parishes later

joined the organization, making up the territory that
comprises SLEMCO today.
SLEMCO had some difficulty getting its first loan.
To meet the requirements, each co-op had to be surveyed
for feasibility by REA.

An official from Washington, a

Miss Lighter, nearly killed at birth what would become
the nation's largest co-op.

She inspected ane examined

the area, concluded that a co-op in that part of Louisiana
was not feasible, and reported that to Washington.
The response from the co-op founders was to call REA,
though making a call to Washington for these men was not
easy.

Pitifully broke, they passed the hat in order to

make the call.

Their office was as unimpressive as their

financial position.

It was "just a little old hole-in-

the-wall," one early member recalls.

They even lacked

office furniture; they used apple crates for chairs.

But

despite their condition, they were able to contact an REA
official in Washington, C. 0. Faulkenwald.

He took an

interest in the new co-op, and made a trip to Lafayette
to reinspect the area.

46
47

He was evidently satisfied.

Due

Ibid.
Ibid.
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It was still 1937.
The new co-op hired the William G, Morrison engineer
ing firm to do the pre-allotment work and the surveying.
One of their engineers was U. J. Gajan.

He would become

manager of SLEMCO in 1941, remaining there for forty years.
He would build the co-op from its birth to the largest in
the country.

And in the process, he would become the

focal point of a controversy over the concept of generation
that would divide the statewide organization.
Gajan went to work for Morrison in 1937.

The pace

was frantic, since they had to get the lines up as quickly
as possible to maintain local support.

"We were putting

in sixteen to eighteen hours a day, because we had to get
the lines staked, make our notes at night . . .
touch-and-go-deal.

it was a

They finally got the lines built

and energized on May 11, 1938.

They initially bought their

power from the city of Lafayette.
Gajan worked for the engineering firm for about two
years.

On July 1, 1941, he was given the position of

general manager at SLEMCO.

"And from then on," he says,

it's been just a heavy construction program.

"Biography of U. J. Gajan," unpublished vita in
possession of Gajan.
Interview with Gajan, November 16, 1981.
Ibid.
52
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Gajan is the quintessential self-made man, complete
with bootstraps.

His early life was meager at best.

He

grew up on a small farm near New Iberia where electricity
was the luxury of others.

Not unlike many other co-op

leaders in Louisiana, Gajan was denied access to a private
utility line that ran near his home.

The price quoted

for the hookup was an out-of-reach $1,500.
his early life without lights.

So, he lived

After high school, he

attended a small preparatory school in New Iberia, and
became a licensed professional engineer after twenty years
of experience.

Now, after forty years of service to

SLEMCO, he is retired.
SLEMCO's size has always made it an aberration among
the other co-ops in the state.

It has always been big

enough to stand on its own, and even to stand toe-to-toe
with the private utility companies.

Over the years, SLEMCO

and Gulf States Utilities (the main private utility in
SLEMCO's service area) have developed a healthy respect
for each other.

Throughout the years, there have been few

conflicts between the two, and there has always been com
munication.

Consequently, SLEMCO has received favorable

Ibid.
Interv
November 16, 1981.
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in the rest of the state.

The smaller co-ops— many very

small--formed a statewide organization to marshal enough
money and strength to keep from being virtually crushed
by the private companies.

SLEMCO joined this organization

in the early Fifties, and Gajan was an early leader.

But

in the mid-Sixties, when the other co-ops decided that
the only way to remove the dominance of the private com
panies was to generate their own electricity, SLEMCO re
fused to join in.

Gajan felt that he could still buy

power from GSU cheaper than the united co-op group could
generate it.

He was right, but his critics have said

that he was being used by GSU to break up the co-op
generating plan.^^

Whether Gajan received good contracts

because of his past association with GSU, or because GSU
hoped to break up the co-op consortium is not clear, but
the effects were to damage the united co-op effort to
generate, to oust SLEMCO from all statewide dealings, and
to shape Gajan as the bad boy of it all.

It was a deep

wound that even today occasionally arouses animosity.

It

involved personalities, egos, and a lot of hostility.

It

will be worth a closer look later.
The controversy ended in 1973 when SLEMCO joined the

Interview with Gajan, November 16, 1981.
Interview with McVea, July 13, 1982; interview with
A. A. Robinson, Baton Rouge, May 19, 1982; interview with
Merle Burgin. New Roads, Louisiana, August 5, 1982; inter
view with Robbins, August 9, 1982.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

other co-ops in their generating plans and, on the surface
at least, all was forgiven.

Today, SLEMCO's involvement

in the affairs of the statewide organization is not quite
up to par with the other members.

This might be due to

past grievances, SLEMCO's size, or even its heritage of
independence.

But for whatever reason, SLEMCO remains

the state's black-sheep, the aberration.
When Gajan retired, Herman Kesel took his place.
Kesel was Gajan's longtime assistant.

In fact, Gajan

hired Kesel as a young stake-and-chain-man in the early
days of the co-op.

Kesel has carried on Gajan's amicable

association with GSU.^^
Despite that association, in the fall of 1980, Kesel
aimed all his guns at GSU in an all-out bid to serve the
town of Opelousas.

The old gas-fired plant there had be

come too expensive to operate, and the town leaders had
begun looking for a new source of p o w e r . S L E M C O and GSU
both wanted the town.

Each tried to sway the voting public

by sweetening the pot: GSU offered to absorb some of the
town's energy costs, while SLEMCO offered free street
lights, free distribution, and free i n s u r a n c e . T h r o u g h o u t

with Kesel, ibid.
Opelousas Daily World, March 29, 1981, 1.
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the battle, the Opelousas city council supported SLEMCO’s

bid.60
The controversy seemed rather calm until April 11,
1981, when fights broke out at the city council meeting
and police had to be brought in on two different occasions.
The Opelousas Daily World stated that the "shouting and
decision-making . . . has become as popular in some circles
as the LSU Tiger basketball t e a m . A n d

in 1981, the

LSU Tigers were commanding considerable attention through
out the state.
As the conflict grew, each side continued to up the
ante: GSU finally underbid SLEMCO by twenty-five cents per
kilowatt hour; Kesel countered by agreeing to hire all the
employees from the old plant, a touchy point that many had
d e m a n d e d . B u t the deciding factor seems to have been
that GSU's cheap gas contracts would soon run out, forcing
its fuel costs to rise substantially in 1984, and probably
resulting in higher long-term consumer costs under GSU than
SLEMCO.

The final popular vote was a three-to-one margin

in favor of SLEMCO.

The co-op took every precinct.

Only SLEMCO, with its enormous size, could challenge

Opelousas Daily World, February 22, 1981, 5.
Ibid., April 12, 1981, 1; ibid., March 29, 1981, 1.
Ibid., March 10, 1981, 1.
Interview with Kesel, November 16, 1981.
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GSU and take over the utilities of a city the size of
Opelousas.

Such a power play exhibits both strength and

independence.
movement.

It also shows indifference for the co-op

And, more than anything else, it shows SLEMCO,

because of its size, to be something quite different from
the other twelve co-ops in the state.

It may very well

be the foreshadowing of what the other twelve will become
as they pass from the middle age of their development
into old age.

Valley Electric Membership Corporation
Natchitoches, Louisiana
Valley Electric is one of the largest co-ops in
Louisiana.

With 29,000 members, it ranks third behind

only SLEMCO in Lafayette and Dixie in Baton Rouge.

In

addition to having a large membership, Valley Electric
also has the largest service area of any co-op in the
state.

It serves all or part of eight parishes : Caddo,

Grant, DeSoto, Sabine, Natchitoches, Winn, Red River, and
Vernon in West Central Louisiana.

Its service area spans

both banks of the Red River from the outskirts of Alexandris
in the south to the outskirts of Shreveport in the north.
Probably the most notable feature of Valley Electric,
other than its size, is the dedication of its employees.
Three employees at Valley have worked there for over forty

Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.
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years.

Odessa Winn came to the co-op in October of 1937,

just one year after the first organizational meeting and
seven months before the first lines were energized.
husband was Valley Electric's first lineman.

Her

"We were

rich," she recalls, "he was making $110 [per month]."
But she had to work for nothing for the first three months
until the co-op received its first loan from R E A . A f t e r
a few months as secretary-bookkeeper, Mrs. Winn hired an
assistant, Vannie Rogers.

Mrs. Rogers has been at Valley

Electric since then, with the exception of a leave of
absence in 1945.^^

In that year, Homer Cox came to Valley

as a lineman's helper at the grand salary of thirty cents
per hour.

He moved up the ranks, serving under six

managers, as acting manager twice, and finally, in October,
1981, became Valley Electric's eighth m a n a g e r . H e does
not have the engineering degree usually required at most
co-ops to fill the manager's post, though the thirty-seven
years of hard-knocks education he has received at Valley
may be as valuable.
It was first intended that Valley Electric be located
in Grant Parish rather than in Natchitoches Parish.

But

the town of Natchitoches had long been the central place

January 21, 1983.
66 Ibid.

Interview with Vannie Rogers, ibid.

Interview with Homer Cox, ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

for that section of Louisiana, and more of the board
members were from in and around Natchitoches than were
from Grant Parish.

Possibly of more importance, J. H.

Henry, the co-op's first president and the main thrust
behind its beginning, was from Natchitoches Parish.

At

any rate, the plans were changed; the co-op was moved
from Grant to Natchitoches Parish, with the office even
tually being relocated to the town of Natchitoches.^^
The first meeting was held at the American Legion
Hall in Natchitoches on November 30, 1936.

According to

the minutes, it was called by S. B. Thorton, Natchitoches
Parish County Agent, and attended by C. 0. Faulkenwald,
the REA representative from Washington who had a hand in
the formation of several co-ops in Louisiana.
On May 16, 1937, J. H. Henry was elected President
of Valley Electric.

Henry was from Melrose, Louisiana,

south of Natchitoches on the Cane River.

Melrose was also

the name of his plantation, possibly the largest pecan
orchard in the state.

His home today is a Louisiana

historic monument, partly because of several "African
style" cabins on the property.

The main house, "Yucca

House," was built in 1796.^®

Interview with Winn, January 21, 1983; interview
with Rogers, ibid.
Valley Electric Membership Cooperative, "Minutes,"
November 30, 1936.
Baton Rouge State Titries, September 29, 1964.
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E. J. Giering was the first to receive .the designa
tion of manager at Valley Electric, elected to that post
in August of 1937.
Randall MacNeely.

But the first manager was really
His position was described as "Temporary

Project Superintendent," and his main job was to obtain
rights-of-way for the first lines.

He was probably

hired more for his ability to climb a pole than for his
managerial skills.
A story is often told at Valley Electric about a
member who would not relinquish a right-of-way to the co-op
because construction of the line necessitated the removal
of one of a magnificent stand of oaks on his property.
Two days after the request was made, an electrical storm
hit the area, and lightning shattered the oak that the
co-op wanted to move.

Faced with what seemed to be the

wrath of God, the man relented.
The first loan from REA was for $390,000, and arrived
on June 28, 1937.
September 24, 1937.

The bids for construction came in on
As an interesting side note, two com

panies submitted identical bids to sell electric meters
to the co-op.

Henry simply suggested that they flip a

coin--heads won.

Valley Electric Co-op, "Minutes," June 19, 1937;
interview with Winn, January 21, 1983.
Clyde T. Ellis, A Giant Step (Random House, New
York, 1966), 57-58.
Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 8; Nat chitbches Times,
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The first line was built south of Natchitoches toward
the Cane River area, toward Henry's plantation.

It spanned

185 miles, serving 391 members, and was energized in May
of 1938.

Other lines followed, expanding west toward

Robeline, and then north to Powhatan.
As the lines were being built people would come out
of their homes to watch.
so bad to get lights.

Mrs. Winn recalls, "They wanted

They understood that as soon as

they built that line, they'd be on it."
developed a good reputation.

The co-op soon

"Valley Electric was one of

the most wonderful things ; we could do no wrong."
things are different now, she says.

But

"As time goes on, the

people's attitude has changed a whole lot.

Now they just

take [us] for granted.
The annual meetings at Valley were significant local
events in the early days.

They brought together the

farmers and other rural people much like the county court
house days, 4-H fairs, and church picnics did in other
parts of the country, in other periods.

The town merchants

in Natchitoches held sales on that day, the co-op provided
food, and everyone had a good time.

But co-op business

September 24, 1937, clipping in "Valley Electric Co-op
Scrapbook," in possession of Vannie Rogers, Valley Electric
Co-op.
Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

was the main order of the day.

Decisions were made, and

members voted— after all, it was their co-op.

Unfortunately,

there is not as much interest on the part of members today ;
in fact, there is very little.

As Mrs. Winn has stated,

"times have changed.
Valley Electric has a sparse 5.3 consumers per mile.
The co-op covers so much area that it has almost as many
miles of line as SLEMCO, while SLEMCO has nearly twice as
many consumers per mile.

Such a situation would normally

bring financial disaster, but Valley Electric has obviously
been well managed over the years.

Its equity is high at

eighteen percent, and its current and accrued assets are
the second highest in the s t a t e . I t

is by no means the

wealthy concern of Teche Electric or SLEMCO, but it does
operate efficiently under a severe handicap of only 5.3
members per mile.

Northeast Louisiana Power Cooperative
Winnsboro, Louisiana
As stated earlier, most of the co-ops had a manager
who was responsible for building the organization to its
present place.
exception.

Northeast Louisiana Power Co-op is no

The first manager there was Robert Holladay.

He helped to construct the first lines, and under his

76 Ibid.
77 REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980,
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supervision, rural northeast Louisiana received electricity.
Most of these co-op leaders are now retired, or on the
verge of retiring; several have logged as many as forty
years as manager.

Holladay, though, left the post in 1965

because of illness, at about the time when most of the
construction was completed.

Although he did not have the

opportunity to serve for forty years, as did Gajan, Taylor,
Killingsworth and others, he got the job done before he
left.
When Holladay became manager in 1939, much of the
paperwork was completed and construction was ready to
begin.

At several other co-ops in the state, someone often

took over the reins of command, completing this work before
the first manager was hired.

He obtained rights-of-way,

did the paperwork, and, in come cases, began construction.
At Northeast, this job fell to three men, David Anders,
Edgar Lowrey, and W. L. Rush.
Anders is a lawyer.

He helped to organize the cor

poration and did all the other legal graoundwork to get
the co-op on its feet.

He served as assistant manager

under Holladay and eventually took over as manager when
Holladay left in 1 9 6 5 . Although Anders is not an
engineer, he seems to have fulfilled the engineering re
quirements of the job quite well.

He was one of those

Interview with Eugene Lowrey, March 28, 1983,
Winnsboro, Louisiana.
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who worked tirelessly for the co-op but received little
in return.

One employee recalls that when she came to

work for the co-op in 1941, she discovered that Anders
had never been on the payroll; he had worked three years
without pa y.

Today Anders is retired and living in

Winnsboro--just around the corner from the co-op office.
Edgar Lowrey is one of those who began at the bottom
and worked to the top; he claims to have held every job
in the co-op.

His first job was obtaining rights-of-way

and staking lines for sixty cents an hour.

After the war

he moved into the office, working mostly on insurance and
retirement programs.

During the few months between the

time Anders left and the present manager, John C. Tucker,
took over, Lowrey temporarily held the manager's post.
W. L. Rush was an REA representative sent from
Washington to get the co-op started.

The role of most

REA representatives around the state was to do little
more than attend the first organizational meeting and in
form the organizers about REA.
been more than that.

But Rush seems to have

He stayed on at Northeast until

well after Holladay was hired, until the first lines were
energized in December, 1939.^^

view with Eugene Lowrey, March 28, 1983.
Interview with Lowrey, ibid.
id. Northeast Louisiana Power Cooperative,
"Minutes," July 15, 1939-December, 1939, passim.
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These three men, Anders, Rush, and Lowrey, together
with Holladay, did much of the work that took the co-op
from the organizational stage to the energizing of the
first lines.

Ttie organization of the co-op— the conception

of the idea, the first contact with REA, the recruitment
of interested local leaders, the real beginning of the
co-op--was initiated by a different group led by H. B.
Landis and W. P. Sellers.
Sellers was the county agent for Franklin Parish, and
his role was the same as the role of other county agents
in the state : to assist with the organization, get it on
the right track, and then, when things were rolling along
on their own, hand the leadership over to the co-op board
of d i r e c t o r s . S e l l e r s was important in the organization,
but it was Landis who deserves most of the credit for
bringing the co-op together.

He was the community leader

whose prominence brought enough weight to the organization
to recruit other community leaders, and eventually many
members to the co-op.
Landis owned a variety store in Winnsboro, and when
he died, in January, 1941, he was mayor of the town.

He

was elected president of the board of directors at the
organizational meeting on July 15, 1938, and held that
position until he died.

82

Although he was president for

Interview with Lowrey, March 28, 1983.
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only two and a half years, he is credited by those who
remember him as laying the foundation for the co-op.
When these organizers got the co-op on its feet, and
were ready to begin construction, they hired Holladay.
Holladay was born in 1894 in Swollie, Louisiana, in Sabine
Parish.

Before he came to the co-op he had had some

limited experience in managing utilities.

He began his

career working at a sawmill in his hometown.

Before REA,

sawmills often provided electricity to a small area, or
even a town located near the mill.

Apparently, Holladay's

job at the mill was associated with electrical generation
because from there he went to Gibsland, Louisiana, in
Bienville Parish, where he managed a small municipal plant.
He eventually became mayor of the town.

That plant was

bought out by LP&L when the utility expanded in the midTwenties and Holladay accepted a position with the utility
company as a district manager in Bastrop, Louisiana,
probably as part of the buy-out agreement.

He stayed

there until he went to the Winnsboro co-op in May, 1939.
He was lured from LP&L by a grand salary of $139 per month.
Holladay's administration was benevolent.

The board

of directors evidently had enough confidence in his abili
ties to allow him to operate things pretty much as he

Newspaper clipping entitled, "R.E. Holladay Quits
Position," in possession of Fannie Bonner, Winnsboro,
Louisiana; interview with Fannie Bonner, March 29, 1983.
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wanted.

He was a true leader, his secretary recalls, with

a real knack for getting things done.

He left the manager's

post on January 1, 1965, due to illness.

He died in 1980

of Parkinson's disease.
There were, of course, other leaders.

J. E. Richardson

was a farmer from Liddieville in Franklin Parish.
one of the original organizers in 1938.

He was

He retired from

the board in 1969, after thirty-one years of service to
the c o - o p . W .

P. Martin, also a co-op founder, owned

the Bel-Mar Ranch near Delhi where he raised one of the
most celebrated Black Angus herds in the S o u t h . A n o t h e r
organizer, E. C. Calloway, was from near Holly Ridge in
Richland Parish.
leader.

He was also a large farmer and community

He resigned from the co-op board of directors in

1968, after thirty years of s e r v i c e . T w o women were on

interview with Lowrey, March 28. 1983. Newspaper clipping
entitled "Local Rural Electrification Pioneer Honored for
Services," in possession of Fannie Bonner, Winnsboro; Rural
Louisiana, February, 1965.
Newspaper clipping entitled, "Richardson Retires
from Co-op Board," in possession of Fannie Bonner,
Winnsboro; "Resolution of Commendation and Appreciation
to J. E. Richardson," issued November 11, 1969, Northeast
Louisiana Power Cooperative files, Winnsboro.
Newspaper clipping entitled, "Columns Add Grace
to Country Home," in possession of Fannie Bonner, Winnsboro.
"Information of E. C. Calloway," in Northweat
Louisiana Power Cooperative files, Winnsboro; "Resolution
of Commendation and Appreciation to E. C . Calloway,"
November 11, 1969, in Northeast Louisiana Power Coopera
tive files, Winnsboro.
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the first board, Mrs. T. A. Woodridge from Ft. Necessity,
and Mrs. G. A. Newcomer from near Crowville in Franklin
Parish.

Both women served on the board for only a short

t i m e . B e n Cheeck was also one of the first board members.
He was a farmer from Mangham in Richland Parish.

Richard

Ward was from near Gilbert in Franklin P a r i s h . T h i s

list

comprises the original roster of board members and organi
zers .

All were local leaders and prominent citizens.

Of all those who pieced together the whole of North
east Louisiana Power Co-op, only one more needs attention:
C.

J. Grayson.

Grayson was a Winnsboro banker.

He became

a board member in early 1941, and was elected president
one year later, succeeding Landis.

Grayson's and Holladay's

administrations coincided and, evidently, so did their
personalities.

Lowrey recalls that the two got along

famously, complementing each other's temperament and ability.
"Mr. Holladay and Mr. Grayson made a real pair."

After

thirty-four years of service, Grayson finally retired to
his home in Ft. Necessity where he lives today.

He is

eighty-five.^^

"Northeast Louisiana Power Cooperative, Inc.,"
mss. in Northeast Louisiana Power Co-op files, Winnsboro,
April 24, 1958, 2; interview with Fannie Bonner, March 28,
1983.
Ibid.; interview with Lowrey, March 28, 1983.
1983.
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The current manager, John C. Tucker, was hired by the
board in 1971 after Anders became ill and had to retire.

He is

from Crowville in Franklin Parish and is a graduate of LSU.
The first loan from REA was for $72,000 for the con
struction of 158 miles of line to be built out of Winnsboro
in several directions.

The contractor was John Owen from

Monroe, who was awarded the contract on April 8, 1939, and
completed construction of the first lines in early December.
On December 9, 1939, W. L. Rush wrote to his boss in
Washington, Harry Slattery, informing him that construction
was c o m p l e t e d . T h e lines were finally energized the day
after Christmas, 1939, lighting a rural area toward Ft.
Necessity and Delhi.

Two days later, 290 members received

power in West Carroll Parish.

When construction was finally

completed, the co-op spread through seven parishes : Franklin,
Richland, Madison, East Carroll, West Carroll, Morehouse,
and T e n s a s . T o d a y ,

the co-op serves over 13,000 consumers

in those parishes.

Contract between Rural Electrification Administration
and Northeast Louisiana Power Co-op, June 3, 1939, in North
east Louisiana Power Co-op files, Winnsboro.
Northeast Louisiana Power Co-op, "Minutes," April 9,
1939.
W. L. Rush to Harry Slattery, December 8, 1939,
Northeast Louisiana Power Co-op files, Winnsboro.
"Northeast Louisiana Power Cooperative, Inc.," 2;
interview with Fannie Bonner, March 29, 1983.
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 69.
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Strong leadership was the key to a successful begin
ning in the life of a -Louisiana co-op.

The Northeast Power

co-op had that strong leadership, not only from Holladay,
but also from the board of directors who supported him.
These people worked together to set the foundation, to
build the co-op, and to assure its success.

South Louisiana Electric Cooperative Association
Houma, Louis iana
At first glance, there are few things obviously dis
tinctive about SLECA.

This might be because the co-op

never had its dynamic leader like Chaney at Tech, Gajan
at SLEMCO, or Robbins at Jeff Davis--no obvious bright star
to focus on.

SLECA just seems to be there, quietly doing

its part delivering electricity to Terrebonne, Lafourche,
St. Mary, Assumption, and St. Martin parishes.

But despite

its placid character, SLECA is distinctive in at least one
area: it is located in one of the nation's most volatile
economic regions.
SLECA's total kilowatt sales volume is forty-seven
percent commercial and industrial--nearly half of all elec
trical sales are to commercial and industrial interests.
And of that forty-seven percent, nearly seventy percent is
delivered to large corporations.

In 1980, SLECA brought

in nearly as much total revenue from large commercial and
industrial sales as did SLEMCO, a co-op with three times
the total kilowatt sales and nearly twice the number
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of commercial and industrial c u s t o m e r s T h e reason for
this is obvious to anyone familiar with the oil and gas
industry in Louisiana: The Houma-Morgan City area is
saturated with the large companies that comprise that boom
ing industry.
SLECA is also distinctive in that it serves over four
teen consumers per mile, the highest density in the state
by far.

The reason for this is the same as at Teche

Electric, only to a greater degree.

The rural population

lives on the high ground along the bayous that connect the
small urban settlements.

These areas are, of course,

natural levees formed by centuries of flooding, and may
extend back from the bayous for as far as five miles.

The

area behind these natural levees is mostly swamp, largely
unhabited except for an occasional hunting camp.

SLECA's

role, then, has been merely to serve these high ground
areas.

Although SLECA has the same obligation as all

other co-ops to serve any rural resident within the service
area who wants electricity, it has seldom had to extend its
lines into these unprofitable remote areas.

So, rather

SLEMCO collected $5,421, 194 in large industrial
sales in 1980. SLECA collected 4,023,348. SLEMCO sold
1,015,062 total megawatts in 1980; SLECA sold 326,333.
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 68.
Ibid., 68. Teche Electric is second with ten
consumers per mile. ibid., 68.
Interview with Rickie Pietre., January 17, 1983,
Houma, Louis iana.
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than distinctive personalities, it has been the economic
factors of the oil and gas boom in the area, coupled with
its geographic situation, that gives SLECA its distinction.
The growth in SLECA's service area is extensive.
Northern Terrebonne Parish, eastern St. Mary Parish, and
parts of Lafourche Parish are booming.

Since the mid

seventies, the oil and gas industry has not only brought
in industry and people, but economic growth as well.

The

per capita income for those three parishes is among the
highest in the state, and all three have had a ten-year
increase in per capita income of over 100 p e r c e n t . B u t
without SLECA, the situation might be different today.
Certainly, if oil and gas is discovered and demand is high,
the big oil companies will not be held back by a lack of
electricity.

But SLECA has made the job easier and less

expensive than if the oil companies had had to generate
their own power or pay high prices for LP&L hookups off
the utility's main lines.

The companies that support the

oil and gas industry have also had an easy time thanks to
SLECA; co-op lines were already built in the area where
much of the support industry is located.
The early organizers of SLECA were C. C. Couvillion,
the county agent for Terrebonne Parish, and Owen Walther
from Gibson.

Walther was to become the first president
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of SLECA.

He was a consulting engineer for a Washington-

based firm that had installed the first air-conditioning
system in the United States Capitol.

He had also worked

for the Hershey Company in Hershey, Pennsylvania.

Walther

and Couvillion were influential community leaders as were
the other co-op founders : Aubin Buquet was a wealthy sea
food buisnessman from Dulac; W. C. Cooke was a wealthy
planter; Karl Geist was a German immigrant living near
Houma; John Mouman was a wealthy sugar planter from Theriot;
Albert Thibodaux was a successful farmer from the Bayou
Blue area; Robert Marcel was from Amelia, J. H. Morrison
was from Mathews, and J. B. Hill from Raceland.

All were

prominent citizens and influential local leaders.
Those early leaders are gone, but one founder remains,
Claude Duval— and he is still going strong.

When the co-op

was organized in 1938, Duval was an eager young attorney
less than one year out of Tulane.

He and his partner,

Ashby Pettigrew, signed on as the co-op's lawyers, acquiring
the position by something like default.

"We were the young

est, least knowledgeable attorneys around," Duvall recalls.
"The other attorneys declined to represent the co-op, I
think, in part, because they didn't think it would amount
to a n y t h i n g . T h e

co-op, of course, was a success, and

Houma, Loui s iana.
103
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so was Duval.

He went on to become a prominent Houma

attorney, and, from 1967 to 1980, he was a state senator
from the Houma district.

He is still SLECA's attorney,

after forty-five years.
SLECA had a precarious beginning.

After the usual

process of organization, REA was contacted and a represen
tative was sent from Washington to assess the feasibility of
the program.

The representative found it unacceptable.

But like SLEMCO, where a similar situation had occurred,
the organizers appealed, and their application was finally
approved.

Their first loan, in the amount of $110,600,

was received in October, 1938.

They set up shop in an

old two-room shotgun house on East Park Avenue in Houma.
They were in business.
As the co-op's lawyers, Duval and his partner were
busy from the start.

But Duval's participation in SLECA's

early years went beyond his services as the organization's
attorney.

Aside from his legal duties, Duval soon found

himself sorting out rights-of-way.

The employees had done

a poor job of keeping records and no one knew what rightsof-way had been obtained where.

Duval then got involved

in obtaining the rights-of-way himself, going from house
to house, explaining what a co-op was, and how it would
affect the residents and their entire area--he was a salesman.

Ibid.; Watts Line, April, 1982, 1; Rural Louisiana,
May, 1 9 6 0 7 ^
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The board-of directors, evidently with no other prospects
for manager, and seeing Duval's youthful enthusiasm, named
him to the position.
1938.

This, Duval recalls, was in May of

He was only twenty-five.
Obtaining rights-of-way was not always easy.

It would

seem that the desire for electricity, the desire to finally
enter the modern world of convenience, would easily out
weigh any apprehension about lines, poles, or workers on
their property.

But, for whatever reason, a farmer occa

sionally refused electricity.

In one area near Bayou Louis,

Duval recalls, a group of farmers had gotten together to
keep SLECA from obtaining rights-of-way--they did not want
the co-op to build on their land.

The group had a ring

leader, and if he could be convinced, Duval thought, the
others would easily agree.

Several of the co-op's board

members— influential men--had had no luck with the man.
Duval went out, talked to the man's wife, and settled the
problem. The entire area came along within a few days.

A

bit of pressure in the right place can make all the
difference.
In August, 1938, the board of directors chose Nolin
Cunningham to relieve the overworked Duval as manager.
Cunningham began linebuilding, first near the Bayou Blue
area along Highway 90, then south toward the source of
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power at Houma.

In the midst of construction an unusual

incident occurred: "lo and behold," Duval recalls, "LP&L
started putting up a line on the other side of the highway."
The law was first-come-first-serve, so Duval and Cunningham
picked up the gauntlet: "So I told Nolin, 'let's go!'"
And they did; the race to Houma was on.

Both crews worked

into the nights, setting poles as fast as they could dig
the holes. Edgar Chaney at Teche Electric in Jeanerette
sent two trucks and as many crewmen as he could spare to
help.

"We had to get our poles and lines up to be able to

have that territory," Duval remembers.
gized in October, 1938.

The line was ener

SLECA won the race, and claims

the territory today.
SLECA bought its first power from the city of Houma
in 1938.

By 1946, Houma wanted out of its contracts, claim

ing a lack of generating capacity to serve the co-op, and
a low return on investment.

Duval represented SLECA before

the Public Service Commission, arguing that a contract had
been negotiated and that Houma was legally bound to continue
the service.

Duval and SLECA won the point, but immediately

entered into a contract with LP&L, letting Houma off the

108

interview with Chaney, July 23, 1982; Rural Louisiana, May,
1960, 8.
Interview with Duval, February 14, 1983.
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It was at the beginning of the post-war period that
industry began moving into the Houma-Morgan City area, al
though it would be another twenty-five years before the
oil and gas industry would hit full stride.

Possibly see

ing the potential for the area, and seeing that SLECA had
become a successful endeavor, LP&L attempted a buyout of
the co-op in 1948.^^^

Duval again took up the gauntlet

thrown down by LP&L.
"We had a dead dog fight.
bought newspaper ads.

We bought radio time, we

We went at it.

whipping the hell out of them."

And we ended up

The final blow came when

Duval had the by-laws changed to make it nearly impossible
for LP&L to buy SLECA.

As of 1948, a majority of the

membership, and not merely a majority of the quorum, was
necessary to sell any or all of the co-op's property.
SLECA has gone through some riotous times.

When it

began, the area to be served contained little more than a
few fishing villages and cane fields in south Louisiana.
Today, it serves a smattering of boom towns among the oil
and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico.

SLECA has not

only kept up with the boom, it has helped to foster it.

It

is not at all the quiet uneventful co-op that it appears
to be.

Ibid.; N. J. Cunningham to Allen Ellender, June 15,
1949, Ellender Papers, Box 9, Allen Ellender Library, Nichols
State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana.
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Washington-St . Tammany Electric Cooperative
Franklinton, Louisiana

What is taking place in the Washington-St. Tammany
service area, while possibly not as glamorous as the oil
and gas boom near Houma and Morgan City, is certainly as
dynamic.

The Washington-St. Tammany service area, which

includes Washington, St. Tammany, and Tangipahoa parishes,
is the fastest growing area in the state.
St. Tammany Parish has had an astounding population
increase of more than ninety-six percent during the last
decade ; the population grew from 38,643 in 1970 to 110,869
in 1 9 8 0 . The reason, of course, is not oil and gas,
but urban sprawl.

In 1955, when the Pontchartrain Causeway

was built, the north-lake became a New Orleans suburb, and
the population of St. Tammany Parish boomed.

Slidell, on

the southeastern edge of the parish, is growing even faster.
It is, in fact, the fastest growing city in the state.
As New Orleans spread eastward in the Seventies into what
became New Orleans-East, the city continued to spread across
the east side of the lake into Slidell.

These two St.

Tammany towns have become suburbs of New Orleans, advertis
ing clean air, clean water, and a general reprieve from

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Census
of Population. Number of Inhabitants : Louisiana (Washington,
D.C. USCPO, 1982), 9, 14.
Ibid. 14.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the various and highly publicized problems of the city.
The Washington-St. Tammany co-op does not, of course,
serve these towns, nor does it serve Bogalusa, Covington,
Pontchatoula, Hammond, or other even smaller towns in its
service area.

But in the late Thirties and early Forties,

when the co-op was just beginning, it did serve up to the
city limits of these towns.

Today, as a result of popula

tion growth, the towns have expanded well into the co-op's
service area.

Therefore, those areas served by Washington-

St. Tammany include a large urgan population as part of its
membership.
In 1938, when the co-op first began, very little of
the three-parish area had electricity.

In Washington Parish,

only Franklinton, Bogalusa, and a couple of C.C.C. camps
were electrified.

In Tangipahoa Parish, only those towns

along the Illinois Central tracks running north out of New
Orleans had power.

In St. Tammany, only Covington, Slidell,

Mandeville, and Abita Springs had electricity.

The new

co-op had a big job.
The co-op was chartered September 2, 1938.

The first

lines stretched 109 miles, serving 226 members from
Franklinton in Washington Parish, north to Warrenton and
Sunny Hill on the Mississippi border, then south to Folsom

Interview with Lyle Killingsworth, November 20,
1981, Franklinton, Louisiana.
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in St. Tammany Parish, and southwest to Enon and Sun.
Service was established quickly; on November 11, 1938,
just two months after the first loan was received, the
first lines were energized, and rural residents in
Washington and St. Tammany Parishes received electricity
for the first time.

About one year later, Tangipahoa

Parish was brought into the co-op's service area.
The first manager was N. W. Taylor.

As was the case

at several other co-ops in the state, the first manager
was more of a lineman than an engineer, usually replaced
once the system was energized and the co-op got on its
feet.

But in this case, Taylor remained on at the co-op

for a number of years as a serviceman.

The second manager

was S. J. MacMahon, who remained at the post until 1947
when the current manager, Lyle Killingsworth, was given
the job.
Killingsworth came to Washington-St. Tammany in 1941
as a serviceman, worked his way up to operations superin
tendent in 1943, and then to manager in 1947.

He has

since been regarded by several of the state's managers as
one of the best managers in Louisiana, by at least one as
one of the best in the nation.

Interview with Killingsworth, November 20, 1981.
Ibid.; interview with Mark Bonner, July 29, 1982.
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Killingsworth has a statistical bent.

In fact, he

seems to be as much an accountant as an engineer.

Each

year he reports on the financial situation of the co-op
to his members through the statewide's organ, "Rural
Louisiana."

He has recently begun using easily understood

graphs and charts to show each year's progress.
Killingsworth's attitude toward the co-op system is
the attitude of many of the early members.

It is an under

standing of membership ownership ; it is an understanding
that possibly only someone who participated in the early
stages of the co-op can have, someone who saw darkness
come to light:
I feel that this is something that belongs to
the people; they control it. If we specialize
in anything at all, it's providing service for
the rural people. , . . It's still possible [for]
a person to build a home two miles from a power
line [and still get electricity]. I just feel
that it's a lot of difference in having the
owner, the consumer, and the operator all the
same person . . . from having an investor own
i
it [who is] looking toward making a profit. . . .
Killingsworth would never deny the right of the investorowned utilities to make a profit, but it was that right that
kept electricity out of the rural areas until the advent of
REA.

When Killingsworth was a boy in Jefferson County,

Mississippi, he recalls one of those incidents that touched
and shaped the lives of so many co-op leaders in Louisiana
and the nation:

Interview with Killingsworth, November 20, 1981.
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I remember my father and others trying so hard
to get Mississippi Power and Light Company to
build a line into the rural area, and they
wouldn't consider it even with the people paying
the cost of the line.119
Killingsworth became the co-op's manager just as the
war broke out, when times were lean for the co-ops due to
the lack of building materials.

But after the war, the

post-war boom snapped the economy back.

The demand for

electricity in rural areas was high, and Washington had
the money to lend.

Line-building was furious.

In the

Washington-St. Tammany service area, the post-war growth
brought conflict with LP&L.

Both were expanding rapidly,

trying to tie up as many areas as possible by moving into
settled areas, or into areas that might develop in the
future.

At one point, Killingsworth remembers, LP&L

simply built lines along all the public roads, whether
there were houses on those roads or not.

Often the lines

would never be hooked into a substation, never even ener
gized; they simply served to tie up areas.
LP&L's zealousness backfired.

At one point,

An inexperienced manager,

hoping to get a jump on the co-op, tied up a large section
of woodlands in Washington Parish.

The woodlands, it

turned out, belonged to the Crown-Zellerbach Company and
the area has never produced anything but trees.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.
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"We called them races at the time," says Killingsworth,
recalling the competition with LP&L, "we'd work at nights
at times.

We would have large areas staked and on contract,

and if they could beat us into these areas, they would.
We beat them into a big part of the area, but," he added,
"they also beat us into large areas.
Today, of course, this kind of activity is a thing of
the past, partly because of the lack of such potentially
productive areas and partly because of various laws passed
in the Sixties that more accurately defined spheres of
control.

These laws have been important in the conflict

between the co-ops and the investor-owned utilities ; they
are worth a separate discussion later.
Today, Washington-St. Tammany serves over 21,000
consumers, the third largest in the state.

And this number

can be expected to climb rapidly throughout the 1980s.
The growth of St. Tammany Parish, and to some extent
Tangipahoa Parish, is the most distinctive characteristic
of the Washington-St. Tammany co-op.

The co-op, of course,

has had to match that growth, keeping up, expanding as the
population expands.

Washington-St. Tammany's guiding light,

Lyle Killingsworth, has directed that expansion through
the years, while upholding an undying faith in the coopera
tive concept that only a founder can have.

121 Ibid.
122

Ibid.
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Like many other leaders in the Louisiana co-op move
ment, Killingsworth will soon relinquish his role to a
younger man.

If he and those other founders on the verge

of retirement take with them their philosophy, if the
idea of member-ownership dies with them, the movement it
self might lose its purpose.

Claiborne Electric Cooperative
Homer, Louisiana
Claiborne Electric began much as did the other co-ops
in the state.

Local leaders needed electricity, and they

wanted others to have it.

They organized, contacted

Washington, and collected memberships.

The only difference

is that at Claiborne Electric there is no one still living
who can recall these events.

Only a few official records

and some secondhand information hold the story.
It is hard to tell who brought it all together, who
that one person was who conceived the idea, contacted the
other leaders, and threw his weight behind the program from
the start.

There was one man, though, whose name seems to

stand above the rest in those early years, who served as
the co-op's first employee, and then as the first manager :
William M. Rainach.

Willie Rainach, as he was more commonly

known, went on from his interest at the Claiborne co-op to
advance (some might say "regress") into the hotbed of
Louisiana politics at a time when it was at its hottest.
Rainach may have done a lot to bring electricity to
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the rural people of north central Louisiana, but he was
not one of Louisiana's most venerable political stars.
During his time in the State Senate, 1940-1959, he organ
ized and chaired the Joint Legislative Committee on
Segregation, whose job it was to circumvent desegregation
and outlaw the NAACP.^^^

He also formed Louisiana's first

White Citizen's Council in Claiborne Parish in 1955.

With

in four years, he had advanced to the head of a statewide
White Citizens Council which he had also organized.

The

purpose of these groups was to unofficially resist desegre
gation.

In 1959, Rainach ran for governor on a wholly

racist ticket, addressing his campaign to little else.
Earl Long had said that a gubernatorial candidate in
Louisiana could not win an election using race as an issue,
and he was right; Rainach finished a poor third behind
Jimmy Davis and deLesseps Morrison in the Democratic primary
After the election, Rainach faded from the public eye, but
while he was there, he and his friend, Judge Leander Perez,
kept Louisiana's disreputable segregationist politics in
the national press.

(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1977), 231.
Ibid., 235.
Perry Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1971),
340; Calhoun, Louisiana Almanac, 348.
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But as far as Claiborne Electric was concerned,
Rainach played an important role in its organization.

He

was an early leader whose energy breathed life into a co-op
that otherwise might have died.

On January 10, 1939, four

months after the organizational meeting, the board of
directors met for the first time with W. 0. Coe, an REA
representative from Washington.

The directors had not

been informed of the 2.5 meters-per-mile rule and were
told by Coe that REA would not support the program unless
more members were enrolled.

The board then turned to the

person they felt had the ability to sign up enough new
members to make the program work: Rainach.

"After a full

discussion, it was decided that it was to the best inter
est of the corporation that Mr. Wm. Rainach, who had
heretofore been devoting considerable amount of time, be
engaged to spend more time and use his best efforts to
secure a sufficient number of members.

..."

Rainach

was to be paid $250 per month to marshal his "best efforts,"
and get the co-op off the ground.
Apparently Rainach was successful.

On June 3, 1939,

a loan contract was drawn up between Claiborne Electric
and REA for $175,000, and Rainach was hired as the first
manager.

On December 16, 1939, it was proudly entered

into the minutes : "Be it resolved: The lines of Claiborne

Claiborne Electric Co-op, "Minutes," January 10,
1939.
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Electric have been energized.

. . .

On that same day, Rainach announced to the board that
he intended to be a candidate for the State Senate and
offered his resignation to be effective as soon as a suit
able replacement could be found.

The board was concerned

that they "should prevent anyone from using the cooperative
as a political stepping stone," but entered into the record
their satisfaction that Rainach had not done that.

But

contact with a good portion of the Thirty-Sixth Senatorial
District certainly did not hurt his campaign.

On May 4,

1940, Rainach resigned and headed down the bumpy road of
Louisiana politics, and out of the history of Claiborne
Electric.
The co-op was organized at its first meeting,
September 14, 1939, at the law offices of Meadors and

years, then rented office space in Homer until building
its current offices in 1948.^^^

As is usually the case,

those present at the meeting became the board of directors.

Ibid., December 16, 1939.
Ibid., May 4, 1940.
Ibid., September 14, 1939.
Interview with Elmer Poss, April 1, 1983; Homer,
Louisiana. The Current building has been expanded six
times. Ibid.
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At the next meeting, five days later, L. Almond was elected
as first president.

Almond was a farmer from near Minden.

The vice-president, J. Burnett, was from near Haynesville
in north Claiborne Parish.

J. H. Odom, also from near

Haynesville, signed as the first secretary.
prominent farmer and merchant.

He was a

Also on the first board

was R. L. Hays from near Athens, S. P. Meadors from near
Homer, and Rainach from Summerville.
When those first 131 miles of line were energized in
December, 1939, parts of three parishes received electricity:
Claiborne, Webster, and Bienville.

Today, Claiborne Elec

tric serves those three parishes in addition to Union,
Lincoln, and a small part of Ouachita.

The areas served by

the first lines were out of Homer north toward Camp and
Colquitt, northwest to Blackburn, Leton, Shongaloo, and
then north to Old Shongaloo on the Arkansas b o r d e r . A t
one point in late 1940, Claiborne tried to expand into
southern Arkansas.

But Arkansas Power and Light objected

so strenuously that expansion had to be called off, and
the co-op had to refund a large amount of collected member
ship fees to the southern Arkansas residents

September 14, 1939. Rainach was a butane appliance sales
man in Summerville— interview with Poss, April 1, 1983.
Interview with Poss, April 1, 1983; Claiborne
Electric Co-op, "Minutes," May 25, 1939.
Claiborne Electric Co-op, "Minutes," August 17,
1940.
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On January 20, 1940, Almond stepped down as president,
and Mrs. M. D. Wren was elected,

Almond himself nominated

her and continued to serve on the board, so there was no
power s t r u g g l e . I t was very unusual for a woman to
serve as president of a co-op in Louisiana.

Often women

served as board members in the early years, but they were
usually home demonstration experts who traveled in the
areas explaining the various uses of kitchen appliances.
Mrs. Wren must have been exceptionally competent to be
elected to such an important position at a time when women
were seldom allowed to achieve such status.
Wren remained president for just over a year and was
then replaced by Odom.

He served as president until 1954,

when he and several of the directors were dressed out of
office by an irate group of misinformed members.

They felt

that the board was doing a poor job because after fifteen
years, the co-op was still not paid off.

Odom, in turn,

refused to defend himself and the co-op.

A group formed

in opposition, and, with a misconceived notion of the nature
of the co-op system, sent the founders packing.

Almond, it

seems, was wise enough to see it all coming and resigned
before he was asked to.
Rainach was succeeded as manager by Albert Aymond,

Ibid., January 20, 1940.
Ibid., February 12, 1941; interview with Poss,
April 1, T9BJ.
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who served only until October, 1940.^^^

Thomas Stevenson

took the job until September, 1954, when he became a
casualty of the incident of that year which removed the
original board of directors.

Orval Crouch followed him.

In 1973, the current manager, Elmer Poss, took over the
position.

Poss has an unusual background for a Louisiana

co-op manager.

First of all, he is from Kansas.

Secondly,

his background is in accounting, and not electrical engineer
ing.

After he completed a two-year business college curricu

lum in Lawrence, Kansas, he went to work for the War
Department in Washington.

After one year there, he trans

ferred to REA, spent four years in the service during the
war, and then returned to REA, where he remained until 1949.
His job was to audit the co-ops in the four-state area of
Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Louisiana.

He had not

had the occasion to audit Claiborne Electric before he came
to work there in 1949 as office manager.
heard of Homer.

"I'd never even

I accepted the job by telephone."

From

office manager he advanced to assistant manager in 1965,
and finally to manager in 1973.^^^
The area served by Claiborne Electric has a few dis
tinctions worth mentioning.

Row crop farming has been

137 Claiborne Electric Co-op, "Minutes," May 4, 1940.

139 Interview with Poss, April 1, 1983.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

130

replaced by cattle and broiler raising and dairy farming.
An occasional ice storm has wrought havoc to the co-op
over the years, much as the occasional hurricane keeps the
co-ops in south Louisiana from letting their guard down.
The population of the area has decreased dramatically over
the past few years, as the young people have heated a path
to Houston, New Orleans, and other urban centers where
jobs are more plentiful than on the north Louisiana prairie.
This has left a large population of low-income elderly
people in the Claiborne service area, most of whom use
very little electricity.

The average residential consump

tion of electricity is the second lowest in the state.
Consequently, the Claiborne management must count every
penny.

Bossier Rural Electric Membership Co-op
Bossier City, Louisiana
The most distinctive characteristic of Bossier Rural
Electric membership Co-op (BREMCO) is its independence,
even isolation, from the other co-ops in the state.

This

is partly because BREMCO is situated at the opposite end
of the state from Baton Rouge, the power center for the
state's co-op system.

Of course, with today's rapid

Ibid. The average monthly consumption of kilo
watt hours in the Claiborne area is 787. Only Pointe
Coupee Co-op is lower with 757. The average monthly con
sumption of kilowatt hours throughout the state is 988.
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 58-70.
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transportation and communications, contacts with the Baton
Rouge offices are virtually around the corner compared to
just a few years ago.

But over the past decades, when

transportation and communication systems were less conveni
ent, BREMCO developed independently of the others.

Also,

during the battles of the Sixties and Seventies for the
right to generate power, BREMCO was not quite as interested
as were the other co-ops.

They had had few problems with

the investor-owned utility in their service area, their
rates were low, and, to them, generation did not seem a
real necessity.

BREMCO had been purchasing power from the

Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO) since the
beginning of its operation in 1939.

SWEPCO is located in

Shreveport, but its main service area is Texas and Arkansas.
It has, over the years, had very few dealings with the
other Louisiana investor-owned companies.

In fact, even

today, SWEPCO is not interconnected with the Louisiana power
pool.

When all the fighting was being waged between the

co-ops and the other companies in the state, SWEPCO stayed
out and, to some extent, so did BREMCO.

Today, all of the

state's power is dumped into one large pool in the state.
All the groups draw from it for their own needs, including
the investor-owned utilities, the co-ops, and most munici
pal systems--but not SWEPCO and BREMCO.

Because SWEPCO

is not tied in to this pool, BREMCO must still buy most of
its power, about eighty-five percent, from SWEPCO; it is
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the only co-op in Louisiana to do so.

Both BREMCO and

SWEPCO are, to some extent then, independent of the rest
of the state.

The old Louisiana adage that the northwest

part of the state is more a part of Texas than Louisiana
holds true, at least in this c a s e . T h e r e
a significant exception to this.

is, though,

Charles Roemer, the

chairman of the BREMCO board from the mid-Sixties until
the early Eighties, was a leader in the statewide movement
and in the G&T project.

In fact, he was one of the most

important leaders in both programs.

In that position, he

was able to close the gap between BREMCO and the other
co-ops, but, despite his influence, BREMCO has maintained
an independent attitude due mainly to the SWEPCO connec
tion and its isolation in northwest Louisiana from the
other co-ops.
Despite this independence, though, BREMCO is a member
of the G&T association, and, as such, is obligated to charge
its members the same rates charged by the other distribu
tion co-ops in the state.

BREMCO's rates over the past

few years have been as high as two and one-half times
SWEPCO's rates, a disparity greater than the other co-ops
have had to endure compared to the investor-owned utilities
in their a r e a s . T h e result has been a consumer revolt

141 Interview with Robert Southworth, Bossier City,
Louisiana,, October
Octo
3, 1983.
142

Ibid.
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that began at BREMCO and spread throughout the state.

It

has even most recently led to legislation to regulate the
co-ops.

All of this started at BREMCO in February, 1981.

It was in that month that the SWEPCO-BREMCO rate dis
parity made the fateful jump to 250 percent.

Elaine

McLemore, one of BREMCO's member services officers, went
to Elm Grove, a small town in south Bossier Parish, to
answer a complaint from what she thought was one or two
members.

She was met by an angry mob of twenty.

Several

days later, she and other BREMCO employees met a crowd
200-strong--the Concerned Consumers Committee.

At this

meeting Foster Campbell, a state senator from the ThirtySixth District, Elm Grove citizen, and BREMCO member,
fanned these fires of discontent all the way to Baton
Rouge.

By the 1983 legislative session, he had turned this

local restlessness into a movement, and eventually into a
bill to place the co-ops under the regulative umbrella of
the Public Service Commission.

Locally, the group organized,

raised money, and hired lawyers and auditors.

In the sum

mer of 1981, they voted to replace three of the nine board
members, and, in addition, were able to recall two others
for re-election, including Charles Roemer.

Roemer had been

one of the co-op's principal leaders since the early Fif
ties, and had gone on to manage Edwin Edward's 1975 cam
paign for governor, and then to become Edward's Commissioner
of Administration.

In 1981, when the demonstration occured

at BREMCO, Roemer was falling from his position as the
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state's second most powerful person to one of its least
powerful.

He was indicted and eventually convicted in the

FBI's "BRILAB" investigations that landed him in prison,
along with New Orleans mafia figure Carlos Marcello, for
accepting insurance kickbacks.

Busy fighting this charge,

Roemer stepped down rather than face defeat.

The other

board member brought up for election by this recall peti
tion was able to escape defeat, but in 1982 he chose not
to push his luck, and resigned.

The manager, D. L. Knight,

took a job with the National Rural Electric Cooperative
Association in Bangladesh.

Apparently, he wanted to get

as far away as possible from BREMCO consumers.

According

to McLemore, "he'd had all he could take.
The revolt has subsided considerably in the last few
months, according to the present manager, Robert Southworth,
and McLemore.

SWEPCO's rates have begun to rise, and today

they are only about forty percent below BREMCO's.

The

future for the co-op, according to its employees, is that
prices will be higher than SWEPCO's until the turn of the
century, but that about 1990, the gap will begin to close.
By 1995, the two will be less than one cent per kilowatt
hour apart.
This consumer fight is interesting, but the co-op does

Interview with Elaine McLemore, October 3, 1983.
Ibid.; interview with Robert Southworth, October
3, 1983.
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have a past, as well as a present and a future.

The co-op

began with its first meeting at the parish courthouse, at
the Bossier Parish seat in Benton, on June 10, 1939.

It

was called by J. H. Messer, who was elected chairman and
then president.
Martin.

The secretary-treasurer was Mrs. S. W.

There were eleven board members, most of them

from Bossier Parish.

Four of the group represented Plain

Dealing, Louisiana, a small town in the hills of north
Bossier P a r i s h . A t

the second meeting, a year later,

they selected a manager, B. H. Allen, and agreed to borrow
$104,000 from REA for 113 miles of line.

Allen traveled

to Valley Electric in Natchitoches to get some tips on how
to get the project m o v i n g . B y August, Allen had the
entire 113 miles staked and ready for c o n s t r u c t i o n . B y
December 8, 1939, he had announced that a few miles of
line had been energized, and that all the lines would be
on within a week.^^^
Smith stayed on until 1941, but it is nearly impossible
to determine from the minutes the succession of managers
after that.

The secretaries, over the years, simply referred

to the managers in the minutes as "the supervisor," and they

June 10, 1938.
Ibid., May 30, 1939.
Ibid., August 25, 1939.
Ibid., December 8, 1939.
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never recorded changes from one manager to the next.

But

in Rural Louisiana, beginning in 1952, the managers of the
co-ops are listed each month.

In that year, Ralph Gravelle

was manager at B R E M C O . H e was replaced in 1956 by

followed by D. L. Knight in 1964.^^^

In December, 1981,

the current manager, Robert Southworth, took over the
position.
BREMCO's service area is all of Bossier Parish, and
parts of Webster, Bienville, and Red River parishes.

Its

office is located just across the Red River from Shreveport
in Bossier City, the fastest growing area in North Louisiana.
Bossier City itself has a twenty-seven percent growth rate,
compared to Shreveport which is growing at seventeen per
cent.

Of course, BREMCO does not serve Bossier City,

but that city's growth reflects the co-op's growth.
average

growth rate forthe four-parish servicearea

healthy

5.2 p e r c e n t . T h e co-op itself has had

percent

consumer growth rate since 1960.

The
is a

an84.7

Rural Louisiana, January, 1952, n.p.
Ibid., January, 1956, n.p.

cal Abstract of Louisiana (7th ed., T98%T, 4-5.
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REA, Annual Statistical Report. 1980, 69; ibid.,

1960, 77.
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BREMCO’s future can only improve over its immediate
past.

The new bill that might place BREMCO and the other

state co-ops under the PSC would be, according to BREMCO
officials, a welcomed relief.

All the blame for high

rates could then be placed on the shoulders of the PSC,
and that would take much of the pressure off BREMCO.
is obvious that the revolt took its toll.

It

"It’s not some

thing I ’d like to live through again," states McLemore.
There are even some hard feelings between BREMCO and the
Baton Rouge office.

According to Southworth and McLemore,

had the G&T group been willing to allow BREMCO to lower
its rates, establishing parity with SWEPCO at least for
a short time, this entire problem could have been killed
at b i r t h . T h e pressure would have been eased on BREMCO,
and the uprising would not have spread and ended in state
rate regulation.
BREMCO is not particularly proud of its position as
the place where a statewide, anti-co-op, consumer revolt
began, but, as BREMCO personnel see it, the rate gap be
tween themselves and SWEPCO made such a conflict inevitable.
They even hold a great deal of sympathy for their consumers.

Interview with McLemore, October 3, 1983.
Ibid.; interview with Southworth, October 3, 1983.
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Pointe Coupee Electric Co-op
New Roads, Louisiana
It is difficult to examine the thirteen co-ops in
the state and find something distinctive for each.
for Pointe Coupee, the job is easy.
Coupee is very small.

But

First of all. Pointe

Two other co-ops in the state serve

fewer consumers, Teche Electric and Jeff Davis, but none
sells less electricity.
for 1980 was only 93,621.

Pointe Coupee's megawatt sales
By comparison at the other end

of the scale, SLEMCO, the largest in the state, sold
nearly eleven times that in 1980.

Dixie Electric, just

across the river, sold nearly seven times as much.^^®
Pointe Coupee also has one of the state's lowest consumer
growth rates, at only ninety percent since 1960.^^^

All

of this, of course, is not to say that the people at Pointe
Coupee are not doing their jobs.

The three parishes served

by Pointe Coupee— West Baton Rouge, Pointe Coupee, and
part of Iberville--are small, although there is some growth.
West Baton Rouge Parish is growing at a rate of 7.6 percent,
while Pointe Coupee is growing at a 3.2 percent rate.
Iberville Parish, though, is stable.
Another significant statistic is that Pointe Coupee
serves nearly ten consumers per mile.

Only SLECA and

REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 68.
Ibid., 68.
UNO, 1981 Statistical Abstract, 4-5.
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In all three co-ops, it is
not the case that the rural population is numerous, but
that it is condensed.

Over the years, settlements have

sprung up along the high ground on either side of the
bayous, and between the swamplands.

In Pointe Coupee,

much of the population is along the Mississippi River in
small towns such as Brusley. Bayou Goula, and Addis.

Many

of these towns existed in another age as river towns,
making their livelihood from the river's commerce.

Today,

the towns remain in existence, but the river commerce has
vanished.
It might seem that of the three parishes served by
Pointe Coupee, West Baton Rouge would have the largest
population, since it is an industrial suburb of Baton
Rouge, the fastest growing city in the state.

But West

Baton Rouge Parish has a small population; it is, in fact,
the smallest of the three,

Iberville Parish has nearly

twice the population of West Baton Rouge P a r i s h . T h e
problem, if it is a problem, is that Port Allen, the
principal town on the west side of the river, has never
become a bona fide middle-class suburb of Baton Rouge, as
Algiers or Gretna have become of New Orleans ; and hence
the suburban growth across the river has just never begun.

REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 64.
UNO, 1981 Statistical Abstract, 4-5.
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Furthermore, West Baton Rouge Parish has become industrial,
and that seldom sets the stage for growth in suburban
living.

Also, the industry that has come into West Baton

Rouge, principally the chemical industry, is chiefly
capital intensive, hiring only a few engineers here and
there, most of whom are more comfortable commuting from
the East Baton Rouge Parish suburbs, east of the city.
Most visitors to the Pointe Coupee service area will
recall sugar cane.

It covers the fields throughout the

summer, and it seems to be the main activity at November
harvest time when travel is difficult because of slowmoving sugar cane wagons.

But recently, sugar cane has

moved far down the list in agricultural production in
this area.

As with most sugar producing areas in the

state, soybeans have taken over as a better provider, while
sugar has gone to the wayside.

In fact, in Pointe Coupee

Parish, sugar ranks third behind soybeans and cattle.
But sugar milling still remains the chief industry
One unique characteristic of Pointe Coupee is its
manager, A. A. Robinson, best known as "Bubba."

In 1937

he was elected to the co-op's first board of directors, at
age twenty-two.

Two years later, the manager that

Robinson had helped hire as a board member was killed in
an electrical accident.

Robinson agreed to take over the
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position.

It was 1939, and he was twenty-four.

still there today.

He is

No one in the nation, he says, has

been a manager longer— forty-four years.
Robinson was born and raised in Jackson, Mississippi,
and attended Millsaps College there before moving to
Pointe Coupee Parish in the mid-Thirties.
2,000

He moved on to

acres of family-owned property there ; most of it

was shared out to about twenty-five tenant families.

He

had just been married, and one of his chief concerns was
that he and his wife would have to contend with an unelec
trified farm.
Robinson was on the co-op's first board of directors
that met in June, 1938, in the town of Lettsworth on the
Texas and Pacific Railroad line in northern Pointe Coupee
Parish.

The organizer was A. B. Curet, the county agent

for the parish.

He called together the most prominent

local citizens, nine in all, and Robinson was one.

Ap

parently, the group saw some eagerness in this young man
and elected him chairman at the first meeting.

He then went

on to become manager, an unusual move for a board member.
The first loan was for $124,000 for 125 miles of line.
Interview with A. A. Robinson, New Roads, Louisiana,
September 11, 1980; Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 9; ibid.,
November, 1959, 7.
Interview with Robinson, September 11, 1980 ; Rural
Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.
Ibid.
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serving 504 consumers.
If there is any co-op in the state that has been
dominated by one man, it is Pointe Coupee.

Robinson has

a dynamic, forceful personality that has, over the years,
allowed him to govern not only Pointe Coupee but, to a
great extent, both the statewide and the G&T program in
Louisiana.

He is considered a big thinker, unconcerned

with details, strong-willed, and even a bit dictatorial.^^®
Certainly without him, the statewide organization and the
G&T program would never have gotten off the ground.

In

1959, he was elected to the presidency of the statewide,
and that job led to the presidency of the G&T federation
His terms in various offices have not been without con
troversy, but his influence, over the years, has been
substantial.

Bubba Robinson has been Pointe Coupee, and,

to a lesser extent, he has been one of the principal
leaders in the Louisiana co-op movement.

Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.
Interview with McVea, July 13, 1982; interview
with Robbins, August 9, 1982.
Rural Louisiana, November, 1959, 7.
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Beauregard Electric Co-op
DeRldder, Louisiana
Several co-ops in the state, over the last two
decades, have been growing very fast, particularly Dixie
Electric with a 213 percent rate of consumer growth since
1960, and SLECA, with 204 p e r c e n t . B o t h of these co-ops
are growing for obvious reasons.

Dixie is expanding with

Baton Rouge, while SLECA is benefiting from the industry
that has developed around the oil and gas fields near
Houma.

Beauregard Electric is the third fastest growing

co-op in the state with a 164 percent rate of growth since
1960.^^^

But at Beauregard, the reason for the growth is

not as obvious.

Of course, the area is growing.

Beauregard

Parish is the fourth fastest growing parish in the state,
and Calcasieu Parish is also growing rapidly.

The other

parishes, though, in the Beauregard service area are grow
ing more slowly, some are even losing p o p u l a t i o n . S o ,
why are Beauregard and Calcasieu parishes growing so rapidly?
The answer for Calcasieu is simple: Lake Charles is growing,
and Beauregard serves the outskirts to the north of the
city.

This growth is rapid, particularly along U.S. High

way 171 north of the Calcasieu River toward Gillis.
it is not so simple to analyze Beauregard Parish.

But
With

REA, Annual Statistical Report, 78; ibid., 1980, 70.
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the exception of DeRldder and a few smaller towns, the
parish is rural.
5,000

DeRldder, in fact, is the only town over

in the parish.

The answer might be Fort Polk, al

though it is located to the north in Vernon Parish, but
many of the fort's military and civilian personnel live in
and around DeRldder, and, with its large payroll. Fort
Polk certainly has an impact on the parish and the entire
co-op service area.

Also, the Vietnam War brought Fort

Polk to life in the late sixties and early seventies, and
that would help account for the area's growth statistics
for the last two decades.

Possibly as many as one million

soldiers passed through the barracks at Fort Polk during
that period.

A second reason for the rapid growth in

Beauregard Parish is the lumber industry.

Boise-Southern

has built one of the largest papermills in the country in
Beauregard P a r i s h . I t

is, in fact, the largest such

plant to have been constructed in one stage.

And like any

large industry, it has attracted support activity, has
hired people, and has generally fed the local economy.
This activity has brought development to Beauregard and
Calcasieu parishes, therefore, to Beauregard Electric.
But ironically, the co-op does not serve Lake Charles,
Fort Polk, or Boise-Southern, the three catalysts of the
growth in the area.
Interview with Horace Wingate, DeRidder, Louisiana,
September 30, 1983.
Ibid.
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The other parishes served by Beauregard Electric are
parts of Vernon, Allen, Rapides, Evangeline, and Jeff
Davis. All of the service area is generally agricultural,
with emphasis on soybeans, timber, cattle, and rice, in
that order.

The topography ranges from low-lying and

swampy in the south, to rolling hills in the north.

In

between lie the flat Louisiana prairie lands.
The Beauregard Electric Co-op was one of the last in
the state to organize and get on line.

The first meeting

was held in the police jury room at the parish courthouse
on First Street in DeRidder on March 8, 1939.

But it was

nearly a year and a half later that the area's first
lights were turned on.

The minutes do not reveal an

organizer, the one person responsible for getting the
thing started.

But the present manager, Horace Wingate,

who came to the program in 1946, speculates that it was
Rugus Morris.

Morris was a member of the police jury and

a prominent local figure, and since the first meetings were
held in the police jury room at the DeRidder Courthouse,
he may have organized the program.

But if he was the

organizer, he was not the first board president.

That

distinction went to C. F. Hennigan.^^^

Beauregard Electric Co-op, "Minutes," March 8,
1939.
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At the second meeting, held in late November, Hennigan
resigned his post, along with two other board members: J. E.
Cockran, and L. C. Cole.

Their reasons for leaving will

disappoint those who perceive the nation's co-op movement
to be an idealistic, unselfish endeavor led by those with
a will to help others.

They left because the first lines

would not connect their h o u s e s . P o s s i b l y the program
at Beauregard developed those idealistic standards without
them.
The first manager at Beauregard was R. I. Davis, an
instructor in electronics at Northwestern State College in
Natchitoches.

He left that post to pioneer the program

at Beauregard in 1940.

His connection to the new co-op

was his cousin, W. D. West, who had succeeded Hannigan as
president of the board.

Wingate began at Beauregard under

Davis and recalls that he was a "strongheaded, hardheaded
builder, with a knack to put things together."

But in

October, 1941, Davis decided that the project would never
get off the ground; he felt he would be better off back
teaching in Natchitoches, so he quit--but his influence
was far from ended at B e a u r e g a r d . T h e second manager
was R. B. Miller.

The by-laws required three nominations

Ibid., November 21, 1939.
Interview with Wingate, Se,
Beauregard Electric Co-op, "Minutes," October 21, 1941.
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for manager's position, so the secretary entered three
choices into the minutes :
1.

R. B. Miller

2.

R. B. Miller

3.

R. B. Miller

He got the job.^^^

Nine months later, the program had

apparently turned around.

According to Wingate, West

worked hard and long to make the program work.

He paid

many five dollar fees from his own pocket, and even super
vised construction.

In July, he called his cousin to

come back; the program would work.
On July 3, 1942, Davis returned.

He quibbled with

the board a bit over his salary, but it is clear in the
minutes that they were delighted to have him back.
stayed on until 1955.^^^

He

According to Wingate, it is

Davis who deserves the credit for putting Beauregard
Electric together.
The first lines were built south along U.S. Highway
171 toward Lake Charles.

The first loan was for $106,000

to serve some 432 Louisianians.

A line was also built to

the Methodist Church in Sugartown, where the first meter

1941.
Interview with Wingate, September 30, 1973.
Beauregard Electric Co-op.

"Minutes," July 3,

1942.
Interview with Wingate, September 30, 1983.
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was installed.

The church's bill for the first year was

eighteen dollars.

The co-op received its electricity

from the old Longbell Lumber mill in DeRidder until about
1948 when expansion required more power than the mill
could provide,

Beauregard then connected to the Crosby

Chemical Company, and for several years received power
from both companies.

It was not until the early Fifties

that they began buying power from the state's investorowned companies, principally LP&L.^^^
Wingate worked his way up the ladder at Beauregard,
He came in 1946,

Before that, he managed German prisoners-

of-war at Fort Polk, where he supervised some electrical
work.

He began at Beauregard as a clerk, then became

line supervisor, then purchasing agent, and finally assist
ant manager,
John Sim,

Davis left in 1955, and was succeeded by

Sim remained on for ten years, followed by

Wingate in 1966,^®^
Today, the co-op has grown to be the fourth largest
in the state, with the third most rapid rate of growth,

Beauregard Electric Co-op, "Minutes," January 9,
1940; interview with Wingate, September 30, 1983,
Interview with Wingate, September 30, 1983; inter
view with Almond Cole, DeRidder, Louisiana, September 30,
1983,
Interview with Wingate, September 30, 1983,
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To those outside that part of the state, the Beauregard
Electric service area may not appear to be the state's
most dynamic economic sector, but it is growing rapidly and
for several reasons may sustain future growth.

Dixie Electric Co-op
Greenwell Springs, Louisiana
Rapid growth has characterized several Louisiana co
ops, but no co-op in Louisiana is growing as rapidly as
Dixie Electric.

In 1960, Dixie served 12,552 consumers.

By 1980, it had grown to serve nearly 40,000--a growth of
nearly 220 percent.

Several co-ops come in close behind,

such as SLECA with just over 204 percent and Beauregard
with 164 p e r c e n t , D i x i e ' s rapid growth is, of course,
due to the growth of the area it serves : East Baton Rouge
Parish, East and West Feliciana, Livingston, St. Helena,
and Ascension Parishes.

Of those parishes, Livingston is

the fastest growing, and the second fastest growing in
the state, with a growth rate of 38.6 percent since 1970.^^^
Livingston Parish is receiving the brunt of the Baton
Rouge overflow and suburban rush, as Baton Rouge grows
eastward along Interstate Twelve toward such rapidly grow
ing towns as Denham Springs, Walker and Livingston.

At

the same time. Baton Rouge is also spreading southward.

188 UNO, 1981 Statistical Abstract, 4-5.
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into Ascension Parish, also a rapidly growing parish with
a population increase of over twenty-one percent since
1 9 7 0 . Much of this growth can be attributed to popula
tion movements along Interstate 10, toward Gonzales.

All

of this is not to exclude the growth of East Baton Rouge
Parish itself.

Although the population there has begun

to level off in the last decade (and, in fact, is moving
outside the parish borders to the east and south), East
Baton Rouge Parish was, in the two post-war decades, the
fastest growing parish in the state, by far.

The

other parishes in Dixie's service area, those to the north
of Baton Rouge, are losing population--possibly to the
three rapidly growing parishes to the s o u t h . I t may
seem that these no-growth areas distort Dixie's growth
statistics by dragging down the statistics of the rapidly
growing areas, but it is parishes of this type that co-ops
like Dixie exist to serve.

If it were not for Dixie, areas

such as St. Helena, East Feliciana, and West Feliciana
might not have lights today, or at least they would have
received them later than they did.

At the same time, it

is the rapidly growing areas of East Baton Rouge, Livingston
and Ascension parishes, with their high density and rural

UNO, 1981 Statistical Abstract, 4-5.
Calhoun, Louisiana Almanac, 125.
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industrial loads, that allow Dixie to serve the three
northern parishes in its service area,
Dixie's beginning was not much different from the
beginnings of the other co-ops.
things at about the same time.

It did most of the same
Irving Heath was the

county agent for East Baton Rouge Parish in 1938.

He

contacted three wealthy area farmers on the East Baton
Rouge Parish Police Jury: Willie Wicher, Philander Smith,
and Frank Milican.

They agreed to organize a co-op if the

area showed an interest.

These three men called a meeting

at Central High School in Baton Rouge: 350 attended.
Several weeks later, they all met there again.

More

interested people showed up, and many came ready to pay
their $5.00 membership fee.

From that, the first meet

ing of the "incorporators and directors" was at the law
office of Fred G. Benton at the Louisiana National Bank
building in Baton Rouge on August 9, 1938.

Philander

Smith chaired the first meeting, and Leander Hopper took
the minutes.

Other "incorporators" that attended were

Mrs. Joe W. Annison, S. S. Lipscomb, Mrs. James E. Robinson,
and Milican and Wicker.

These members were to go out among

the people in their areas and solicit the $5.00 membership
fee.^^^
ful.

Over the winter, the group apparently was success

They met again on March 13, 1939 and pooled their
Rural Louisiana, November, 1967.
Dixie Electric Co-op, "Minutes," August 9, 1938.
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collection of $2,500.

Although it had been nine months

after their first meeting, they had apparently met un
officially within that time (or possibly minutes had not
been kept for intervening meetings), because they had by
then made their first loan application and decided where
the lines would be built.

The first loan was for $309,000

at a 2.73 percent interest rate to build 362 miles of line
in East Baton Rouge, Livingston, and West Feliciana par
ishes .

It was board member Willie Wicker who took a

train to Washington to see REA Administrator John Carmody
about the loan.

The meeting was arranged by the young

Louisiana Congressman, Jimmy M o r r i s o n . A l s o at this
March meeting, Emanuel Morgan was named the first manager.
Morgan, like his counterparts at many of the other co-ops,
was not an engineer, but rather a contractor whose job
was to build the system and get it on line as quickly as
possible.

Just two months later, the Dixie board, deciding

it needed an engineer rather than simply a contractor,
abruptly fired Morgan and hired Lynn Cook.

Ten days later

they accepted bids for the project and construction began.
But just two months later. Cook resigned, and was
replaced by his chief engineer, E. B. Kasiske.^^^

In just

Dixie Electric Co-op, "Minutes," March 13, 1939;
ibid., June 9, 1939.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

three months, he r e s i g n e d , a n d was replaced by Ellis B,
Thompson.This

is an example of what became Dixie's

most distinctive characteristic: a high turnover of managers.
Over the years, Dixie has had as many as ten managers.
Compared to some co-ops such as Teche, Jeff Davis, SLEMCO,
and Washington-St. Tammany that have had only one or two
managers in some forty-five years, it is obvious that there
is something different about Dixie.
very powerful board of directors.

The minutes reveal a
It is a group that has

been in control from the beginning, has hired all employees,
and has made all the decisions.
of Dixie to this day.

Ths is a characteristic

Today, the President of the Board,

Scott McVea, feels that managers are generally not reliable,
that "there's more stability on the board than there is in
the manager.

They move for one reason or another, or

they're forced to leave.

. . .

But the managers [are] not

as good as the members of the b o a r d . M c V e a has observed
as many as eight of those ten managers of the last forty
years, and his statement is an obvious reaction to that
high turnover.
Finally, about one month after Thompson was hired as
the fourth manager at Dixie, the first lines were energized

199

Ibid.

200 Interview with McVea, July 13, 1982.
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on December 20, 1939.
other co-ops around the state, the lights were on for
those rural residents by Christmas.
There have been two real leaders at Dixie over the
years; McVea has been one.

He came to Dixie in 1942 as a

board member, and has been there ever since, serving as
Vice President, then as President, and also as one of the
principal leaders at the statewide organization and in the
G&T program.

McVea does not fit the mold of many of the

state's other board members.

He does not have a farming

background; in fact, he does not even have a rural back
ground.

When McVea came to the Dixie board in 1942, he

was a school teacher and coach at Zachary High School.
From there he went on to Baton Rouge High School, and then
to Istrouma High School before quitting— to become a
farmer.

But, ironically for a leader in a rural program,

he decided that farming was not his calling, and he returned
to school for a masters degree in 1949.

He then went back

to teach at Zachary, and retired from there as principal.
He was elected President of the Board at Dixie in 1957 and
continues to serve in that position today.
The other important figure in Dixie's history has been
J. E. McAdam.

He came to Dixie in 1947, and was the

Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.
Interview with McVea, July 13, 1982.
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exception to Dixie's manager turnover problems; he remained
at his position for twenty years.

He was also an exception

in that he was apparently at least as powerful as his board
members.

He had a reputation for being difficult to get

along with, hardheaded, and independent.

At the same

time, he brought Dixie through its greatest growth period,
and it might be said, built the Dixie that is Dixie today.
To most co-op leaders he is best remembered for several
times pulling out of the newspaper, by not allowing the
statewide organization to send the paper to his co-op
members.

His usual reason was that he disagreed with the

content.

Finally, in 1967, he butted heads with his board

and was fired.
Today, Dixie is managed by Bob Harbor.

He is new at

the job, and might prove to be one of the first of a new
generation of younger men and women in the Louisiana co-op
system.

He was preceded by C. J. Watson, and then by Paul

Wood, who came to Dixie in 1977.

Wood has gone on to the

manager's position at the statewide organization.

He was

preceded by Harold Sicard, who followed McAdam.
Dixie has recently moved to new headquarters near
Greenwell Springs, Louisiana, just east of Baton Rouge.

view with Robbins, August 9, 1982.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The first Dixie office was on North Street in Baton Rouge.
From there they moved to Airline Highway, remaining until
1QQO
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The importance of the individual co-ops cannot be
understated.

It was there, on the local level, that the

movement began in Louisiana.

No amount of federal legisla

tion, or even federal money could have gotten these local
programs off the ground; it took local organizers, local
leaders, and local interests.

In these thirteen little

histories of the state's co-ops, there are a lot of names,
and each of them is important in relation to the beginning,
growth, and development of the co-ops.

Of course, most of

the co-ops' recent political activity in Louisiana has
centered around the statewide association, but the local
groups started it all.

The statewide organization is the

creation of the local groups and would not have come into
existence without them.

They were the ones who organized

the program and made it work, and it is the local groups
today that are still the heart of the whole system.

Rural Louisiana, June, 1973, 16.
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BEGINNINGS OF THE STATEWIDE ASSOCIATION;
INCEPTION TO 1960
The statewide organization, the Association of
Louisiana Electric Cooperatives, had its birth on October
28, 1941.^
until 1960.

That official name, though, was not adopted
Until then, it was known simply as the manag

er's association, or the statewide association.

It began

as a meeting of the minds of the state's managers, and
would remain that until 1950 when the board presidents
were invited to a.ttend.

There were many reasons to meet.

All the managers dealt with many of the same problems at
their local co-ops, and a coordination of thought and
effort would make those problems easier to solve.
first objective was to obtain copper.

But the

The private utili

ties, the managers felt, were getting more than their fair
share of the precious metal, and the managers hoped to
unite and lobby for what they considered their quota of
copper not being used in the war effort.^
Acquisition of copper was the association's immediate

^ Manager's Association, "Minutes," October 28, 1941.
^ Ibid., October 28, 1941.
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purpose, though lobbying soon became more Important,

In

their organizational statement, after copper, the members
wrote that it was "necessary to maintain normal growth to
all REA's throughout Louisiana and generally by representa
tion with our Senators and Representatives in Washington
and to obtain such benefits and advantages that are our
just dues.

That statement, although probably never read

again, was the beginning of a lobbying campaign that would
attain full stride in the mid-Sixties and never slow down.
The first president and organizer of the association
was Robert Holladay, manager at Northeast in Winnsboro.
The monthly meetings were first held at various co-op of
fices around the state, but the group finally settled down
in a two-room office in Opelousas in 1 9 5 3 The presidency,
over the years, passed from one manager to the next in a
kind of rotation that kept everyone involved.
The first lobbyist was Mike Scanlon from SLEMCO.

In

1946, he lobbied to keep the Louisiana co-ops from being
regulated by the state's Public Service Commission.
was successful; the bill was defeated.^

He

This, the

group's first attempt at persuading legislators, was their
first success.

There were many fights ahead, but few would

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

be as hard fought as PSC regulation.
fired in 1946.

The first shots were

A similar fight continues today.

On the floor of the legislature, it was Willie Rainach
who did the co-op's bidding in the early years.

Rainach

was one of the organizers of Claiborne Electric and later
a candidate for governor.

In 1940, he worked to keep the

co-op's lines tax exempt, and later he led the fight on
the Senate floor to keep the co-ops from under the regula
tory thumb of the PSC.^
Lobbying was important, but for the first five years
of the organization's life, the members more often than
not simply collaborated on mutual needs.

They discussed

a group purchase of trucks ; they set up a training center
for employees; they generally discussed common problems,
common interests, and common situations.

"We'd meet and

carry on statewide business," Shubal Robbins remembers,
"and exchange ideas [on] statewide publicity and an adver
tising program.

We'd discuss technical things, improve

ments in lines, and that sort.

. . .

But in 1946, the direction of the organization changed.

Ibid. Included in the "Minutes" for this month is
a handwritten appreciation to Rainach for aiding in the
passage of Act 376 of 1940 which excempted co-op lines from
taxation, and "For advice and labors in securing the defeat
of legislation . . . designed to place electric cooperatives
under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission."
August 9, 1982.
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In that year, the members decided to generate their own
electricity.

It was concluded at the November 15th meeting

"that this organization apply to REA for a loan for the
purpose of erecting a generating and transmission system
[for] the purpose of getting a definite source of power
for the cooperatives in L o u i s i a n a . T h e group aspired,
for the first time, to be sellers of electricity instead
of buyers.

The reason was the cost of wholesale power--

what the utilities were threatening to charge the co-ops
for power.

It is difficult to verify a proposed rate in

crease, but those who were there recall that the private
utilities wanted an increase of approximately two-thirds,
from an 8.8 rate to about 14.5 mills per kilowatt hour.^
The plans progressed.

In 1947, a fund was set up to

Manager's Association, "Minutes," November 15, 1946.
1969, 2. These are general histories of the early G&T
proposals.
See also, "Statement of J. S. Robbins before
the Joint Committees of Interior and Insular Affairs and
Public Works Committee," undated, unpublished copy in ALEC
files. Baton Rouge. Robbins states here that the price was
8.25 mills.
"Statement of Charles Roemer Before Bureau of
Reclamation and Interior Power Marketing Agencies Subcom
mittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee," (undated,
unpublished copy in ALEC files. Baton Rouge), 5. Roemer,
here, states 9.0 mills. Also, interview with Robbins,
August 9, 1982; interview with U. J. Gajan, Lafayette,
Louisiana, November 16, 1981.
Manager's Association, "Minutes," January 15-16,
1947.
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the Kiljian Corporation of Philadelphia was retained as
engineers, and in 1949, a plan was made to build a plant
in Beauregard Parish.^^
At the same time these plans were being drawn, the
managers were trying to buy power from the Southwest Power
Authority, a Department of the Interior division that
builds dams and generates hydro-electric power in the
Southwest much as TVA does in the Tennessee Valley.

The

Louisiana co-ops hoped to purchase this power through a
super-cooperative known as Tex-La.

This group was made

up of several cooperatives throughout Louisiana, Texas,
and Arkansas whose sole purpose was to buy blocks of power
from SPA dams at a lower price than could be offered by
the private utilities.

This power would then be wheeled

(moved for a charge) over private utility transmission
lines (the small co-ops had only distribution lines) to
the co-ops and small municipal systems in the state.
The Louisiana co-ops seemed to be moving into the
world of self-sufficiency.

A G&T plant was on the drawing

board, and a connection was about to be made to cheap
hydro-power.

But these plans were all scrapped.

In 1951,

the cost of power from the utilities dropped to 5.5 mills.
By 1955, the average co-op in the state was paying only

11 Ibid., June 24, 1948; ibid., January 11-14, 1949.
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proposed rate was amazing.
the bluff worked.

If the co-ops were bluffing,

They got what they wanted: cheap power,

which, in the late Forties and early Fifties, was all
they wanted.

Later, when a second plan for a G&T was

drawn up, the objective would be somewhat different.
But for the moment, the objective was achieved.
Each time the companies raise rates, there is a lot
of fingerpointing by the co-op officials, accusing the
companies of trying to put the co-ops out of business.
Of course, the higher the cost of fuel to the co-op, the
higher the cost of electricity to the consumer.

High

utility bills make for a rebellious membership, one that
might even vote to sell out the entire co-op system to
the private utilities in exchange for promised lower rates.
Co-op leaders have always claimed that this scheme was the

tical Report, 1955 (Washington, USGPO, 1955), 74-76. Here
after cited as ASR. See also. Rural Louisiana, February,
1963, 2; ibid., February, 1962, 2.
Examples of such claims are: Rural Louisiana,
March, 1963, 11. "In recent years the companies have
arbitrarily increased wholesale power rates to the co-ops
. . . designed to put the co-ops out of business. Manager's
Association, "Minutes," October 5, 1954. "Mr. Holladay ad
vised that the power companies are step-by-step, one way or
another, increasing power costs to the cooperatives." This
fear was not limited to the early years.
In 1973, Gene
Taylor, manager at Concordia Electric, feared that LP&L
might try to take over his co-op. As late as 1976, Mark
Bonner, the manager of the statewide, spoke before that
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this proposed rate increase of over sixty percent was cer
tainly excessive in a period of lowering fuel costs and
increased revenues in the post-war expansion years.

The

threat of a G&T (the possibility of losing their biggest
customers) seemed to have forced the utilities to drop
their prices drastically.

The 1954 rate decrease to be

tween 4.5 and 5.0 mills is essentially the same rate at
which the co-ops could have bought power from SPA had that
hookup been p u r s u e d . A l s o ,

the percent of income used

to buy electricity dropped from thirty-seven in 1947 to
twenty-three in 1953.^^

So, with usage up, there had ap

parently not been a need for any price increase, and cer
tainly not one as drastic as sixty percent.

Also at about

this time, the utilities made at least one attempt to buy
out a co-op at Houma,

The attempt was blatant and outright

to the point of the utilities' drawing up contracts and

group : "The ultimate goal of Middle South Utilities [the
holding company for CLECO and LP&L] is to take every bit
of electric utility service in Louisiana . . . with the
possible exception of GSU."
Rural Louisiana, February, 1963, 2; ibid., April,
1956; Manager's Association, "Minutes," January 8, 1952;
ibid., October 25, 1951.

February 14, 1983.
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Probably the best reason the utilities had to try to
acquire the co-ops (if in fact they were) was that the
co-ops were becoming prosperous.

Post-war rural growth

was certainly far beyond anything the utilities must have
imagined.

Between 1945 and 1950, Louisiana co-ops con

nected over 55,000 consumers, and by 1950, they had re
corded a margin of profit of nearly $600,000.^^

The private

utilities had been shortsighted in the Thirties and Forties.
Rural electrification had quickly become lucrative.

Possi

bly the utilities hoped to make up for their shortsighted
ness by making life so difficult for the co-ops that they
would sell out.

Whether or not the utilities were trying

to take over the co-ops is unclear ; what is clear, though,
is that the co-op leaders thought they were and reacted
accordingly, and that is the important point to be made
here.
By 1950, the thirteen co-ops had successfully fended
off a crippling price hike by standing together against
the investor-owned utilities.

It was a lesson that had

been learned well and would not be forgotten : united they
could stand, individually they could not.

But they also

learned that the investor-owned utilities were the enemy,
that they were under their thumb, that a severe price hike,
justified or not, could force the members to sell out their
co-ops in order to bring prices down.

The private companies
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had a monopoly on power, and the only way the thirteen
co-ops could force them to withdraw was to threaten the
monopoly with self-generation, a situation that, in 1950,
would have cost the private utilities over eighty-six
million kilowatt hours in purchased power, nearly $700,000
in revenue, a loss they were not willing to sustain.
Victory had been sweet, lessons had been learned, but
the results were not all good.

The two groups squared off

into the armed camps preparing for a battle that would
eventually come.

The utility-as-enemy attitude would re

main with these young leaders for many years, making future
compromises with the investor-owned utilities almost
impossible.
Meanwhile, the manager's group settled down to lobby
for its cause in the state legislature, and promoting the
Louisiana electric co-ops.
their world was calm.

For eight years, 1950 to 1958,

The price they paid for electricity

was low, allowing most co-ops in the state to progressively
lower prices to their members, and prosper.

They were the

men in the white hats, one Gulf States Utilities official
r e c a l l s . I t was a period of quiet growth and prosperity.
The main endeavor of the statewide organization in
this period was to begin publication of the statewide

1983.
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newspaper, REA News.

The editor was Wayne Martin, and the

first issue went out on March 20, 1950.

The feature article

was the first article of its kind defining the paper's
purpose.

Articles like it would appear over and over again;

"Just What is an REA Co-op?"

Other stories in the first

issue included one on E. E. Taylor, manager at Concordia
Electric, who made use of "up to date radio equipment" to
keep in contact with his trucks during a flood; and one on
most of the state leaders making a trip to the annual NRECA
meeting in Chicago.

There was a cartoon of a smiling Uncle

Sam lending money with one hand from the U.S. Treasury to
a grateful REA borrower while gratefully receiving a loan
payment from another REA borrower with the other.
message: "REA loans are not 'grants.'"

The

There was a report

from the statewide president.

Several co-op members were

praised for their good works.

And there was a "Woman's

Page" in which the editor's wife, Alice Martin, assembled
such "womanly" things as dress patterns, recipes for hot
bean salad, and one article that might have been a sign of
the times to come, entitled, "No Second Fiddle," in which
was stated that farm women were tired of playing second
fiddle to farm animals.

The message, of course, was that

if the farms had electricity the farm wife's role might be
raised to a point somewhere above that of cattle,
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After only about two years as editor, Wayne Martin
left the group under strained circumstances.

In his

resignation speech, he spoke of the immediate cause; "For
a period of several months, I have felt the affairs of the
state association and Louisiana REA News were being hindered
through my services.

Several attempts have been made--and

they have failed--to solve the major personal differences
between me and one Co-op manager.

For that reason, and

that reason only, I would like to resign.
Whatever personal conflict drove Martin out of the
association, there were other reasons, as well, for his
resignation.

Martin's position was not only designated as

"editor," but also as "manager," manager of the statewide
organization.

This, he apparently felt, put him above the

local managers, or at least he aspired to such powers.
Martin had come from Arkansas where the statewide associa
tion was strong, where the statewide manager often delegated
authority down to the managers.

According to Martin's suc

cessor, Mark Bonner, Martin wanted "to sell the concept
somewhat like they had [in Arkansas] where you would have
a state association manager who would initiate things and
that didn't go over well with the old managers.

They were

all kings of the mountain and they could just see somebody

Manager's Association, "Minutes," October 17, 1952.
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When Martin stepped out, Bonner stepped in.

But Bonner

wisely stepped lightly where the position of manager was
concerned, immersing himself instead in the publication of
the paper to the point of near e x h a u s t i o n . L a t e r , when
politics, propaganda, and public relations became key factors
in the association's growth, Bonner would become a powerful
figure in the organization.
Bonner came to REA News from the Franklin Sun where
he had worked as associate editor from 1948 to 1952.

During

that time, the Sun had become Louisiana's top award-winning
n e w s p a p e r , B o n n e r himself had gained some notariety for
a 1950 editorial in which he supported the right of blacks
to serve on Louisiana juries.

But the editor of the Sun,

despite his award-winning ways, had allowed the paper to
fall apart under the weight of his drinking problem.

Facing

a bleak future, Bonner decided to run for clerk of court in
Franklin Parish.

When he lost the bid by thirty-two votes,

he suddenly found himself out of work unable to support
his wife and child.

His sister, Fannie Bonner, was employed

as Bob Holladay's secretary at Northeast in Winnsboro, and

Interview with Mark Bonner, Baton Rouge, August 29,
1980.
24
25

Ibid.
Rural Louisiana, June, 1977, 4.
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through that connection he was hired as associate editor
under Martin for the two months prior to Martin's resigna
tion in October, 1953.

He then moved into Martin's

position.
Over the years, the title of that position has changed
drastically.
manager.

Bonner was hired as editor, instead of

Obviously, the members of the association did not

want to make the mistake with Bonner that they had with
Martin by giving him a title equal to theirs.

In 1959, his

title was changed to Director of Public Information, then
to Executive Secretary to the Board, and in 1965, to
General Manager, and finally to Vice-President and General
Manager in 1977.^^

Bonner insists that these outlandish

title changes occurred because of a recognized need by the
board to bestow a title that would put him on an equal foot
ing with the private utility lobbyists in Baton Rouge and
W a s h i n g t o n . H e often states the policies and clout of
the statewide association to important people throughout
the country, having taken the cause of Louisiana's co-ops
to everyone from John McKeithen to Hubert Humphrey.

It was

necessary that his title reflect his importance.

Interview with Mark Bonner, August 29, 1980; inter
view with Fannie Bonner, Winnsboro, March 28, 1983; Rural
Louisiana, June, 1977, 4.
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The title changes also show Bonner's growing power
within the organization.

By the 1970s, Bonner led what

Edwin Edwards called one of the strongest special interest
groups in the s t a t e , I t

is difficult to overemphasize

his role in the growth and development of the statewide
organization.

In the early years, each manager was the

king of his own little kingdom, and the relinquishment of
any power was anathema to them all.

One manager has said

it was like thirteen prima donnas trying to get into one
buggy— they all wanted to sit in the front s e a t B u t
when it came to such unfamiliar things as lobbying, public
information, politics, negotiations, these engineer-types
found themselves at a loss.

And over the years, as these

functions became more and more a part of the everyday life
of the statewide association, even important to the very
survival of the distribution co-ops themselves, Bonner's
position and power grew in importance, and so did his title.
Bonner furthered the cause of Louisiana's electric
co-ops in many ways over the years, but his greatest legacy
will be his articles in the statewide publication.

Through

out much of the newspaper's thirty-year existence, Bonner
has written nearly everything appearing in it.
taken most of the photographs.

He has even

Today there are photographers,

Interview with Edwin Edwards, Baton Rouge, June 3,
1982.
Interview with A. A. Robinson, Baton Rouge, May 19,
1982.
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assistants, and associates, but in the Fifties and Sixties,
it was nearly a one-man s h o w . H i s

editorial, "Mark My

Word," later changed to "One Small Voice," has been a
monthly tirade on everything from the evils of desegration
in the Fifties and Sixties, to longhairs and drugs in the
Sixties and Seventies.

His editorials reached every co-op

member in the state, and his influence touched every corner
of society and politics.

His themes have always emphasized

conservatism, the sanctity of the family, religion, and
patriotism.

His writing, simple, appealing, and often

emotional, is aimed at the rural South.

He has always felt

a need to attack viciously wild-eyed liberals, give-away
politicians and their programs, socialists, and communists,
probably because his critics have always tried to associate
him, and REA in general, with those sorts.

He is the per

fect example of that American enigma, the southern conserva
tive Democrat.

Like this type of southerner, he had the

foresight to see the necessity of government assistance,
but only as far as those being helped can begin to help
themselves.

To him, a.handout is as disgusting as it is

debilitating: "You don't help people by giving them things.
I guess you just about defeat your p u r p o s e . T h i s

theme,

often used by Bonner, is, of course, directed at those who
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would accuse REA of being a government give-away program.
David Hamil, the Republican REA Administrator under
Eisenhower, and then again under Nixon, visited Louisiana
for the first time in 1959.

He listened to a few speeches,

talked to a few of the state's co-op leaders.

Bonner, as

he tells it, was finally approached by Hamil: "I'm puzzled,'
he said to Bonner.
than I am.

"You damn people are more Republican

You just don't know it .

So, Bonner, a

southern Democrat who is more conservative than many north
ern Republicans, must defend himself against those who
would call him a socialist.
Bonner's early life prepared him for a life as a
writer, crusader, and idealist.

It may also have given

him the unique ability to view both halves of society.

He

had the all too common experience of seeing his father go
from wealth to destitution in the Depression.

"I grew up

in one of the nicest homes in that part of the country,
but we lost everything in the Depression.

We were in a

situation where we went from the top of a little society
right down to the bottom, right down with the blacks and
everything else."^^
In 1971, and again in 1977, Bonner wrote the story of
"A Symbolic Boy," who he later identified as himself.

The

Ibid., Baton Rouge, July 29, 1982; interview with
David Hamil, Sterling, Colorado, May 31, 1983.
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following is an excerpt:
Stark poverty— the kind that warps bodies and
minds --stalked the cotton fields, towns and
villages of the South in 1933.
Here in the South, long a victim of a feudal
cotton economy and oppressive policies, few
families were fortunate enough to eat well.
Still, less ate a balanced diet, witnessed by
the boils and constant sores on the mouths of
children--bloated stomachs, bowed legs and
rotten teeth.
Symbolic of millions of youngsters, a barefoot
boy, sporting a belly blown up with pinto beans
and sour milk, followed an old mule up and down
the endless cotton rows. He was now the son of
a sharecropper.
The family farm, a pride and joy since early
American history, had been lost the year before
in the early gulps of the Great Depression. His
family now lived in a shack among the lowest of
the low--Southern sharecroppers.
One day, the lad left the poor mule standing in
the middle of the field to pursue the American
dream. He hitch-hiked to college, got a job,
numerous jobs--cleaning toilets, dug ditches,
waited on tables.
Then, he marched off to war for four long years
to protect the American dream for all mankind.
He and the millions of his kind, proud, patriotic,
burned no flag, did not demonstrate against the
draft, or run off to Canada. They did not drown
their senses with pot or LSD.
They came home determined to build a world for
their children. These poverty-reared youngsters,
from Maine to California, to Louisiana did build
a new society through law and order— through due
process in the American tradition.
The lad from behind the mule and his millions of
cohorts in poverty and depression created the
most affluent society the world has ever known.
The article goes on, some 1600 words, to tell that
these once poverty-stricken youths created a society that
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did its job too well, making life too easy.
The crime, rebellion, dope, and disorder threaten
ing our American heritage— the American dream-came not from poverty.
They are the

bitter fruits of an easy life.

We failed to create a better world. We have
og
given too much and demanded too little in return.
Bonner graduated from LSU in 1938, and then entered
law school there, but with only one semester remaining to
graduation he answered
Air Corps

in 1941.

a call

to arms and enteredthe Army

He was immediately packed offto India

(the military thoughtfully supplied him with winter gear),
where he seemed to have been more involved in adventures
such as mountain climbing and tiger hunting than furthering
the war effort.

After the war, he returned to his hometown

of Franklin where he landed his first job with the Sun.
In 1982, Bonner received the prestigious Clyde T.
Ellis Award from the members of NRECA "in recognition of
outstanding accomplishment and service to electric coopera
tives and for increasing their i m p o r t a n c e I t

is a

fitting conclusion to an extraordinary career.

Rural Louisiana, July, 1977, 2.
Interview with Mark Bonner, August 29, 1980; inter
view with Fannie Bonner, March 28, 1983; interview with
Edgar Chaney, Jeanrette, Louisiana, July 28, 1982; Rural
Louisiana, June, 1977, 4.
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,
People— Their Power; The Rural Electric Fact Book (n.p.
Washington, 1980), 107; Rural Louisiana, March, 1982, 9.
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But Bonner was still at the beginning of his career
in the late Fifties when the history of the co-op system
in Louisiana began to change, when the companies again
would try to hike prices.

But this time, the co-ops would

do more than threaten to build a generation and transmission
system.

This time, the cause would be something other than

low prices.

The thirteen co-ops would this time break away

for the sole purpose of independence.
The first rumblings of what the future held came in
1954 when Gulf States Utilities modified its rates to in
clude a fuel adjustment p r o v i s i o n . T h i s ,

of course, tied

the rate base to the price of natural gas purchased by GSU.
In October of that year, Holladay expressed his fear of what
could come: "The power companies are step-by-step, one way
or another, increasing power costs to the cooperatives by
adding power factor clauses, fuel cost clauses and any
other means whereby they may increase rates.
The fuel adjustment was apparently no cause for im
mediate alarm because the cost of power increased only

Norman M. Clapp, "Information Relating to the 'A'
Loan Application of Louisiana Electric Cooperative, Inc.
of New Roads, Louisiana," September 12, 1964 (unpublished
copy, ALEC Files, Baton Rouge). This is a report from
Clapp (REA Administrator under Lyndon Johnson) to Carl
Hayden, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, providing in
formation concerning the loan. Hereafter cited as "Informa
tion Relating to the A Loan."
40 Manager's Association, "Minutes," October 5, 1954.
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slightly in the following years, but it was reason enough,
in the minds of the statewide members, to reform the G&T
c o m m i t t e e . I t was not high prices but the anticipation
of high prices that again set the co-op leaders to thinking
about the G&T,
Between 1957 and 1959, GSU fired the first shots of
the new war by demanding a dual rate.

There would now be

two charges for wholesale power, one for residential use,
and one for industrial.

The residential base rate would

be an exorbitant nine mills, and the industrial rate was
in the vicinity of eight m i l l s . T h i s would, of course,
cause rates to skyrocket for the individual consumer on
the co-op lines, but, more importantly, it practically put
the co-ops out of business when it came to serving industrial
loads.

GSU, with lower prices than the co-ops, could now

move into the fast-growing, industrial, rural areas of
south Louisiana and serve the new plants there without any
competition from the co-ops.

Several co-ops, such as Jeff

Davis and SLECA, needed those industrial loads to keep

Bonner reported in 1969 that the dual rate demand
was made in 1957. Rural Louisiana, February, 1969, 2.
Norman Clapp, in his report to Carl Hayden, stated that the
dual rate was demanded in either 1958 or 1959. Clapp,
"Information Relating to the A Loan," In a letter to Allen
Ellender, January 5, 1963, the co-op leaders cited the dual
rate as 1958. Robinson, McVea, et al. to Allen Ellender,
January 5, 1963, Ellender Papers, Box 268-D Allen Ellender
Library, Nichols State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana.
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them financially above water.

GSU's dual rate proposal

could hurt them terribly, and they might even sink.^^
GSU, though, argued that they could not allow the co-ops
to undercut their industrial prices with GSU electricity-electricity they had generated.

They also saw the co-ops

as essentially a rural farm supplier, and felt that when
ever the co-ops wandered into the industrial or urban
market, they had stepped beyond their intended purpose
and into competition with the private utilities.
In 1956, LP&L entered into a new ten-year contract
with the co-ops that contained satisfactory terms, but, in
1958 they called a meeting of co-op leaders at the LP&L
offices and introduced a new higher rate schedule for 1959
similar to the GSU rate increase based on estimated fuel

cularly true of SLECA, with industrial revenues of 42% of
total revenues in 1957. Jeff Davis' was at 32%. A SR, 1957,
74-76.
Such arguments are made in several private utility
publications.
See particularly. Gulf States Utilities, "The
Changing REA Picture," undated [1958?], ALEC files. Baton
Rouge. This pamphlet states that co-ops "are seeking to
get state legislation that will permit them to serve customers
inside the corporate limits of town. . . . "
In probably the
most famous anti-REA publication, "The Deviation of REA,"
the author, Edward Vennard, states the private utility argu
ment on this point: "no one imagined that cooperatives would
buy electricity at a special discount and then try to sell
it, at prices less than the companies' standard prices, to
aluminum plants or pipelines or oil refineries. But that
is what some of them did." Edward Venard, "The Deviation
of REA," (Edison Electric Institute, Washington, DC, n.d.
[1962?]), 39.
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costs.

This was understood by the co-op leaders to be a

take-lt-or-leave-lt proposition with no room for discussion
or compromise.

Although their opinion was apparently not

asked for, the co-ops rejected the demand and retreated
under fire to begin building their defenses.
With that, the G&T plan was shifted into high gear.
The situation was similar to the post-war G&T threat that
had been so successful in getting rates down.

But this

time, with that experience under their belts, the co-op
leaders emerged for the fight with a different attitude.
The cause this time was independence, not merely lower rates.
Even if a second G&T threat worked, and the utilities dropped
their rates to a reasonable level, the co-ops would continue
to strive to be out from under the thumb of the utilities.
The time to break away was at hand.

In 1967, Charles Roemer,

a co-op leader through this period, told a subcommittee of
the Senate Appropriations Committee : "For the sake of con
jecture, let us assume the companies offered our Co-ops an
unprecedented 4-mill rate.

Would it be 'reasonable', if

after five years these hostile companies, dedicated to our
distribution, could come back and demand eight mills, or

Clapp, "Information Relating to the A Loan;" Charles
Roemer, before a Senate Subcommittee stated: "In 1958, the
companies summoned us to the office of Louisiana Power and
Light Company , . . and handed us a take-it-or-leave-it
projection." "Statement of Charles Roemer Before the
Bureau of Reclamation," 5.
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even 15 mills in the absence of a G&T?

We think no t .

And later in the same statement Roemer declared: "We are
not engaged in a crusade against private companies. We
merely wish to be let along to develop rural areas we
p i o n e e r e d . T h e cost of power was no longer a factor;
independence was the cause.

But first, a loan had to be

approved.
The co-ops were confident that REA would approve the
loan for several reasons.

First of all, they were well

organized: the statewide association had developed into
a strong lobby that was quickly becoming familiar with the
workings of government, and with the weight of several
thousand rural constituents behind it, and an effective
newspaper to publicize its opinion, the Louisiana co-op
group was a force to be heard and contended with.

Also,

they had already run the gamut of applying for a loan.
They knew whom to contact, whom to work around, what to do.
This experience would certainly speed up the process.

"Statement of Charles Roemer before the Bureau of
Reclamation," 19. A. A. Robinson made a similar statement
before a House subcommittee in 1966. "It would avail us
nothing to receive temporarily 'reasonable' wholesale
rates and service conditions with them in the absence of
our G&T and adequate G&T loan funds. "Statement of A. A.
Robinson on behalf of Louisiana Electric Cooperative, Inc.
before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, Department
of Agriculture and Related Agencies," March 28, 1966 (un
published copy in ALEC files. Baton Rouge), 5.
Ibid., 17.
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Lastly, they had a good argument for needing the loan.
Without any other source of electricity available, the
co-ops were at the mercy of private utilities that were
using their monopoly to gouge prices, and, in the some
instances, to try to take over the co-ops.

REA could cer

tainly be sympathetic, particularly if the co-ops could
show that they could produce electricity more cheaply than
they could buy it from the utilities.
Moreover, on the horizon was the possibility of a
changing political scene that gave the co-op leaders even
greater confidence that the loan would be approved.

The

1960 election brought with it the hope of a sympathetic
Democratic administration.

For eight years, REA had fought

an administration that had not understood its problems or
needs, an administration that had established the hostile
Hoover Commission to raise the interest rates on REA loans,
an administration whose secretary of agriculture had come
out foursquare against small farms, an administration that
vetoed the Humphrey-Price Bill, the most important piece
of REA legislation since FDR created the whole thing.

If

the new administration were a Democratic one, certainly it
would be more sympathetic to the G&T application than the
Republicans had been.
So, in Louisiana, these conservative southern Democrats
looked forward to the end of the Eisenhower years with an
even greater hope of obtaining a G&T loan than ever before.
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They were delighted when, just before the election, Truman,
speaking in Abbeville, said that the "present administration
. . . has tried every way it could to hamstring the Rural
Electrification Administration."^®

Also, the co-ops could

look forward to aid from Allen Ellender, Louisiana's very
influential senior senator.

Ellender had on many occasions

expressed his support for REA and for the local programs
in Louisiana.

In 1956, Bonner quoted him on the topic of

the Hoover Commission: "Don't worry about Mr. Hoover and
his recommendations to abolish REA.

We will take care of

that and see that nothing happens to hamper this finest of
farm programs.
It was 1962 before the co-ops were able to complete a
feasibility study, work out the details, and mail their
loan application to Norman Clapp, Kennedy's new REA adminis
trator.

In the four or five years between the companies'

proposed rate hikes and the application, a type of unde
clared war was fought between the two groups.

The utilities

stepped up advances into unclaimed territories, duplication
of co-op lines, and the building of spite lines.

There

were several reports of aggressive actions by LP&L in the

Rural Louisiana, November, 1960, 11.
Ibid., January, 1956, 8. See also, a letter from
Ellender to Bonner in 1955 : "If the advice of the Hoover
Commission were followed the net effect would be to price
REA loan funds out of the reach of our farmer cooperatives.
We must not permit this to happen." Ellender to Bonner,
April 21, 1955, Ellender Papers, Box 278-D&M..
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prospect of a co-op G&T during half-time of LSU football
g a m e s . T h e r e were duplications at Bossier Electric,
Pointe C o u p e e , D i x i e , B e a u r e g a r d , a n d numerous spite
lines throughout the state.
The co-ops did not sit idly by and watch their terri
tories be gobbled up.

They also stepped up their building

programs, they complained to Ellender, and they tried to
expose the utilities' actions in the media, but they were
no match for the strength of the private utilities.
By 1960, it seemed that the co-ops were in a crossfire
between the unsympathetic Eisenhower Administration and the
increasingly aggressive private utilities.

The response

was, of course, for the statewide organization to try and

50 Rural Louisiana, October, 1963, 15; ibid., April,
1960, 1; P. R. Hall (Manager at SLECA) to Richard Richter
(REA Regional Director for Southwest United States), Octo
ber 11, 1963, ALEC files. Baton Rouge; Rural Louisiaha,
October, 1958, 2; ibid., September 5, 1958, 2.
Bonner requested several times that the radio sta
tion stop broadcasting such material.
The station complied
in fall, 1964. Rural Louisiana, October, 1964, 5. See
also, Bonner to John Hunter (President of LSU) September
21, 1964, ALEC files. Baton Rouge.
Rural Louisiana, November, 1964, 4.

Ibid., August, 1958, 2.
Horace Wingate, manager at Beauregard Electric,
stated at the manager's meeting that there was an "invasion
into his area by CLECO." September 5, 1958. See also.
Rural Louisiana, July 1956, 4.
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shore up its ranks, become stronger in the face of adversity,
meet the challenge head on.

After the 1960 Presidential

election, things should have changed for the better, but
they did not.

Internal strife and court action nearly

ground the G&T project to a halt.
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CHAPTER 6
INDEPENDENCE AND THE GENERATION OF POWER
The G&T plan was not the only plan being devised to
bring power, other than wholesale power, to the co-ops.
In an unusual piece of cooperation, Tex-La, the super-co-op
made up of distribution co-ops in Texas, Arkansas, and
Louisiana, worked out an agreement with the power companies
(principally GSU) whereby it would buy peaking power (power
that the dams can provide only when the water level allows
it) from the Southwest Power Authority dams in Texas and
sell it to GSU in exchange for firm power (power that can
be provided consistently) from the GSU generators.

This

power would be wheeled by GSU from the dams to their genera
tors and then to those few Louisiana co-ops that could bene
fit from the operation.^

The amount of power that was

finally exchanged was so small that it was hardly worth
noticing, but the deal had its significance.

The negotia

tions, for the most part, were carried on between U. J.
Gajan, president of Tex-La and manager at SLEMCO, and GSU
representatives.

As manager of the largest co-op in the

^ Telephone interview with U. J. Gajan, July 11, 1983.
See also. Rural Louisiana, August, 1958, 3.
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state, Gajan had always been able to deal with the utili
ties on an equal footing; consequently his relationship
with GSU (the utility in SLEMCO's service area and the
principal supplier of SLEMCO's wholesale power) had always
been better than the relationships of the other managers
to their wholesale suppliers.

The Tex-La agreement of

1958 was the culmination of years of cooperation between
these two utility giants.

It was an

had sought for a number ofyears and
not easily turn his back on.

agreement that Gajan
something he would

This contract was the sort

of wheeling agreement that would, in the 1970s, be negotia
ted between the co-ops and the private companies settling
most disputes and finally bring the two sides together
under a peaceful, integrated system whereby the private
companies would wheel co-op-generated power to the distribu
tion co-ops in the state.

This cooperative endeavor between

SLEMCO and GSU was an advancement, a step into the future
for both.

But in 1962, as soon as the state's

co-ops made

it clear that they planned to generate their own electricity,
attitudes went quickly from compromising to antagonistic.
And as the G&T plans got underway, and the fights with the
private utilities went from warm to hot, the first casualty
of the war was SLEMCO.

After years of cooperation and

working in harmony with GSU, culminating in the Tex-La
agreement, Gajan, backed wholly by his board of directors.
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Preservation of the cooperative attitude with GSU
was only one of several reasons SLEMCO and Gajan left what
had by now become the Association of Louisiana Electric
Cooperatives.

The letter of resignation from the SLEMCO

board to ALEC cited such "a lack of understanding and
mutual cooperation among the Louisiana electric coopera
tives as to render the association ineffective."^
Gajan, though, had his own reasons.

In a letter to

his very powerful friend, Allen Ellender, he stated: "A
recent study, undertaken by the Association of Louisiana
Electric Cooperatives performed by the H. E. Boyay Engineer
ing firm of Houston, Texas, appears to be unrealistic and
extremely low.

. . .^

That is, he did not feel that ALEC

could build the plant for what Bovay said it could be
built for.

In another letter to Ellender, dated January

29, 1963, Gajan further explained his situation and
decisions :

U. J. Gajan to Allen Ellender, January 29, 1963,
ALEC files. Baton Rouge; H. F. Young (President of SLEMCO's
Board of Directors) to Orval Couch (President of ALEC Board),
April 2, 1962, ALEC files. Baton Rouge.
SLEMCO first left
in May 1961, and then again (and finally) eleven months
later. Ibid.
^ Ibid.
^ Gajan to Ellender, January 29, 1963, ALEC files,
Baton Rouge.
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. . . SLEMCO agreed to participate in a prelimi
nary generation and transmission study "only"
....
A thorough and complete analysis of this
preliminary study by us, and by SLEMCO's independ
ent engineers, did not convince SLEMCO's board or
its management of its feasibility.5
Though Gajan did not agree with the study made by the
engineers, the decisive factor was money.

Gajan focused

on only one objective: getting the lowest possible rates
he could from GSU and gaining for his membership the lowest
possible prices.

The G&T threat initiated through ALEC,

together with the rapport he had developed with GSU (exem
plified by the Tex-La agreement), allowed Gajan to obtain
his objective.
GSU.

He squeezed an exceptional contract from

As one of A L E C s leaders claimed, he pulled out a

plum.^
On August 31, 1961, the three utilities offered the
co-ops what was referred to as the Tex-La Contract, sup-

^ Gajan to Ellender, January 29, 1963, ALEC files.
Baton Rouge.
^ Interview with A. A. Robinson, Baton Rouge, May 19,
1982.
of a one-page, unpublished rate sheet titled: "Proposed
Rate Offered to Tex-La." It contained the new rate for
each of the thirteen Louisiana co-ops and two Texas co-ops,
and indicated how much each co-op could save by accepting
the new proposal. August 31, 1961, Ellender Papers, Box
268-D. See also, Norman Clapp, "Information Relating to
the 'A' Loan Application of Louisiana Electric Cooperative,
Inc. of New Roads, Louisiana," September 12, 1964 (unpub
lished copy, ALEC files. Baton Rouge).
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Contract because its enactment was contingent upon the
companies receiving peaking power from the Texas dams.
It was generally understood that this offer was intended
to be low enough to halt all G&T plans.

The companies had

lost and were going to give in just as they had done in
1952.

The average rate was 6.5 mills without a fuel escala

tion provision.
took it.

The cooperatives refused the offer; SLEMCO

In his January 29th letter to Ellender, Gajan

explained how the G&T study had helped the co-ops get a
better rate, although only SLEMCO signed the contract.
The study did provide very tangible benefits and assisted
in negotiating a lower rate that would save the electric
co-ops in Louisiana $1,201,691.00 on a very conservative
estimate.

. .

This figure is what the private utilities

estimated all the co-ops in Louisiana would save if they
accepted the new rate over an earlier offer computed over
a five-year period at a ten percent growth rate.^

SLEMCO

stood to save more than one-half million dollars in the
five-year period.
$34,000.
1972.

In 1962 alone, SLEMCO saved over

The new contract was for ten years, from 1962 to

"The new rate schedule incorporated a 6.5 mill rate

. . . with no restrictions, no fuel costs and all the power

Gajan to Ellender, January 29, 1963, ALEC files.
Baton Rouge.
9

Ibid.
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He also told the senator that he feared that "SLEMCO would
lose its identity and independence" if it stayed in the
G&T program, and that he "felt a deep and severe obliga
tion to SELMCO's . . . member consumers, to obtain the
best possible contract at the lowest possible guaranteed
rate, for a ten-year period, with no restrictions, no es
calations, or binding long term obligations."^^

He got it.

There are those, though, who have said Gajan left
ALEC for other reasons.

In the late Fifties and early

Sixties, there was a power struggle between Gajan and A. A.
Robinson, the manager at Pointe Coupee, for the right to
run the statewide organization, and, therefore, the G&T
program.

It is hard to imagine either man being in any

manner power hungry, but probably much of their youthful
fire has been extinguished by age.

All the members of the

board in this period were witnesses to this conflict, and
all have an opinion, but J. S. Robbins and Mark Bonner
seemed closer to the situation than the others.

Robbins

had good, friendly and professional relationships with
both men.

He sees Gajan as a good friend; "I got along

with U. J. better than any."

But at the same time, Robbins

sees him as something of a monopolist: "If Gajan couldn't

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
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control it, he didn't much want to be in it."

At the

same time, he characterizes Robinson as "very dictatorial."^^
Robbins also feels that GSU was using Gajan by giving
SLEMCO low rates, drawing SLEMCO out of the group, and
ultimately weakening ALEC's united effort.
no difficulty in locating his loyalty.

Robbins had

Forced to go with

Gajan and leave, or support Robinson and stay, the decision
was easy: "That isn't the way to win a battle--to quit.

I

never quit I
Bonner also did not support Gajan.

In fact, he says,

"I've fought with him as hard as a n y o n e . H e

sees the

problem that developed between Gajan and Robinson as related
to ego.

Like Robbins, Bonner feels simply that both wanted

control of the program.
whole lot alike.

"He and Bubba [Robinson] were a

They were strong personalities, and both

capable people in their way of doing things, but they had
their egos.

Everybody can't be the top man.

Gajan left ALEC for at least two reasons ; to maintain
the rapport with GSU that he had worked to attain since the
early Forties, and secondly, to obtain the lowest possible

Interview with J. S. Robbins, Jennings, Louisiana,
August 9, 1982.

Interview with Mark Bonner, Baton Rouge, July 29,
1982.
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rates for his eustomer-members .

But he also may have lost

the fight for control of the program, and, with the colos
sal SLEMCO at his side, he left.

In his letter to Ellender

of January 29, 1963, Gajan had said he feared a loss of
SLEMCO's identity and independence if it remained a part
of ALEC.

But of all the things that can be said about

Gajan's departure from the organization, it is obvious that
he missed the point.

The objective of building the G&T

had never been money, nor had it been individual independence.
The objective was independence from the private utilities.
As Roemer would later state before the congressional com
mittee, the co-ops only wanted to be left alone to serve
the territories they had pioneered.

And even if the utili

ties offered an unprecedented low rate, Roemer continued,
and the co-ops again put aside their G&T plans, there would
be, in the future, another rate hike, and then another.
The co-ops had only one objective, and that was independence
--with or without SLEMCO.
dependence, though.

SLEMCO had its own ideal of in

Gajan wanted independence to deal with

GSU on an equal footing, and independence to give his cus
tomers low prices.

They each went their own way.

SLEMCO's withdrawal from ALEC had several repercussions.
The most immediate was that Robinson's victory over Gajan
was complete.

Shortly after SLEMCO's final withdrawal in

April, 1962, Robinson was named to head the newly formed

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The new
corporation (made up of essentially the same people as
ALEC) was to handle only G&T matters.

ALEC would return

to its original role of focusing on public relations and
lobbying.
picture.

This is not to say that ALEC was out of the G&T
As had been its responsibility since the G&T

inception in the late Fifties, ALEC, with Bonner in the
lead, would spend most of its time defending and lobbying
for LEC.

But the point to be made here is that SLEMCO's

withdrawal allowed Robinson to consolidate his power, and
it also allowed for the formation of LEC.

Also, the members

of LEC knew, of course, that a loan application to REA for
a G&T project would not be approved to a fragmented group.
It was necessary for SLEMCO either to join or leave before
an application could be made.

Finally, on August 18, with

out a dissenting vote, the application was sent to Washington.^^
The most important result of SLEMCO's withdrawal was
the effect it had on Allen Ellender, an effect that nearly
killed the program altogether.

It is difficult to convey

the importance of Ellender to the G&T movement.

As chair

man of the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee, he
was a pro-tempore member of each agricultural subcommittee.
He headed the Subcommittee on Appropriations which decided

Louisiana Electric Cooperative, Annual Report (n.p.,
n.d.), unnumbered page.
Ibid., unnumbered page.
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how much money the Department of Agriculture should receive
and for what purpose.

He also served on the Power Market

ing Agencies Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Com
mittee, and was chairman of the Senate Public Works Committee.
If Ellender did not want a G&T built in Louisiana, he had
the power to stop it.
Ellender and Gajan were good friends.

Both came from

the same part of the state, Gajan from New Iberia (although,
of course, he lived in Lafayette) and Ellender from Houma.
It may be of some significance that they both had the same
Cajun background.

In any case, they thought alike when it

came to rural electrification and G&T development.
Ellender had always supported REA.

As early as 1949,

in a letter to "Managers and Directors of all Rural Electric
Systems, NRECA Directors, State Presidents, secretaries.
Managers, and Editors," he wrote of "our right to generate
our own energy [as] our only bargaining p o w e r . I n

the

mid-Fifties, he did all he could to clog the workings of
the Hoover Commission.

"If the advice of the Hoover Commis

sion were followed the net effect would be to price REA
loan funds out of the reach of our farmer cooperatives,"
he wrote Bonner in 1955.
he continued.

"We must not permit this to happen,"

"As long as private enterprise finds itself

Ellender to "Managers and Directors of All Rural
Electric Systems, NRECA Directors, State Presidents, secre
taries, Managers, and Editors," July 18, 1949, Ellender
Papers, Box 9.
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unable to do the job, REA must remain strong enough to
permit our farm families to help themselves.

Ellender

was also a big supporter of hydro-electric power in the
mid-Fifties.

Gajan recalls that Ellender and Sam Rayburn

worked the hardest to supply the money for the southwest

issued a resolution thanking Ellender for his assistance
in funding various hydro-electric projects
In April, 1962, the same month that SLEMCO withdrew
from ALEC, Ellender went on record for the first time op
posing the G&T.

The Daily Iberian (New Iberia), just nine

days after SLEMCO left, reported Ellender's remark: "[In]
my opinion, the REA is moving away from its original goal.
Every effort should be made by the Co-ops to obtain their
power and transmission needs from privately-owned companies
if at all p o s s i b l e . I n an Alexandria paper, he accused
REA of "Trying to build an empire at public expense" by
loaning G&T money to LEC and other such G&Ts.

To a Lake

19 Ellender to Bonner, April 21, 1955, Ellender Papers,
Box 478 D-M.
20 Interview with U. J. Gajan, Lafayette, Louisiana,
November 16, 1981.
Manager's Association, "Minutes," August 7, 1957,
ALEC files. Baton Rouge.
Daily Iberian, April 10, 1963, photostatic copy in
Ellender Papers, Box 268-D.
Alexandria Daily Town Talk, April 8, 1963, ibid.
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Charles constituent, again in April, he was his most trench
ant: "As you know, I was an original supporter of the Rural
Electrification Administration because, in my mind, it ful
filled a necessity.

It brought power to rural people who

had not been served by private industry.

However, I must

say that I do not believe that Federal-supported REA co-ops
should be allowed to compete with private industry.

This

is beyond the purview of REA, and it was never meant to
b e . T h i s

change in attitude, from ardent supporter to

powerful obstructionist, prompted a huge letter-writing
campaign from both sides.

The boards of directors of the

private utilities, now with a new and powerful ally, wrote
Ellender that "such a system is not needed.

. . . The tax

payer's money will be wasted if such a loan is approved.
All data thus far presented by the cooperatives indicate
they cannot match the companies' rates even with 2% money
and tax s u b s i d y . C o - o p leaders from all over Louisiana
wrote letters, and had their members write letters.

In

October, 1963, possibly fed up with the agitation to get
the loan approved, Ellender wrote Robinson a hot letter:
"I do not want any two percent money to be loaned out to
any cooperative, or any group of cooperatives unless the

Ellender to Frank Hazmuka, April 9, 1963, Ellender
Papers, Box 106-L.
Morrison, Coughlin,
Scott, et al. to Ellender,
( ^
September 12, 1962, Ellender Papers, Box 268.
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private utilities cannot supply their demands, or, unless
the price charged for the electricity purchased is higher
than could be produced by the construction of cooperative
G&T facilities.

In other words, I want the law, as I

understand it, to be followed.
Ellender soon became a roadblock to the loan.

To try

and remove it, Robinson, Bonner, Roemer, and most of the
other co-op leaders in the state had gone to Washington a
number of times to speak to Ellender, to persuade him to
release his grip on the loan, but to no avail.

Finally,

Robinson decided that if individual visits by various local
co-op people would not do the trick, a visit by the entire
group— all at once--might succeed.

What followed was a

very unorthodox lobby campaign.
One day in June, 1963, Robinson and Roemer chartered
a DC-6 in New Orleans, loaded it down with two cases of
whiskey, and began hopping around the state picking up co-op
people: first to Baton Rouge, then to Alexandria, and on
to Shreveport.

The plane left Alexandria with ninty-four

co-op leaders and two stewardesses (a DC-6 had a legal
limit of ninty-nine).

The plane arrived in Shreveport to

pick up the last of the group, including Roemer.

The plane

had only room enough for three more, but Roemer had shown
up with five, including himself.

The solution was simple,

Ellender to
Papers, Box 268-D.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Four hours and two cases of whiskey later, Robinson
and friends landed in Washington.

Without time enough for

lunch, they rushed to a one o'clock appointment with
Ellender,

"If you can imagine," Robinson recalls, "ninty-

nine men, and about half of them drunk, going down this
long corridor to Ellender's office."

Ellender walked to

the door to meet the group, apparently expecting the usual
two or three representatives.

" [When] they started coming

in, he backed up to his door and they kept coming, backing
him up to his desk, and they kept coming."

Ellender was a

very small man, now faced with a solid wall of hungry,
slightly intoxicated co-op leaders moving toward him.
Somehow he gathered the strength to climb to the top of
his desk.

From there he addressed the group, but they ap

parently had not come to listen.

"They really laid it on

him," Robinson remembers : "they told him that they didn't
want to make anymore trips" to Washington.

The group's

solidarity and determination must have impressed Ellender,
but he remained unmoved from his position.

The co-op

leaders, though, must certainly have received a boost in
morale from such a solid show of power.

The trip finally

ended when Robinson returned the last group to New Orleans

27 Interview with A. A. Robinson, New Roads, Louisiana,
September 11, 1980.
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eighteen hours later.
Beginning in July, 1962, serious negotiations began
between the two groups with Norman Clapp, the REA adminis
trator, in the middle.

The loan application was made

August 18, 1962, but just prior to that, GSU, LP&L, and
CLECO tried to stop it by offering even better proposals
than the Tex-La contract of the year before.

The private

utilities also agreed not to stand in the way of the G&T
loan if LEC would agree to sell the entire output of the
generation facility to the companies for their use and
resale to the distribution co-ops.

Clapp later wrote

that it was during this period in the negotiations that
"the basic concept of an independent G&T system began to
emerge as the most logical alternative power supply plan.
Apparently he felt that the utility requests were unreason
able.

But by May, 1963, the companies were again ready to

lower their rates, this time to 6.25 mills.

LEC refused.

From July to December, Clapp later recalled, "there were
communications between the parties," but "no significant
development occurred.

. . .

Included here are photographs and a report of the incident.
No date is given.
29 Clapp, "Information Relating to the A Loan."
30

Ibid.
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On April 6, 1964, Clapp met with the representatives
of the private utilities, and then, two days later, with
the leaders of LEC.

The outcome of these meetings was

that LEC would not consider as "reasonable" the companies'
contract proposals unless some sort of territorial protec
tion (the right to serve all loads within the co-op service
area) was given to the co-ops by the utilities,

On April

17, the companies stated that if they agreed to territorial
protection the co-ops must agree to three stipulations :
One, that the co-ops would agree to complete regulation by
the Louisiana Public Service Commission; two, that they
would pay what the companies deemed normal interest rates;
and three, that the co-ops would pay all local, parish,
state, and federal t a x e s . T h e

co-ops, of course, had

since the inception of REA been allowed two percent loans,
plus tax exempt status and subsidies for bringing elec
tricity to highly unprofitable areas of the country.
Territorial protection is something that co-op leaders
in Louisiana had wanted since the late Fifties, but the
private utilities vigorously opposed it.

It is a compli

cated topic and will be looked at in detail later.

Its

bearing on these negotiations is that the companies con
tinued to fight it, and that Clapp (later) stated that he
had been annoyed by the companies' refusal to allow it.

I

33
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"regret that the companies had not made a greater effort
to reach a mutually satisfactory solution to territorial
p r o t e c t i o n . C l a p p , perhaps believing that the companies
were not negotiating in good faith, as demonstrated by
their unwillingness to compromise, ultimately ruled against
them by approving the loan to LEC.
On May 14, 1964, lawyers representing the two groups
met at the Monteleone Hotel in New Orleans.

D. J. Anders,

Theo Cangelosi, Claude Duval, and W. L. Faulkenwald told
the representatives of the companies that they wanted
territorial protection.

The companies' attornies reiterated

that "they would not be a party to such a program whether
by legislation or private agreement."

The companies in

turn asked "that the Cooperatives would immediately with
draw their G&T loan application," and "that the Cooperatives
would immediately execute ten year supply contracts with
the Companies."

The co-op lawyers then "suimnarily stated

that the offer . . . was entirely unacceptable."^^

If

this is in any way representative of the negotiations, it

Ibid. Clapp's interaction with the private companies
was often antagonistic.
"Your failure to accept the area
protection concept and territorial allocation is likewise
inconsistent with the recognition of the rights of the coop
eratives to serve all loads in their service areas regardless
of charâctéT or Size." Norman Clapp to G. C. Rawls, F. H.
Coughlin, J. J. Morrison, May 28, 1964, Ellender Papers,
Box 207-D.
"Minutes" of meeting between lawyers of co-ops and
lawyers of companies. May 14, 1964, Ellender Papers, Box
292-D; Rural Louisiana, June, 1964, 2.
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is no wonder that no agreements were reached.

In a letter

several days later explaining to Clapp why they had not
accepted the co-op leader's demands for territorial protec
tion, the company leaders wrote : It is "purely a matter of
law and beyond the scope of a power agreement between the
Companies and the Cooperatives.

. . .

The co-ops worked out a prerequisite agreement for
standby power (power that can be provided in the case of
an emergency or maintenance situation) with the Southwest
Power A u t h o r i t y , A n d on September 13, 1964, Clapp wrote
to the President of the Senate: "I inform you that I have
today approved a loan to Louisiana Electric Cooperatives
...

in the amount of $56,521,000 for the financing of

certain generation and transmission facilities.
The loan was to be broken down for the following needs :
Two 100 megawatt gas fired steam units at an estimated cost
of $27,079,200, and 627 miles of 161 KV line and related
substations and switches for $13,747,000.

Included here

F. H. Coughlin, J. J. Morrison and G. C. Rawls to
Clapp, May 22, 1964, Ellender Papers, Box 292, D.
Clapp, "Information Relating to the A Loan." State
ment of Charles Roemer Before Bureau of Reclamation and
Interior Power Marketing Agencies Subcommittee of the Senate
Appropriations Committee," (undated, unpublished copy in
ALEC files. Baton Rouge), 6-22.
Norman Clapp to Carl Hayden, September 12, 1964,
ALEC files. Baton Rouge.
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were eighty-two miles of 161 KV lines into Arkansas to
allow for the interconnection to SPA.^^
Two weeks after the loan was approved, Clapp received
a strongly worded letter from Ellender.

His first concern

was that Clapp had refused to discuss rates unless the
utilities agreed to settle the problem of territorial juris
diction.

"I doubt the REA Act gives you that authority,"

he write.

His second concern was stated in the strongest

language.

"I want it clearly understood that the Federal

government will not be called upon to ball out any of the
cooperatives for any debts or arrangements for the purchase
of power [from the proposed G&T] made by them."

Ellender's

third concern was in response to an eleventh-hour offer
from the private utilities of a base charge of 6.04.^^
In his letter to the President of the Senate, Clapp
estimated that this rate would convert to about 7.16 mills,
once such expenses as interest, amortization, insurance,
taxes, operating and maintenance costs were added.

Clapp

then compared this 7.16 to the 6.8 mills that LEC had
computed as their produced-power rate.

In a letter to

Ellender, some seven months after the loan to LEC was

Agriculture and Rural Electrification Administration,
September 16, 1964, Ellender Papers, 400-D; Clapp, "Informa
tion Relating to the A Loan."
Ellender to Clapp, September 28, 1964, Ellender
Papers, Box 268-D.
Clapp, "Information Relating to the A Loan."
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approved by Clapp, the three presidents of Louisiana's
private utilities stated that such additions to the base
rate were incorrect.

"When those costs were estimated and

added to the rates of the companies, the cost of purchased
power becomes 6.15 mills/kwh--not 7.16 mills/kwh as the
Administrator has s t a t e d . T h e
Ellender corroborate this.

figures supplied to

The total cost of power (ad

justed to 7 1/2 percent of the annual bill for interest,
amortization, insurance, taxes, and estimated station
costs) to the ninety-four distribution co-op delivery
points throughout Louisiana was $2,983,504 for the 1964
fiscal year.

This figure, divided by the total annual

consumption of 485,044,000 kilowatt hours by all twelve
co-ops for the same period, is 6.1509.

This would have

been the average cost of electricity to Louisiana's distribu
tion co-ops had they chosen to take it— that is, had they
not built the G&T plant.

It also represents the lowest

possible rate that the utilities could have offered, having
been based on the previous fiscal year's consumption.
These figures are generally equal to figures published in
the REA Annual Statistical Report for 1964, but REA's
fiscal period is based on the calendar year rather than
the June-fiscal period used by the private companies, which

F. H. Coughlin, J. J. Morrison, G. C. Rawls to
Ellender, April 29, 1965, ALEC files, Baton Rouge. Their
emphasis.
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Ellender's information, or at least what he chose to
believe, was quite different from the information that
Clapp had received.

In his letter to Clapp, Ellender

stated that the G&T could not produce electricity for any
thing under 7.25 to 7.50 mills.

He then cited the 6.04

mill base rate offered by the companies— a considerable
difference of as much as 1.21 m i l l s . C l a p p ,

though,

stated in his letter to the President of the Senate that
LEC could produce electricity for as little as 6.8 mills,
while the companies would not sett it for anything less
than 7.16, a difference (the other way, of course) of
.36 mills.
It is impossible to say what were the correct statis
tics.

Clapp's assumption that the companies' last offer

of 6.04 somehow converted to 7.16 is certainly incorrect.
He either miscalculated or was misinformed of the statistics.
He may have realized that because of company belligérance
(in not giving territorial protection) and the monopoly
situation in Louisiana, cooperative independence was neces
sary to protect the co-ops.

The companies' tactic of

Ibid. United States Department of Agriculture
Rural Electrification Administration, Annual Statistical
Report 1964, (Washington, USGPO, 1964), l07-llO.
Ellender to Clapp, September 28, 1964, Ellender
Papers, Box 268-D.
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waiting until the last moment to offer their lowest rate
seems to suggest that they were not negotiating in good
faith.

Furthermore, Ellender's insistence that the G&T

could not produce electricity for less than 7.25 to 7.50
mills also seems out of line.

These figures may have come

from the SLEMCO G&T study that was certainly made available
to Ellender.
But of all the factors here, the price of electricity
was the least important.

The co-op leaders quite possibly

knew that the companies had the power to lower their rates
enough finally to undercut what the co-ops had estimated
to be their produced-power rate, just as a large powerful
company can afford to lower its prices finally to put a
smaller, less profitable company out of business.

The

price of electricity was not the issue here as it had been
in the first G&T plan in the early Fifties— at least it was
not the immediate issue.

Obviously, once the plant was

built, and electricity was being distributed, the co-ops
would work to bring prices down.

But immediately, the

co-ops had to get out from Under the private utilities
because they were being smothered, indeed, Were being
monopolized.

As long as there was only one place that the

co-ops could buy electricity, prices would be higher than
they had to be.
that.

The eleventh hour price drop had proven

And that the co-ops did not take the lower rates

also shows that they were moving for their independence,
not for lower rates.
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The approval of the loan on September 12, 1964, though,
was a long way from granting the loan.

Ellender had no

real power over loan approvals from REA (the REA adminis
trator is a Presidential appointment), but he could stand
in the way of the release of the money.

The private utili

ties were unsuccessful in stopping the loan approval through
negotiations, but now they marshaled their efforts toward
court maneuverings to keep the funds from being granted.
Ellender and Gajan both, of course, felt they were
doing the right things for those people they represented.
The object for both was cheap electricity.

But in the pro

cess, they had managed to throw a monkey wrench into the
workings of LEC.

Ellender had tried to use his influence

and power to stop the approval of the loan, and certainly
Clapp was reluctant to approve a loan so ardently opposed
by the state's senior senator.

Gajan's effect was to sour

Ellender, but, in the end, his exit allowed LEC to get on
with its business without being hampered by a dissenting

What appeared to be a large hurdle crossed (the final
approval of the loan) was simply the beginning of a tremen
dous series of barriers that would have to be crossed.
For the next five years, until the groundbreaking ceremony
on June 23, 1969, the road would be rough.
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CHAPTER 7
TERRITORIAL PROTECTION AND JOHN MCKEITHEN
Territorial protection has been mentioned as one of
many points of controversy between the co-ops and the
private companies over the G&T loan approval.

But the

question of territorial protection had been around for some
time.

It is, in some ways, a part of the G&T controversy

because the question was finally solved as part of a com
promise that released the loan.

But because its beginnings

were different, and the battle for it was fought on the
state level rather than the federal level where the G&T
was fought, territorial protection will be treated here as
a separate topic.
What the co-ops wanted in territorial protection was
simply to prohibit any utility (investor-owned or consumerowned) from duplicating lines already built or from moving
into an area already being served.

The most commonly

favored protection legislation was the 300-foot rule which
gave the owner of an existing line protection against
encroachment for 300 feet on either side of that line.

An

area already occupied (cordoned off by lines) was virtually
guaranteed for the future.

The rule was designed to bring
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stability to a haphazard situation that had allowed utili
ties to serve anyone anywhere.

It would also end needless

and expensive duplication of existing lines.

Furthermore,

an agreement of this sort would be a big step in the direc
tion of mutual understanding and compromise between the
co-ops and the investor-owned utilities.
The need for a territorial protection rule began late
in the 1950's when the private utilities began moving into
areas historically served by the co-ops.

In 1956, Bonner,

for the first time, mentioned private utility "pirating"
and line duplication of co-op facilities, citing a takeover
by CLECO of the Scheutz subdivision in DeRidder.

In his

article, Bonner added photographs of spitelines (electrical
lines not electrified, used simply to control an area for
future development rather than to serve it) and duplication
of existing co-op lines.^

Problems of this sort escalated

in the Sixties, and Bonner continued to report them.^

The

co-ops were too small and too weak to take a strong stand
against these aggressive, high-pressure tactics.

But by

introducing legislation, they hoped to protect their

^ Rural Louisiana, July, 1956, 4.
^ ^bid. October 1958, 3; ibid., January, 1959, 4;
ibid., November, 1960, 4; ibid., April, 1964, 10; ibid.,
September, 1963, 14; ibid., August, 1963, 12; ibid.,
October, 1958; ibid., April, 1960, 11; ibid., October,
1963, 3; ibid., April, 1964, 17; ibid., August, 1958, 2;
P. R. Hall "(manager at SLECA to Richard Richter (Director
of the Southwest for REA), October 11, 1963, ALEC files.
Baton Rouge; Manager's Association, "Minutes," September 5,
1958.
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territorial integrity and the areas that they had histori
cally served.
In 1962, ALEC introduced House Bill 425 into the
legislature.

It was designed to eliminate all these prob

lems with the private companies.

Once the legal jargon

is eliminated, the bill is simple:
No electric public utility, electric cooperative
or other supplier of electricity service shall
construct or extend its facilities . . . to any
, premises, which . . . are being served by, or
which are not being served or are located within
three hundred feet of the distribution lines of
another supplier. . . . 3
Bonner and ALEC rallied with a publicity drive and
lobby campaign.

Roemer was given the role of leader, and

the bill was optimistically dubbed the "Fair Play Bill"
in Rural Louisiana.^
The bill was dropped in the legislative hopper in midMay and placed in Judiciary A committee, which was led by
John Schwegmann of Orleans Parish.

Schwegmann was running

against Hale Boggs in a U.S. Congressional race and had
turned more than one Judiciary A committee meeting into an
anti-communist forum.

In the early Sixties, voters

responded favorably to politicians who found communists
where they were not supposed to be.

According to Bonner,

Schwegmann found communism lurking in Louisiana's co-ops.

^ H.R. 425 is published in its entirity in Rural
Louisiana, May, 1962, 4.
^ Ibid., May, 1962, 2.
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Bonner wrote: In his zeal to defeat the Electric Co-ops'
territorial integrity Bill [Schwegmann] linked the Co-ops
and their supporters to Russian communistic experiments
and spoke loudly in terms of 'Americanism, ' preserving
free enterprise, and 'marching socialism.'

No records

were kept of committee meetings in the early Sixties, so
it is impossible to know just what Schwegmann said, but he
was notorious for such actions, and co-ops were well-known
targets.
On May 30, the bill was reported unfavorably from the
committee.^

The next day, the committee's minority resolu

tion to allow the bill to be debated on the floor was voted
down by the House in a vote of sixty to twenty-five.^
Probably the most interesting thing about the bill was that
of its twenty-five sponsors, thirteen turned around and
voted to kill the bill, leading Bonner, even today, to
ponder the possibility of foul play.®

If not that, the

private utility lobby had certainly earned its money.

Just

after Memorial Day, 1962, the Fair Play Bill, despite its

1962 Legislative Calendar of the State of Louisiana,
25th session, 1962, 100.
^ Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House of
Representatives of the State of Louisiana, 25th session,

3ÏÏ2:
® Interview with Mark Bonner, Baton Rouge, August 20,
1980.
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good name, was killed--easily.
off," recalls Bonner,

"They just beat our butts

"They beat the hell out of us on

that simple t h i n g . B u t

there;would be another day.

Two years later, in the midst of the G&T discussions,
the two groups tried to come to some sort of agreement
over territoriality as a part of these discussions.

On

May 7, 1964, the lawyers of the two groups met at the
Monteleone Hotel in New Orleans to debate, among other
things, territorial protection.

One week later they met

again, and the co-op lawyers stated their need for an "area
concept," with disputes to "be worked out by agreement
between the Companies and the Cooperatives rather than [by]
Legislation."

The response was predictable.

"The Company

attorneys again stated that they would not be a party to
any such program, whether by Legislation or private agree
ment."^^

Eight days later, the company representatives

wrote to Norman Clapp to explain their interpretation of
the meeting.

They made it clear to Clapp that they would

not be a part of any territorial agreement unless the
co-ops would come under the Louisiana Public Service
C o m m i s s i o n . I n June, Bonner wrote that at these meetings

^ Ibid.
Rural Louisiana, June, 1964, 2; "Minutes" of meet
ing between lawyers ofco- o p s and lawyers of companies,
May 14, 1964, Ellender Papers, Box 292-D, Allen Ellender
Library, Nichols State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana.
F. H. Coughlin, J. J. Morrison, G. C. Rawls to
Norman Clapp, May 22, 1964, ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the co-op leaders had not objected to the PSC as arbitrator
of disputes, that, in fact, they welcomed a powerful and,
supposedly, unbiased umpire.

But the companies refused

to agree to any territorial integrity rule such as the 300foot rule that the co-ops wanted.

They would simply have

the PSC deal with disputes as they arose.

This would give

no legislative basis for the decisions made by the PSC,
and should the members of the PSC change, as, of course,
they would over the years, the attitude of the commission
could just as easily change--possibly to the detriment of
the co-ops.

With that stumbling block thrown in the way,

and with the deadline fast approaching for filing bills
in the legislature, negotiations terminated.

Both groups

would submit bills and let the legislature d e c i d e . I t
looked again as though the co-ops would get the short end.
The utilities' refusal to allow territoriality may
have caused Clapp to approve the G&T loan to LEC.

It cer

tainly demonstrated to him that the utilities were not
negotiating in good faith.

In his letter of explanation

for approving the loan, he stated, among other reasons for
approval, his "regret" that the companies had not made a
greater effort to reach a mutually satisfactory solution
to territorial protection.
Rural Louisiana, June, 1964, 2,
Norman Clapp, "Information Relating to the 'A'
Loan Application of Louisiana Electric Cooperative, Inc.
of New Roads, Louisiana," September 12, 1964 (unpublished
copy, ALEC files. Baton Rouge).
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On May 28, the co-ops filed three bills: HR 811, HR
812, and HR 813,
tant.

Of the three, HR 813 is the most impor

It would grant the PSC jurisdiction over the co-ops

where disputes had occurred between the co-ops and the
private utilities.

But it would exempt the co-ops from

PSC jurisdiction in relationships between the co-ops and
REA, and between the co-ops and their own membership.

The

bill would also allow the PSC to allocate territory among
the co-ops and the private utilities.

This allocation

was to be granted to the utility which first served an
area and which served the largest number of consumers there.
This type of territorial guarantee was apparently more
desirable to the co-ops than the 300-foot rule.

Bills

811 and 812 were simply clarifications of PSC jurisdiction
over the co-ops.
The companies' bill, the Munson-Womack Bill, was filed
two days earlier.

Its purpose was "to remove statutory

exemptions of co-ops from jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission"— that is, to put the co-ops entirely under the
jurisdiction of the PSC.^^
The co-op bills were read May 18, passed to Judiciary
B on May 31, reported unfavorably on June 9, and killed the
the next day.

They were handled so swiftly and so roughly

Bill printed in its entirety in Rural Louisiana,
June, 1964, 3.
Legislative Calendar, 27th session, 158.
Ibid., 158.
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that the co-op organizers barely had enough time to bring
their influence to bear.

They did not have a chance.

For the companies' bill, though, it was a different
story.

It was also sent to Judiciary B, but three days

before the co-op bill.

By the time the co-op's plan was

considered, the utilities had had plenty of time to state
their case to the same committee members.

On June 9, the

same day that the co-op bills were reported unfavorably,
the Munson-Womack Bill received a favorable report.
it seemed, was everything— at least in this case.

Timing,
On

June 11, the bill passed the House with a respectable
eighty-two to eighteen vote, and was passed on to the
Senate.

It was reported favorably from committee there on

June 18 and adopted five days later, again with a respectable
vote of thirty-one to seven.

The next day, the House ap

proved a few Senate amendments, and the bill slid its way
on to the governor's desk where, after such resounding
legislative support, no opposition was expected.
In the final hours of the ten-day veto deadline, Bonner
visited Governor John McKeithen in a last-ditch effort to
stop the bill from becoming law.

But the governor was not

seeing anyone ; he had, of all things, the mumps.

Bonner

resorted to speaking with Gus Weil, a McKeithen aide.
"And here came Big John," Bonner recalls, "stumbling out
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of the office in his pajamas."

His bearlike growl startled

Bonner: "Boy, quit your damn worrying.
bitches pass the bill.

Let the sons-a-

I'll veto the damn thing."

And,

as Bonner remembers, "that's exactly what he d i d . O n
July 6, his veto message was read in the legislature :
Having been a member of the Public Service Com
mission for approximately ten years, I am
thoroughly familiar with the problems of both
the electrical cooperatives and other utility
companies and the conflicts which develop between
them from time to time. - Base# upon this know
ledge, I feel that this bill goes too far and
that it would be unwise to place all phases of
the activities of cooperatives under the Louisiana
Public Service Commission.
Some portions of
their activities undoubtedly should be regulated,
and, if at some future legislative session a less
comprehensive bill is passed, I will be happy to
sign it.
And with that, the ordeal ended.

On the day the veto was

read, it was sustained, eighty-one to fourteen.
Bonner stated that it took a lot of courage for
McKeithen to veto that bill.

The sponsors, Lantz Womack

and Robert Munson, were McKeithen floor leaders.

The bill

passed both houses quickly, and with strong support.

But

McKeithen, still in the early months of his administration,
had a strong grip on the legislature, shown by the lopsided
vote to override.

Interview with Mark Bonner, Baton Rouge, August 28,
1980.
Legislative_Calendar, 27th session, 158. The veto
was dated July 4, 1964. It is printed in Officiai Journal
of the Proceedings of the House of Représentatives, 27th
session, 1, 532. It is also printed in Rural Louisiana,
July, 1964, 2.
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Bonner's reaction to all this was to let the rural
people of the state know what the governor had done for
them.

He placed an eight-by-ten photograph of McKeithen

on the front page of Rural Louisiana with the headline :
"Governor Protects Rural F o l k s A l s o

in the issue,

Bonner published photographs of the legislators who voted
against the company b i l l . B u t he then went one step
further by publishing the names of those who voted for
the company bill.

They were shackled with the headline :

"These are the Legislators Who Voted Against Your Coopera
tive."^^

This.sort of publicity is one of the worst things

that can happen to a politician, and certainly many of
them remembered it later when co-op bills came up for con
sideration.

It is worth mentioning, parenthetically, that

a young senator from Acadia Parish, Edwin Edwards, was
listed among those "Who Voted Against Your Cooperative."
He never would again.
Bonner's power must have gotten a real shot in the
arm from this incident.

Legislators did not want them

selves blacklisted in a newspaper that hit every rural
doorstep in Louisiana each month.

Also, he had (or at

Rural Louisiana, July, 1964, 1.
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least it seemed he had) enlisted the support of a powerful
ally in McKeithen against the armies of two great enemies :
the hostile legislature, and their all-powerful allies,
the utilities.

At the end of his article praising McKeithen,

and raising him to a level somewhere between an American
hero and a demigod, Bonner writes : "Thanks, Governor, for
our reprieve to fight another day.
would.

And, of course, they

Bonner and ALEC were poised to take on Washington

in their fight to release the G&T money.
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CHAPTER 8
FOUR YEARS OF FIGHTING: 1964-1968
Bonner announced the approval of the loan in Rural
Louisiana in September 1964.

He was jubilant.

He wrote

that construction would take place in fifty parishes in
Louisiana, and that the plant itself would be located
somewhere near New Roads.

The issue also included an

artist's conception of the new plant.^

Four years later,

at an LEC meeting in Houma, Norman Clapp (now in his last
six months in office) stated, "No where has the controversy
over an REA loan been more bitter than here in Louisiana
over this loan for your generation and major transmission.
In the years between these two announcements the private
utilities dragged LEC and REA into every possible nook
and cranny of the state and federal court system.

By the

time Clapp made that statement in 1968, LEC had spent
nearly one million dollars in legal fees, and the cost of
building the plant had risen to where the fifty-six million

Remarks of Norman Clapp before the annual meeting of
the Association of Louisiana Electric Cooperatives, Houma,
Louisiana, May 10, 1968, Allen Ellender Papers, Box 207-D,
Ellender Library, Nichols State University, Thibodaux,
Louisiana. Also quoted in Rural Louisiana. June, 1968, 3.
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originally loaned in 1964 was not adequate to do the job
in 1968.

The private companies had effectively turned

the legal system into a legal quagmire that had stopped
LEC dead in its tracks.
The loan was approved on September 14, 1964.

Within

one month, the private utilities had made two, almost
simultaneous moves to block the granting of the loan.

On

October 26, they went before the United States District
Court in Shreveport to ask for an injunction to stop the
loan.^

Before Judge Benjamin C. Dawkins, they "claimed

that the result of consummation of the loan will be illegal
competition.

..."

They also complained that the "Adminis

trator [Norman Clapp] conspired with the super cooperative
[LEC] to create an unregulated monopoly and to deprive
plaintiff of its property and income."

They went on to

accuse Clapp, who was also named in the suit, of attempting
"to coerce plaintiff . . .
integrity.'"

to agree to so-called 'territorial

This apparently was enough to persuade Judge

Dawkins to issue the injunction on November 18, 1964, put
ting the brakes on the entire effort.^

It was only the

beginning of the battle in federal courts, where only half
the war was fought.

Central Louisiana Electric Company, Inc., v. Rural
Electrification Administration, Norman Clapp, and Orville
Freeman" Federal Supplement, Vol 236 (West Publishing
Company, St. Paul Minnesota, 1965), 273.
^ Ibid., 271-280.
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At the same time the private companies were shedding
tears before Dawkins, they appealed to the Louisiana Public
Service Commission in a less successful attempt to double
their case against LEC.

They went before the Commission

on September 30, 1964, just sixteen days after the loan
was approved.

Their argument was that "the proposed

generating station will not be in the . . . best interests
of cooperatives' members, in that [the private utilities]
allege the cooperative defendant cannot produce power as
economically . . .

as its customers now receive.

..."

the companies went on to complain that if the G&T plant
were built, it "would constitute the stealing of existing
customers.

. . .

The PSC ruled, on March 29, 1965, that the co-op
members were not customers but consumers, and, therefore,
the companies had incorrectly stated their case.^
words, the case was dismissed on a technicality.

In other
The

companies countered by filing suit against the PSC in
Nineteenth District Court in Baton Rouge, asking that the
PSC be forced to hear the case on its merits.

The court

agreed and the case was sent back to the PSC on April 26,

Louisiana Public Service Commission, Forty-fifth
Annual Report of the Louisiana Public Service Commission
(n.p ., December 31, 1965), 100-101.
Ibid., 101.
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1965/
Meanwhile, on the federal level, LEC had appealed
the Dawkins decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
There, in an unanimous décision, the court overturned the
injunction, stating that "making a loan for the construc
tion of competitive facilities is not a deprivation of
property rights.

..."

The judges also stated that "the

new cooperative has a right to compete," and that "those
who have heretofore purchased electric power from the
complaining companies certainly have the right, if they
wish, to buy from the new establishment [LEC]."

Further

more, the companies "are to completely lose customers which
heretofore they alone had, but this is not an unusual
product of competition."

Finally, after some twenty pages

of opinion, the judges decided: "We are nevertheless con
strained to the opinion that appelles [the private utilities]
did not have the requisite standing to bring this action
and neither do the courts have jurisdiction to review the
granting or denial of loans by the Rural Electrification
Administration.

The Judgement must be reversed."

But

Central Louisiana Electric Company, et al. v.
Louisiana Public Service Commission, Casie # 122,693, Nineteenth District Court, Clerk of Court Records, East Baton
Rouge Parish, Courthouse, Baton Rouge. On March 29, 1968,
Judge Luther Cole, in deciding the last case in these
series of cases, wrote this short history of the cases that
came before the PSC and the Nineteenth District Court be
tween the companies and the co-ops from 1964 to 1968.
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the judges, provoking what must have been a colossal dis
appointment to LEC people, added an appendix to the opinion
stating that since the case will go before the Supreme
Court it would not allow the loan money to be released
until that higher court made its decision.®
On the state level, in April, 1955, the case had been
sent back to the PSC to be heard on its merits.

There,

on June 28, 1967, the PSC ruled that it had no jurisdiction.^
On July 7, the companies persisted by petitioning for a
rehearing, and six days later than was d e n i e d . T h e com
panies were nearing the end of their legal rope on the
state level.

They again went before the Nineteenth Judicial

Court in Baton Rouge to force the PSC into a discussion.
Judge Luther Cole agreed that the PSC had no jurisdiction
over the case.

And in December, the State Supreme Court

a g r e e d . T h e private companies had lost the state fight.
On the federal level, things were also coming to a
close.

Before the Supreme Court, the utilities' appeal

Rural Electrification Administration et al. v.
Central Louisiana Electric Company, Inc., et al., Federal
Reporter, Vol. 854, Federal Second Series (Nest Publishing
Company, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1969), 859-868. Their
emphasis.
^ Louisiana PSC, Forty-seventh Annual Report (December
31, 1967), 77.
Ibid., 87-88.
Case Number 122,593, Nineteenth Judicial Court,
Clerk of Court Records, East Baton Rouge Parish, Courthouse,
Baton Rouge.
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was denied on October 10, 1966.^^

One year later, their

petition for a rehearing was d e n i e d . T h i s decision not
to decide lifted the injunction on the release of the
money placed by the Fifth Circuit Court.
On December 13, 1958, with these legal road blocks
removed, REA announced that it would release the loan.
Between that date and Christmas Day, the companies would
try to again marshal their legal forces to stop the loan,
while at the same time Robinson would go through a series
of cloak and dagger maneuvers to consummate the loan--spend
some of the money.

But while all this legal rigmarole

was taking place, LEC was having other problems that also
jeopardized the loan's release.

On September 2, 1964, just a few days before the
initial approval of the loan, Douglas Wright, the Adminis
trator of the Southwest Power Administration, agreed to
provide 75,000 KW of standby power for the LEC plant.
This agreement was necessary for the loan approval.

No

Supreme Court Reporter : Cases Argued and Determined
in the Supreme Court of the United States, 385 US 8l5, Vol.
"87, October term, 1966, (West Publishing Company, St. Paul,
Minnesota, 1968), 34.
Ibid., 388.
Reclamation and Interior Power Marketing Agencies Subcom
mittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee (undated
[1967?], unpublished copy in ALEC files. Baton Rouge), 6.
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electrical system could operate without some sort of
standby power.

This 75,000 KW was the amount of power

that would be available to LEC should the plant have to
be shut down for any reason.

In exchange, LEC agreed to

supply ten percent of its capacity to SPA, which SPA could
then sell at its own discretion.

The result would be that

SPA would make considerable profit from the sale while
providing LEC with all the standby power it n e e d e d . A l l
of this was to be a part of a larger plan to connect
several SPA-built dams in Arkansas and Oklahoma.

The

money to do it all was to come from the Department of the
Interior except for the connection from Louisiana to the
system that was to be paid for by LEC.

The connection was

to be made through eighty-two miles of 161 KV line to
the hookup at Prescott, Arkansas.
All of that was satisfactory until Dawkins' injunction,
on October 26, 1964, which, among other things, did not
allow LEC to move forward in any way with the G&T plan; it
forbade them to draw up and sign the contract with SPA.
But the SPA "agreement," which had been unofficially

of Louisiana Electric Cooperative before the Subcommittee
on Public Works, Senate Committee on Appropriations (May 3,
1966, unpublished copy in ALEC files. Baton Rouge), 5.
Ibid., 1; Rural Louisiana, April, 1966, 3; Norman
Clapp, "Information Relating to the 'A' Loan Application of
Louisiana Electric Cooperative, Inc. of New Roads, Louisiana,
September 12, 1964 (unpublished copy, ALEC files. Baton
Rouge).
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initialed by Wright, still stood, and in 1965, Wright went
before the Senate Appropriations Committee to ask for the
money to get the job s t a r t e d . B u t then there was a
change of heart.

Sometime in early 1966, Wright decided

to deal with Louisiana's private utilities instead.

He

had the money held over to connect the SPA dams until 1967,
pending an agreement with the private utilities to wheel
SPA power between the dams on their transmission lines,
thereby saving the government most of the $4,500,000 it
would take to build new lines connecting the dams.

The

problem was that the agreement between SPA and the utili
ties left out the LEC hookup at Prescott, and the loan
release was predicated on that hook u p .
The LEC members were astonished and caught off guard.
They met with Wright at his office in Tulsa on March 22.
As Roemer told the House Committee on Appropriations in
May, "Amazingly, Mr. Wright told us, and I was in the group,
that he had no obligation to the Louisiana G&T.

Statement of Roemer before Bureau of Reclamation, 7.
Ibid., 3, 6, 8, 14; Testimony of J. J. Morrison
before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations for De
partment of Agriculture and Related Agencies, May 11, 1967
(unpublished copy in ALEC files. Baton Rouge), 15; State
ment of Charles E. Roemer II on Behalf of Louisiana Elec
tric Cooperative, Inc. and the Association of Louisiana
Electric Cooperatives, Inc. before the U.S. House of Repre
sentatives, Committee on Appropriations, Public Works Sub
committee, May 2, 1966 (unpublished copy, ALEC files.
Baton Rouge), 2, 11.
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Furthermore, he said that his . . . agreement was 'no more
than a scrap of paper--an offer at most.'

And that he

had made no attempt to negotiate with the companies to
help a G&T he 'never believed in in the first place.
Four days later, the LEC group met with Kenneth Holum,
Assistant Secretary of the Interior, and, following that,
LEC members testified repeatedly before various Congressional
subcommittees--all to no a v a i l . T h e SPA agreement was
dead.
There is no evidence that the utilities conspired with
Wright in order to place another road block in front of
LEC, but since that agreement excluded any consideration
of LEC, and since the companies had not shown any interest
in any of it until after it looked as though they would
lose the Federal Court battle, there is good reason to be
lieve they did.
believed that.

Roemer (and probably most LEC officials)
In a statement before a Senate Appropriations

Subcommittee in 1967, Roemer stated; "The companies had
never shown the slightest inclination to negotiate a con
tract with Mr. Wright until after our standby arrangement
came into the picture, and until after we had won a major
victory in federal c o u r t s . T h e companies argued that

I M . , 11-12.
10.

Statement of Roemer before Bureau of Reclamation,
Roemer's emphasis.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the SPA connection to LEC was a further subsidy of the
entire program--a program that they did not believe in,
and apparently were willing to go to any extent to kill.
It was Bonner's opinion, though, that Wright wanted so
badly to work out the agreement with the private utilities
that he was more than willing to forsake LEC to do it upon
request from the utilities.
Without the SPA arrangement, LEG could lose the loan.
They had to look for a possible alternate standby power
source.

Consequently, Robinson, who had some connections

with Dow Chemical executives, found that Dow was one of
the biggest generators of private power in the country and
fully capable of providing standby power for LEC.

Further

more, Dow was unhappy with its relationship with GSU, which
had been supplying it with standby.

To add to the capacity

of this proposed LEC-Dow pool, Robinson sought to bring into
the arrangement one or two municipalities.

He was success

ful in selling the arrangement to the city of Lafayette,
and, finally, after some contributions to a few political
campaigns, the town of Plaquemine.

The agreement was struck.

It was the first time, anywhere, that public, private, and

Morrison before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropria
tions, 15. J. J. Morrison was Chairman of the Board at GSU
in 1966. By 1967, he was given the position of Director and
Consultant at GSU.
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municipal power had come together in a pooling arrangement.^^
The way the proposed plan would work was that trans
mission lines would be constructed between the four parts
(Dow, Plaquemines, Lafayette, and LEC); LEC was willing to
do that in order to obtain the standby power it needed.
But the plan annoyed the private utilities.

These lines

built from the LEC plant near New Roads, west to Lafayette,
would pre-empt, or control, the areas they covered.

The

result would be that utilities would lose control of a lot
of territory that included many budding businesses in south
Louisiana--from chemical plants to independent shrimping
operations.

The plan would also sidestep the SPA road

block that the companies had thrown down, and, at least on
the question of standby power, it would move LEC closer to
the release of the loan.

The companies, beginning to lose

the fight, complained to Ellender: "Under the proposed
arrangement, Dow Chemical, a major national industrial
company, would benefit from tax free power.

The use of TL

funds to build transmission lines and generating facilities
to benefit large industries like Dow was never intended by
Congress."
Interview with A. A. Robinson, New Roads, Louisiana,
September 11, 1980; Interview with A. A. Robinson, Baton
Rouge, May 19, 1982.
Ibid.
Norman Lee to Ellender, August 26, 1969, Ellender
Papers, Box 207-D. Lee was Chairman of the Board at LP&L.
See a similar letter one month later. Lee to Ellender,
October 2, 1968, ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

229

At about the time of the formation of the Dow Pool,
it had become increasingly clear to LEC officials that
higher construction costs, higher fuel costs, and infla
tion had all taken their toll on the fifty-six million
dollars originally approved.

Building a generating plant,

and then building transmission lines and substations to
twelve co-ops would be impossible at that price.

A new,

temporary, even inadequate, system would have to be worked
out.

The new plan was announced as part of the Dow Pool,

and would provide power to only four of the twelve co-ops,
the four in the southernmost part of the state, those
nearest to the plant: SLECA in Houma, Washington-St. Tammany
in Franklinton, Dixie in Baton Rouge, and Pointe Coupee in
New R o a d s . T h e building of transmission lines to these
four rather than to all twelve would save LEC a consider
able amount of money.

The only drawback was that the other

eight co-ops would have to pool their power costs with the
four receiving LEC power to produce an average for all
twelve.

The eight "outs" would, of course, have to continue

buying their power from the private u t i l i t i e s . B u t the
plan, as imperfect as it was, was to be only temporary; they

planation of this system is Statement of Floyd W. Lewis
before the Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies
Subcommittee on Senate Appropriations, April 17, 1969 (un
published copy in ALEC files. Baton Rouge), 2-3.
Ibid., 5.
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would soon enough produce all the power needed to connect
the other eight.
To no one's surprise, Ellender did not like this new
proposal.

In a letter to all rural electric members, pub

lished in Rural Louisiana, and paraphrased by Bonner,
Ellender wrote that the "new arrangement with Dow and
Plaquemine and Lafayette made him think twice before jump
ing on the bandwagon for the loan.

He is concerned because

the G&T will only serve 4 of the 12 co-ops yet it would
obligate the other eight to pool their costs, yet it would
create a tie-in for standby power not with the Southwest
Power Administration, as had been originally planned, but
with Dow and two other cities."

Bonner concluded Ellender's

message with a quote : "In all honesty, I cannot see why I
should be tarred and feathered for being concerned over
this peculiar set of facts and circumstances.
In the middle of all these controversies, Robinson
found himself stuck with the problem of buying property
for the plant.

He was in Washington testifying before one

of several subcommittees when, as he remembers, he was
asked: "Well, do you have a place to put this plant, and
I said, Richard Glenn's place, and we just cut eighty acres
out of the heart of his farm.
didn't know it."

He was selling land and

As it turned out, the purchase was for
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some 117 acres and the price was $97,450 for the tract.
Glen, who was Robinson's board chairman at Point Coupee,
was more than willing to sell a large portion of his
Hermitage Plantation in Ventress, just east of New Roads,
for that p r i c e . A l l of this may well have happened just
as Robinson said it did, but it is no coincidence that the
plant was finally built near New Roads.

As even Edwin

Edwards agrees, Robinson is a local leader ; he takes care
of his people.

The LEC plant meant jobs, prestige, and an

economic upsurge for his area.^^

The location of the plant

also reflected Robinson's growing power as President of LEC.
By late 1968, the legal problem, both state and local,
had been overcome, the difficulty with standby power had
been resolved, and a site was chosen, but the loan was
still pending.

In Washington, the private utilities had

persuaded Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture under
the outgoing Johnson Administration, to hold off on the
loan.

It is Bonner's contention that Freeman was playing

politics with the loan, agreeing not to release it in
exchange for financial support from the utilities for
Hubert Humphrey's presidential c a m p a i g n . T h i s is a strong

Interview with Robinson, September 11, 1980.
Interview with Edwin Edwards, Baton Rouge, June 3,
1982.
Interview with Mark Bonner, Baton Rouge, August 20,
1980.
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accusation and difficult to prove, but it is important
because Bonner believed it and reacted accordingly, and
also because he was able to make Hubert Humphrey believe
it.
Humphrey was the biggest fish in a sea of Washington
Democrats in these late months of 1968.

The presidential

campaign was at full tilt, and to many observers Humphrey
appeared on his way to a November victory.

To Bonner and

Robinson he was the man powerful enough to release the
loan from its political shackles.

So they went to Washington

hoping to present their case to him.
a man as powerful as Humphrey.

It was not easy to see

They called in political

favors and made their most important contacts.

Finally,

through the assistance of a sympathetic Hale Boggs and Edwin
Edwards (by then Seventh District Congressman) they wormed
their way i n . " I

just took it upon myself to go up

there . . . and see what could be done," recalls Bonner.
"It was the last desperate effort you might say.

Before

they entered Humphrey's office, before they confronted this
seat of power, Robinson and Bonner had discussed who was
going to say what, and it was decided that Robinson, as
President of the group, had the best title and that he would
do most of the t a l k i n g . " S o , we went in," Bonner
Interview with Robinson, September 11, 1980; Inter
view with Bonner, August 20, 1980.
Ibid.
38 Ibid.
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recollects, "and he asked us what he could do.

And I guess

for the first time in his life, Bubba [Robinson] turned to
me and said, 'Mark, you tell him our problem. '"

Bonner's

speech, as well as he remembers, went something like the
following: "Well, Mr. Vice President, the power companies
are running around here telling everybody all the great
things that they're going to do down in Louisiana and else
where to help you politically and, apparently, they've
convinced Secretary Freeman that he should not authorize
Clapp to make this loan . . , and I think if you know the
power companies as well as I do, no matter what they're
saying,

. . . they will not be for Hubert Humphrey."

Humphrey's response to an allegation that a supposedly non
political government agency might be using funds to further
his campaign was violent.
he was going to hit me.

Bonner recalls" "Man, I thought
He jumped up and hit the table,

and said, 'Mark, goddamn it,' and I mean he was eussin';
let's get one goddamn thing straight, a contract is a con
tract, and politics is politics, and if Orville Freeman,
goddamn it, doesn't have sense enough to know it, I can
goddamn sure tell him. '

And he picked up the phone and

called him and told him:

'I want that damn loan released

this afternoon.'

And that's the way it happened.

have used the right tactic,

I must

[because] it sure made him mad."

Ibid. See also, interview with Mark Bonner, Baton
Rouge, August 29, 1980.
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Robinson recalls the conversation between Humphrey and
Freeman as "rough."

"What he told that man, grandma's

soap couldn't get off him."^®
All of this, despite its light drama, still did not
get the job done.

The telephone call from Humphrey

caused Freeman to wash his hands of the loan, but Clapp
(out of respect for Louisiana's senior Senator) would
still not release his grip without Ellender's approval.
But Ellender was on a political junket in Asia and nearly
impossible to reach.

Bonner had repeatedly sent urgent

cablegrams and telegrams to Ellender all over the East.
The Senator had not replied.
The key to Ellender, at this point in his life, was
Edwin Edwards.

Ever since Edwards was elected to the

House in 1965, Ellender had looked upon him as his protégé,
and the young protégé had the Senator's ear on many topics.
Edwards remembers :
I was very young, idealistic.
I had a lot of
time on my hands as a freshman Congressman; he
was getting on in years and very busy and very
preoccupied with national and international af
fairs . . . so I used my energy and my relation
ship with him to make use of the power he had in
Congress for the benefit of the concepts and
ideas that I was interested i n . . . And with

Interview with Robinson, September 11, 1980.
Interview with Mark Bonner, August 20, 1980.
also Rural Louisiana, January, 1962, 2.

See

Ibid., 2.
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his knowledge, and without being anything but
the most admiring disciple of his, I sometimes
kidded him, or cajoled him into positions that
he did not want to [support], but he would do
it kind of as an accommodation to me.43
This power that was magically transferred from Ellender
to Edwards was the obvious connection needed to bring
Ellender around on the loan issue.

Bonner and Robinson

approached him sometime around December 13,
him to

1968,

influence Ellender to bring the loan issue

and asked
to

an end.

Edwards agreed.
Edwards called Ellender in Taipei, Taiwan at midnight.
"I deliberately waited until about midnight his time so I
could catch him in a deep sleep," Edwards remembers.

I

"kind of half-way laughed and apologized, and said I didn't
realize, and I really did, and he knew I was lying, because
he knew I knew better.
Edwards recalls their "father-son" conversation (in
French);
Ellender: "What the devil do you want?"
Edwards :

"I got a serious problem."

Ellender: "You gotta wake me up in the middle of
the night?"
Edwards :

"Yeah, goddamn it; you can sleep tomor- .
row. You [are] over there enjoying
yourself, having a good time and acting
like an important American, and I'm
over here taking care of your business."
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Ellender: "Well, what is it?"
("And so I then told him about the problem," of the need
for his approval for the loan to be released.)
Edwards : "Look, I don't have much time to talk,
this is a long distance phone call,
and I'm going to tell the Secretary
[of Agriculture] tomorrow that you
authorized me to do it."
Ellender: "Well, I'm not sure."
Edwards:

"I'm not going to get you in any kind
of trouble.
If it creates any problem,
you can always say later that it's not
so. "

Ellender: "Well, I don't know about that."
Edwards:

"And

Ihung up.

"Well, okay. I'll see you soon, now
take care, have a good trip, call me
when you get back."

The next day I told the Secretary that I

had called him in Taipei and

that he had said that it was

all right for me to go ahead and do it."

When Ellender

returned in January, Edwards recalls the following
conversation:
Edwards :

"I want to tell you what . . . ."

Ellender: "I know what you did.
of the old man."
Edwards :

You took advantage

"Oh, no, I would never take advantage
of you.
I might fool you in your own
interests, because what I'm doing to
you here is going to help the state
and help our area, and help people that
we both serve.
I just thought that I
would impose upon our relationship by
going ahead and doing what I know is
in your best i n t e r e s t . "45
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There is no reason to believe Ellender was in any way
duped or misled, but he was certainly forced into a deci
sion by Edwards that he did not want to make.

Bonner refers

to "static on the line" in the overseas transmission between
Ellender and Edwards, implying that Ellender was not quite
certain what was going on, but Bonner, of course, was not
there.Edwards,

as the only living member of the two-

party conversation, must be relied upon: "I would have never
done anything at all to abuse our friendship, or to take
advantage of him or do something behind his back, or mis
represent h i m . I t

also might be added that to abuse

Ellender would have jeopardized his powerful relationship
with Ellender to have a simple REA loan approved.
There was another factor that contributed to the re
lease of the loan in these last days of 1968.

The adminis

tration was lameduck; the November election had cast out
of office many of those who had the power to keep the door
closed on the loan, such as Freeman and Clapp.

But, of

course, they had to maintain the government until the Nixon
Administration officially took the reins of power.

Possibly

Clapp wanted finally to complete a project that he had ap
proved four years earlier, and fought for since then, before
he left his post.

No one wanted to leave the work undone.

The position of REA Administrator is for ten years,
but only David Hamil out of ten administrators has served
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and there was a good chance that the Nixon Administration
would be more sympathetic to the wishes and desire of the
private utilities than to the co-ops.
Even though the courts agreed that the loan should
be released, even though Humphrey, Freeman, Clapp, and
Ellender had all given their approval, and even though a
check for $226,000 was about to be released from REA,
there was still a possibility that the companies could ob
tain a stop order or an injunction before the loan could
be consummated, that is, before Robinson could spend some
of the money.

Robinson thought (and he turned out to be

correct) that if he could actually spend money, any request
for a stop order or injunction by the private utilities
would be less likely to be granted by the courts because
the contract had been f u l f i l l e d . S o it was important
for Robinson to get the money from Washington to a bank in
New Roads, write a check, and consummate the loan, moving
the whole thing into a new phase and, he hoped, out of the
reach of the private companies.

What followed was what

Bonner called in the January issue of Rural Louisiana,
"A series of ’cloak and dagger' type activities . . . "

out his term in that office. The point to be made here is
that the position of REA Administrator is political.
Interview with Robinson, September 11, 1980; inter
view with Robinson, May 19, 1982.
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On December 13, 1968, after Ellender's approval, Clapp
announced that he would release the loan.

The next day,

the utilities again obtained an injunction from the Federal
District Court in Shreveport to stop the release of the
money.

This was overruled by the Fifth Circuit Court,

and the companies, along a route which they had traveled
before, appealed to the Supreme Court.
On December 24, Robinson (hoping to have the injunc
tion lifted) made a telephone call to the Department of
Justice.

A rotating Justice remains on duty there all day,

every day, to review emergency cases.

It might not be true

that this case qualified as an emergency, but, nevertheless,
a Justice was available on Christmas Eve to hear the case.
Joseph Swindler, the Chairman of the Federal Power Commission
in the Johnson Administration, represented the LEC and REA.
Since a similar case was brought before the Supreme Court
in 1966 and dismissed, the final injunction against the re
lease of the loan was quickly l i f t e d . S w i n d l e r went to
REA where, despite the holiday, he was able to have a check

Rural Louisiana, January, 1969, 3.
Rural Louisiana, February, 1969, 2; Testimony of
Charles Roemer before the U.S. Senate Appropriations Com
mittee, Subcommittee on Agriculture and Related Agencies,
April 17, 1969 (unpublished copy in Ellender Papers, Box
356-D), 2.
Interview with Robinson, September 11, 1980; Roemer
before U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, 2.
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made out for $226,000 to LEC.

The problem was that the

check was in Washington and the bank was in New Roads.
Robinson feared that the utilities would have another in
junction brought against the loan before he could deposit
the money in the bank in New Roads, and spend the money
and thus consummate the contract.

With no way to elec

tronically transfer funds on Christmas Eve, Robinson's
only alternative was to physically move the check from
Washington to New Roads as quickly as possible.

Robinson's

son, who lived in Jackson, Mississippi, agreed to fly to
Washington, meet Swindler at the airport there, pick up
the check, and fly back to New Roads.
Christmas morning.

By then it was

Robinson met his son at the Baton Rouge

airport, took the check to New Roads, where Robinson used
his influence to have the bank opened.

He deposited the

money and wrote a check to a contractor for a fence and a
temporary road that had been built on the plant site.
The fight for the release of the loan was over.

The loan

was consummated; the contract was fulfilled.
It is difficult to characterize this four-year period
from September 12, 1964 to December 24, 1968.

The co-ops

and their leaders stopped being purchasers of power, moving
into the different world of producers, and even sellers, of
power.

But more than that, the four-year period produced

Interview with Robinson, S
view with Robinson, May 19, 1982.
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a change in attitude from small-time thinkers and small
time politics to something quite different.

Robinson,

Bonner, and Roemer, particularly, had been forced out of
their little spheres of influence into a larger realm.
Making a trip to Washington to testify before a powerful
subcommittee, stand before the United States Supreme Court,
speak poignantly to a powerful Senator or even the Vice
President would not be something to shy away from in the
future.

Some of today's critics of the generation system

have said that it was at this point that the LEC leaders
moved out of their realm and got too big for their britches.
One state Senator has commented: "Farmers can't run a multi
million dollar business.

That comment may or may not

be true, but it is certain that this four-year period was
a watershed in the life of Louisiana's Cooperatives.

As

of December 24, 1968, they were a big operation, with big
money and big headaches.

They had overcome a major obstacle,

but the road ahead would not be smooth.

27, 1983.
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CHAPTER 9
COMPROMISE AND THE RETURN OF DAVID HAMIL
By the mid-Sixties, co-ops all over the nation were
beginning to move into their own G&T systems and out from
under the private utilities.

It was no secret that the

federal government would not be able to appropriate the
money needed to handle such expansion.

At the same time,

opposition was growing in Congress to the lending of two
percent money from the federal treasury to fuel this
growth.

One-time rural leaders such as Ellender had begun

to see G&T development as "empire building," and more than
one group had, since the Eisenhower years, suggested that
either interest rates to REA be raised to at least four
percent, or that REA simply be pushed out of the government
realm altogether and be forced to borrow in the private
sector.

As opposition to two percent money mounted, and

as it became clear that future Republican administrations
would be out to alter drastically, or even kill, REA's
finance program, REA officials began to consider putting
together some sort of alternative finance program.

It was

a good idea, and an even better one was to try to beat the
Republicans to the punch.

Yet for many of these same

242
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reasons the whole idea had been proposed years earlier by
David Hamil, the REA Administrator under Eisenhower.
In the summer of 1958, Ezra Taft Benson, Eisenhower's
Secretary of Agriculture, drafted a bill to force REA to
borrow in the private sector.

As Bonner reported, it

"would force the co-ops to go to hostile Wall Street
financiers [who realize] that few co-ops have enough equity
in their systems to obtain such credit.

. . .

But, ac

cording to Bonner, Hamil went out on a limb, against
administration policy, to block this bill, knowing that
it would retard the future of REA.

As a second option

Hamil suggested alternative financing, whereby REA would
set up its own banking system, something akin to the suc
cessful Farm Credit system.

But to most REA leaders this

was just another Republican scheme to deny them something
they considered a right--two percent money.

Hamil traveled

the nation meeting with top local co-op leaders, trying to
drum up support for his plan, but he was, for the most
part, received as an administration whipping boy sent by
the evil Benson.

Bonner wrote that Hamil had "been coldly

received by rural electric leaders who think they see a
power company motivated scheme. . . .
But Bonner liked the idea.

Like Hamil, he was enough

^ Rural Louisiana, December, 1958, 4.
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of a seer to realize that two-percent money would not hold
out forever, particularly under future Republican adminis
traitions, and that REA had better come up with a program
before someone else did.

And Hamil's idea was the best he

had heard--it was certainly superior to anything Benson
had in mind.^

Bonner's notion was well-founded, but, as

it turned out, he was about the only rural electric leader
anywhere who supported the idea.
ment.

The result was banish

Hamil: "I told them that they needed something be

sides annual appropriations from Congress.
exception to me immediately.
Mark Bonner.

They took

One person who didn't was

And they gave him h e l l . B o n n e r supported

Hamil in an editorial in Rural Louisiana in which he stated

meeting in Estes Park, Colorado, Bonner gave further support
to Hamil.^

Also, simply by refusing to malign Hamil and

his program in his editorials, Bonner gave a sort of silent
support that was as important as anything else.

To Bonner,

the controversy was tinged with a slight degree of regret.

^ Telephone interview with Mark Bonner, August 29, 1983.
^ Interview with David Hamil, Sterling, Colorado, May
31, 1983. The only other national leader to agree with Hamil
was J. K. Smith, President of the Kentucky statewide organi
zation. Ibid.

Telephone interview with David Hamil, August 29, 1983.
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He recalls that Hamil "came up with this concept of a
co-op-owned bank.

. . . Well, even [to] the head of NRECA

and most of our people, that two-percent money was a kind
of religion . . . and a right in their minds,

I didn't

have any better sense, being a kind of newcomer in the
field . . .

I wrote a big editorial convincing them to

make this a future study and idea, and old Clyde Ellis
[President of NRECA] didn't speak to me for two years
after that . . .

he felt so strongly about it."

But

Bonner's problems were not only with the national people.
"And even here in this state, only Lil Killingsworth . . .
agreed with me.

Everyone else said it was one time I

should have kept my damn mouth shut.

Gene Taylor,

manager at Concordia Electric, would not support him, "and
Gene has always been on my side."

Ironically, only a few

years later Taylor was on the committee that devised a
cooperative banking system that was very similar to Hamil's
1958 proposal.^
By the time other REA and local co-op leaders saw the
need for something like Hamil's proposal, he was out of
office with the 1960 Democratic victory ; the push to make
the cooperative bank a success came between Hamil's terms
as administrator.

Norman Clapp, Hamil's successor, did

^ Telephone interview with Mark Bonner, August 29, 1983.
^ Interview with E. E. Taylor, Ferriday, Louisiana,
December 14, 1981.
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not, for some reason, choose to carry the ball.

The

force behind the cooperative bank was Clyde Ellis and
NRECA.
By 1963, NRECA began looking at Hamil's ideas.

They

contracted a financial consulting firm to explore the
possibility of a system similar to the Farm Credit system,
whereby the federal government would lend the bank its
beginning capital, all of which would be paid back.

The

consulting firm reported in July, 1965, that such a system
would work, although interest rates would be higher.^
NRECA and REA combined their efforts to send a bill
to Congress the next year.

The Johnson Administration,

apparently convinced it had a better idea, drew up a
similar bill.

The administration's bill would have capital

ized the rural electric bank for $750 million with an inter
est rate of four percent.

The REA bill would set initial

capitalization at one billion dollars with an interest
of three p e r c e n t . N e i t h e r bill was well sponsored or
supported; consequently both died in committee.
The next year, the bill was reintroduced, this time
with proper sponsorship.

In fact, the bill was connected

with some of the Senate's most prominent Democrats: Church,

National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,
People— Their Power, The Rural Electric Fact Book (n.p.,

vmrTTT.---------

For a synopsis of the bill, see. Congressional
Record, 89 Cong., 2 sess., Vol. 122, pt. 22, 1185 (Index);
ibid., pt. 8, 9785. See also. Rural Louisiana, May, 1966, 2.
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Bayh, Mondale, Cooper, Hart, Hartke, McCarthy, Montoya,
Muskie, and Symington were just a few of the bill's spon
sors.

But, as NRECA later reported, the bill was amended

"to the extent that it became totally unacceptable to the
rural electric systems."

NRECA asked that the bill be

killed.
The next step was to set up a committee to look again
at the whole matter.

In early 1967, the "Parity of Rates"

committee was organized; the name was later changed to
the "Long Range Study Committee."

This is important to

Louisiana because Gene Taylor served on this committee.
In March, 1969, after twenty-two meetings with co-op people
around the country, this group was ready to report its
findings to the REA administrator— who now was David Hamil.
For by that time, Nixon was in the White House, and Hamil
was back in the saddle at REA.
What the committee reported to Hamil in March, 1969,
was not exactly what he wanted to hear.

The group had

decided that his original ideas could be bettered by a plan
that would completely circumvent Congress.

Their co-op

bank would be totally free of federal funding from the

For a synopsis of the 1967 bill, see. Congressional
Record, 90 Cong., 1 sess.. Vol. 113, pt. 28, 1556 (Index);
ibid., 1624. See also, NRECA, People— Their Power, 75.
Interview with Taylor.
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beginning, financed directly through the resources of the
nation's co-ops,

Hamil remembers his response to the com

mittee's report: "This isn't the plan I wanted, but if
this is what you want, I'll do all I can to make it work.
I'll use every ounce of influence

I have. . . . "

"And I

did," he recalls, "and we made it work.
The system is complicated, but generally it is a
revolving-fund-type plan in which each of the co-ops pay
a certain amount to capitalize the bank.

Then, as members,

they are able to borrow from the bank using their equity
as collateral.

Congress continued to appropriate some

two-percent money for those areas

where a sparsepopula

tion made service impossible without some
assistance.

sort of government

The obvious drawback to the program was that

it was several years after capitalization before the system
was on its feet and workable.

Besides, not all co-ops

joined.^^
The official name of the bank became National Rural
Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation, better known as
CFC.

It was officially incorporated April, 1969, with

J. K. Smith, the President of the Kentucky statewide and
leader of the Long Range Study Committee, at its head.

Rural Louisiana, April, 1970, 2.
NRECA, People--Their Power, 80.
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The CFC opened new doors for rural electric coopera
tives all over the country, but it had a special signifi
cance in Louisiana beyond the contributions of Taylor and
Bonner.

CFC, just like the G&T movement in the state, was

part of a larger mentality among Louisiana's co-op leaders
to achieve independence ; more exactly, it was a movement
to become self-sustaining.

After years of being charac

terized as recipients of the federal government's chief
giveaway program, Louisiana co-op leaders (and very probably
co-op leaders in other

parts of the country) were as de

lighted to be out from under the thumb

of the federal

government as out from under the thumb

of the utilities.

This move for independence is apparent in other ways.
Throughout the early Sixties, Bonner published numerous
articles on the theme of "we are not the REA."

He pounded

and pounded the point that REA was merely a lending agency,
a government-backed bank, and that the co-ops were simply
private borrowers--privately owned c o m p a n i e s . " L i k e
millions of FHA and VA homeowners," he wrote, "REA borrowers
must replay their loan[s] on strict schedules, plus interest

For a few of dozens of examples, see, Rural Louisiana,
December, 1968, 2; ibid., July, 1960, 2; ibid., March, 1960,
2; ibid., November, 1961, 2; ibid., July, 1961, 2; ibid.,
November, 1962, 2; ibid., September, 1962, 2; ibid., July,
1962, 2; ibid., January, 1963, 2; ibid., May, 1961, 2; ibid.,
April, 1961, 2; ibid.. February, 1961, 2; ibid.. June, 1966,
2; ibid.. July, 1966, 2; ibid., December, 1965, 2; ibid.,;
August, 1965, 2.
Ibid., April, 1961, 2.
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"Ours never was a giveaway program.
banker.

REA is a prudent

It does not own a foot of line in Louisiana or

e l s e w h e r e . I n 1959, in a small but significant showing
of independence, Bonner suggested strongly that Louisiana
co-ops remove their REA signs from their buildings and
stop answering the telephone, " R E A . I n

1961, he wrote,

"Some cooperatives . . . answer their phone with a cheery,
REA.

Others are so proud of their independence [that]

they wouldn't be caught dead with anything marked REA.
To the conservative Bonner, it was important that Louisiana'
co-ops be independent private enterprises--not extensions
of a government agency, and not regulated by any group.
This need was also reflected in the various Public Service
Commission fights over the years.
anathema to the co-op leaders.

PSC regulation was

Freedom and independence

from all regulation was the conventional wisdom of LEC and
ALEC officials in the Sixties and Seventies, and Bonner
was the main leader and spokesman of that wisdom.
It is significant to note that SLEMCO, the only co-op
not to join LEC and thereby support LEC's independence in
that way, did not join CFC.

If CFC and LEC were cries for

independence from the rest of the group, then SLEMCO and
Gajan, in their stalwart insistence in not joining, showed.

Ibid., May, 1961, 2.
Ibid., February, 1961, 2.
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if not dependence, an inability to look to the future,
and to the inevitability and need for coining growth.
When Hamil again took the reins of power in 1969,
there were two looming problems left over from Clapp's
administration, one in Indiana, the other in Louisiana.
Both problems were virtually the same.

Loans had been

made to G&T groups in each state to build a generating
plant and transmission lines from the plant to the various
distribution cooperatives in the state.

In Indiana, the

transmission lines alone would cost some $20 million.
In Louisiana, the bill would run close to $30 million.
Hamil came to office with a plan for these two systems
that would initially not be popular in either state.

Why,

he asked, should the federal government lend a total of
$50 million to Indiana and Louisiana to build transmission
systems when transmission systems already existed?^^

Over

the years, the private utilities in both states had, of
course, built transmission lines from their plants to the
distribution co-ops.

It would be a simple matter to con

nect the new co-op plants to the transmission system of the
private companies--to integrate the systems.

As Hamil saw

Norman Clapp, "Information Relating to the 'A' Loan
Application of Louisiana Electric Cooperative, Inc. of New
Roads, Louisiana" (September 12, 1964, unpublished copy in
ALEC files, Baton Rouge).
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it, the inability of the two groups (the co-op people and
the private utility people) to see eye-to-eye on how
things should be done was no reason for the federal govern
ment to pay out $50 million in loans.

"We weren't going

to loan a hell of a lot of money to build a system when
there was already a system t h e r e . S o

he set out on an

odyssey to force the lion to lie down with the lamb, as
Bonner refers to it .

Or, as Robinson says, it was "time

for us to get into bed together.

"When I wasn't in

Indianapolis, I was in New Orleans or Baton Rouge," Hamil
remembers.

"I spent my whole first year arbitrating these

damn things.
So Hamil forced the warring groups to the peace table.
But in reality, LEC was coming to the end of its rope and
needed a few concessions from the companies to make its
plan work.

LEC had enjoyed some important victories, but

the companies were simply too strong to fight toe-to-toe.
Soon, LEC would need approval from the state legislature
to borrow from CFC, and in the past, the companies' legis
lative influence had skyrocketed the cost of construction
of the plant to the point that the $55 million would barely

1980.

2
1982.
Rural Louisiana, May, 1972, 2-A.
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build it, let alone pay for additional transmission con
struction— even the down-seated standby scheme of trans
mission lines to Dow, Plaquemine, and L a f a y e t t e . T o
add to their problems, it appeared that the companies
were about to marshal their legal forces to halt construc
tion.^^

By the time the legalities were all ironed out,

by the time the companies had explored all their legal
options, inflation and legal fees could bring LEC to its
knees.

All this is not to say that LEC surrendered--On

the contrary, it won the right to generate.

And to Bonner,

that was "a foot in the door."^^
Hamil came to REA in February, 1969.

The compromise

to connect the systems was underway by June.

Hamil brought

with him to the negotiations his right-hand-man, Reggie
Cole.

Cole was Hamil's engineering consultant and counselor,

and when he returned to Washington, Cole stayed to carry on
the negotiations.
for his diplomacy.

Cole was known for his expertise but not
His occasional astringent attitude,

though, was a consequence of direct orders from Hamil.
At one point in the negotiations in 1972, Coie'c strong
language was entered into LEC's minutes : "Like it or not,"

Louisiana Electric Cooperative, "Minutes," June 17,
1969, ALEC files. Baton Rouge.
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he stated, "LEC is going to have to join with Louisiana
utility companies in certain areas.
with all other power suppliers."

LEC will have to work

You must "pull together,

support decisions, and quit 'snipping' at personalities
and policies.
Sometime in early June, Hamil met with the leaders
of all the groups involved.

The dates of these meetings

are not clear, but on June 17, LEC reported it had been
served with an injunction to halt construction.^^

Eleven

days later, Hamil agreed to approach Floyd Lewis, Presi
dent of LP&L and Hamil's personal friend, "and advise him
that LEC is not interested in compromising until the
private utilities stop filing suit against them.

. .

So, with that, or at least by that date, the compromise
had begun.

On June 23, the companies were apparently

ready to agree to a compromise, but, in a letter to Hamil,
Lewis was not willing to have the Dow Pool as any part of
i t T h i s

became a sticking point in the compromise,

mainly because Robinson felt a moral obligation to Dow,
Plaquemine, and Lafayette, and did not want to leave them

files. Baton Rouge). Hamil made this remark to Schwab, an
LEC attorney, who informed Robinson of the conversation in
this correspondence.
Floyd Lewis to David Hamil, June 23, 1969 (copy in
ALEC files, Baton Rouge).
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high and dry without any standby arrangement.
The compromise, as it was finally laid out and agreed
upon, came out of several closed meetings from June, 1969,
to May, 1970.

The two groups agreed that LEC would build

the plant and produce the electricity.

But the companies

would buy the output of the plant and then wheel the power
over their lines to co-op distribution points around the
state for a fixed rate.

In other words, the LEC plant

would simply add to the overall pool of power within the
private utilities' systems, and then the co-ops would buy
back at a fixed rate the power they needed for their systems.
It was a good deal for LEC; they avoided the cost of trans
mission facilities, while receiving the right to generate.
That the power traversed private lines was really of no
consequence.

LEC profited from the sale of the electricity

they produced, which kept down the cost of purchasing it
at the other end.

Furthermore, there was no need for

standby power with this arrangement ; the companies were
more than capable of supplying that, too.

At the same time,

the consumers would receive electricity at a lower rate than
if LEC had tried to build its own transmission system.
The integrated system was the foundation of the com
promise, but there were other factors involved.

In June,

1970, LEC agreed to join the private companies in
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co-sponsoring a bill before the Louisiana Legislature to
place the co-ops under the complete regulation of the PSC
This was a weighty concession from LEC, but in exchange
they received two concessions that were just as important
to them.

First of all, the companies agreed not to block

a bill that would establish territorial integrity in the
state, something that LEC had been fighting for unsuccess
fully in the Louisiana Legislature since 1962.

The new

bill was the same as the old one; there would be no dupli
cation of facilities within 300 feet of each other's lines
The companies also agreed not to stand in the way of an
ALEC bill to allow the state's co-ops to borrow money from
lending institutions other than REA.^^

This opened the

door for membership in CFC, but it also allowed LEC and its
members to take advantage of a new loan system that was set
up by the Nixon Administration in 1973.

All in all, these

were important concessions.
But LEC still demanded that some accommodation be
made to Dow, Plaquemine, and Lafayette.

The LEC pooling

arrangement with these three generating concerns had rubbed
the companies the wrong way, and now they did not want to
take up LEC's obligation as a condition of the compromise.

House Bill #946. Legislative Calehdar of the State
of Louisiana, 33 regular session, 1970, 260.
Ibid., 260.
Ibid., 111-112.
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But Robinson had arranged the agreements, and he did not
want to turn his back simply because the arrangement was
no longer convenient.^®

He insisted that the three

members receive the same benefits they would have received
had the pooling relationship with LEC been carried out.
Finally, in May, 1972, Bonner reported that the companies
had agreed to work out some sort of arrangement.^^

In

October, GSU (the company that would be serving the group)
agreed to offer interconnection agreements to Lafayette
and Plaquemine but would not agree to extend the same pro
posal to Dow--GSU continued to consider Dow a purchaser
rather than a generator of electricity.

GSU did, though,

agree to furnish standby power to Dow, which was apparently
all Dow wanted because the agreement satisfied all con
cerned.

LEC and Robinson had fulfilled their obligation.

All of this, of course, had to be formalized in con
tracts.

In May, 1970, LEC and the three companies had come

to an agreement to provide wholesale power to all the twelve
c o - o p s . B y September, Hamil was commending the LEC
leaders for "their efforts toward resolving the long-standing

(n.p., n.d.), unnumbered page.
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differences with the power companies.

A year later,

he summed it all up: "The progress toward working out an
agreement between Louisiana Electric Cooperative, the
G&T federation, and the investor-owned companies, was a
major accomplishment.

...

It means an end to expensive

litigation, involving the right to serve rural loads as
well as the right to generate and transmit power through
LEC, and legal recognition of your territorial rights,
together with the right to generate power.
But agreeing to agree was only the first (although a
giant) step toward completion of the compromise.

It was

necessary to bring the companies to the table to sign the
necessary contracts.
to the terms of the

Not until May, 1972, did GSU agree
interconnection a g r e e m e n t . T h e y

would deliver power to the four southwestern-most co-ops :
Dixie, Pointe Coupee, Beauregard, and Jeff Davis.

When

LEC's plant capacity expanded in the mid-seventies, allow
ing it to fulfill the power needs of the other nine co-ops,
then contracts were to be signed with CLECO and LP&L, but

Rural Louisiana, September, 1976, 6.
Ibid., September, 1971, 9. Hamil made this state
ment on August 26, 1971.
Ibid., 9.
The announcement that LP&L signed an interconnection
agreement came at the LEC meeting Cby now changed from LEC
to Cajun Electric) on May 25, 1976. Cajun Electric, "Minutes,
May 25, 1976. One month later, CLECO signed.
Ibid., June
23, 1976. GSU signed the next year.
Ibid., October 28, 1977.
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until then, it was only necessary to "lie down with" GSU.
There were no winners or losers in this compromise.
But LEG did earn the fundamental right to generate power,
while at the same time the companies had to surrender their
advantageous position as the sole wholesale power producers
in the state.

This right (as much a right as a precedent)

would allow LEG to grow unhampered in the future--one plant,
then two, then more, until they could generate all the
electricity the state's co-ops needed.
The companies were charged with buying this power,
but that power enhanced their pooling and generating
capacity.

In the case of LP&L and GSU, their pooling range

covers large parts of the Southeast and West.
brought into that pool was an advantage.

Any power

Furthermore, by

maintaining the transmission systems the companies con
tinued to possess a degree of control over LEG and the
co-ops, something they had always seen as important.

There

might be another generating system operating in Louisiana,
but there was not another complete system (generation and
transmission) in competition, setting rates.

The co-ops

were still buying electricity from the companies, and
therefore contracts would have to be signed for the price
of that electricity, even though they were somewhat com
promised by having to buy it in the first place at the
front end of the deal.
in a limited sense.

The companies still had the monopoly,

They were in control, they had the
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leverage, they were still selling electricity to the co-ops,
and, most of all, there was not an independent system run
ning head-to-head against them.
Hamil was the key to the compromise.

In fact, it is

nearly impossible to underestimate his importance here.
As a Republican, he had the clout with the private com
panies to bring them to the bargaining table.
not have done it.

Clapp could

As a Democrat, Clapp was the enemy in

the eyes of the Louisiana companies, he was out to destroy
them, even take them over.

At the same time, Hamil was a

conservative, and, of course, REA Administrator.
him on the side of both groups.

This put

Kamil's job of straddling

these two antagonists was remarkable.

Today, he counts

both Mark Bonner and Floyd Lewis among his best friends,
friends that he had made before his second term, before
the negotiations and subsequent compromise b e g a n . A n d
there is no doubt that he brought his friendship to bear,
together with his political influence, to see to it that
Louisiana (and Indiana, incidentally) developed an inte
grated system whether they wanted it or not.

The result

in efficiency, to say nothing of money saved, was enormous.
From the compromise, LEC leaders discovered something
that must have been distressing, at least to Bonner and
Robinson.

Independence, as sacred an ideal as it was, was

47 Interview with Hamil, May 31, 1983.
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very expensive, and, at least for now, unattainable.

It

was one thing to remove "REA" from the co-op buildings.
It was quite another to build transmission lines to each
co-op.

Also, by coming under PSC jurisdiction (the ul

timate regulatory agency in Bonner's eyes) LEC left behind
all thoughts of independence, at least for the immediate
future.

It must have been disheartening.

In order to

receive the all important right to generate, LEC had to
come under PSC regulation, as well as surrender its dream
of being totally outside the realm of the private utilities,
of being totally independent of a total monopoly.
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CHAPTER 10
CAJAN II AND THE QUEST FOR COAL
Compared to the rough trip from conception to con
summation, the road for EEC's leaders from ground breaking
to completion was relatively smooth.

After carrying out

that Christmas Day loan deposit and check-writing scheme,
Robinson did not waste any time in getting the system
organized, people hired, and construction started.

His

first move was to hire a manager, someone with experience
who could supervise the plant's entire construction and
operation.

The manager's role would be similar to the

manager's position at the smaller distribution co-ops ; he
would be a paid professional who would head the operation
with approval from the board of directors.

Robinson did

not go through any long-range search to fill the position.
More through luck than anything else, he stumbled upon a
highly qualified individual who, before he left LEC, be
came an extremely powerful and important figure in it.
Robinson is not disposed to dalliance.

He gets things done.

And so was the case in his hiring of Merle Burgin.
Burgin had been the chief engineer at Basin Electric
Co-op in Bismark, North Dakota, from 1963 to about 1967.
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Basin is a generating co-op with the distinction of being
the largest lignite-fired plant in the country.
had the nation's lowest operating costs.^

It also

Burgin had left

his position there after completing his job of getting
their first plant into operation, and went on to work for
a contracting firm.

He found quickly that contracting was

not his calling, and, after only a year or so, began look
ing for something else.

He mentioned his interest in a

new job to a friend at Basin Electric who told him about
the situation in Louisiana— LEC had gotten its loan and
would soon be needing top-level employees.

His friend

suggested that he call Bubba Robinson in New Roads.

Finally,

after some difficulty with the telephone operators in de
ciphering Robinson's nickname, Burgin reached Robinson at
about 9:00 p.m. on January 10, 1969.

After telling

Robinson of his interest in the position, he received one
of Robinson's characteristic responses: "Can you be here
at one o'clock tomorrow?"

Burgin tried to meet the demand,

but the best he could do was 2:30.
a Saturday.

So, they met January 11,

By Tuesday, Robinson had contacted REA in

Washington, received a favorable report on Burgin, and
hired him.

He called Burgin to tell him the news :

"Can

People--Their Power: The Rural Electric Fact Book (n.p.,
1980) , 6 0 . Interview with Merle Burgin, New Roads, Louisiana,
August 5, 1982.
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Burgin could not make the Wednesday request, but he
did come on the job January 20.

Robinson had rented some

space in the old King Theater in downtown New Roads.^
The office was small, only about 900 square feet.

They

partitioned that small space into a reception area and
three offices.

By February first, they were in business.^

To those who today complain that LEC is a billiondollar operation that should not be in the hands of a few
farmers, Merle Burgin should be offered as an example of
experience and qualification.

He is not from Louisiana,

and in the late 1960's , when LSU and other Louisiana
colleges were just beginning to upgrade their engineering
programs, it was probably necessary to bring in such out
side talent.

Burgin, a native of Kansas, received both

bachelor's and master's degrees from Kansas State University,
and then went on to a career as manager of generating
facilities in Rockport, Missouri, and Bloomington, Illinois,
before he took the position at Basin Electric in 1963.^
Burgin's experience at Basin would have a profound impact
on LEC throughout the Seventies.

VJhether or not he steered

^ Interview with Burgin, August 5, 1982.
^ Rural Louisiana, August, 1978, 8; Louisiana Electric
Cooperative, l97l Ahriual Report (n.p., n.d. ), 5.
^ Interview with Burgin, August 5, 1982.
5

Ibid.
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LEC in the right direction in those years is a matter for
debate, but, without a doubt, he was qualified for the job
when Robinson hired him in 1969.
Before construction of the plant could begin a fuel
source was required, and the obvious fuel for LEC was
natural gas.
and cheap.

In the Sixties fuel was seemingly abundant-But LEC was not large enough to attract good,

low-priced, long-term contracts.

Robinson had received

some commitments from Texaco in 1968, but he was kept from
signing a contract because he did not know how long the
problems with the private utilities would last, and there
fore did not know when LEC could take delivery on the fuel—
an important part of any fuel contract.

So, Robinson's

hands were tied, at least until he could force solutions
to his problems.

Texaco certainly knew of Robinson's

predicament— that once the legal barriers were removed,
there would be a very short time before the loan was re
leased.

Robinson would have only that short time in which

to negotiate a fuel contract.
he could get.

He would have to take what

Texaco had made some tentative commitments

that Robinson had relied upon, but just when the time came
to sign the contracts, they backed out.

Bonner still feels

that the private companies had something to do with it.
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situation fell into Bonner's hands.

The only way to bring

Texaco around was to use some political influence, he
thought.

So he went to his old friend and savior-of-the-

day, John McKeithen.

On a Saturday, McKeithen, and his

administrative assistant Lewis Quinn, wrote a letter over
the governor's signature to the president of Texaco, and
then they tried to reach him by telephone.
successful.

The call was

McKeithen's clout forced the Texaco president

to agree to work out some sort of contract with Robinson
and LEC.^

Without this contract, the loan would certainly

have been delayed, allowing the companies again to marshal
their legal forces to stop the loan release; McKeithen had
again saved the day.
The agreement that Robinson signed appeared at the
time to be extremely bad for LEC.

With gas prices running

in the vicinity of seventeen to eighteen cents per million
BTU's, LEC got stuck with an exorbitant twenty cents.
looked like a terrible deal.

It

But three years later gas

prices were sixty cents per million BTU's and Texaco was
begging LEC to abrogate the contract.^
Having acquired fuel, a loan, and a manager, LEC held
ground breaking ceremonies on the plant site in New Roads

^ Ibid.
^ Interview with Burgin, August 5, 1982; Carroll P.
Trosclair, Big Cajun (n.p., n.d., photostatic copy of
pamphlet in ALEC files, Baton Rouge), 9; See also. Rural
Louisiana, July, 1974, 3.
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between the companies and LEC was well underway, and by
then it must have appeared that all would soon agree, that
Hamil's influence would be successfully brought to bear on
both sides of the fight.
affair.

The ceremony itself was a modest

No big names attended, and Bonner did not even

bother to report it in Rural Louisiana.

This was partly

because there were still some possibilities that the entire
program would fall through, or be delayed even further.
Nevertheless, on that date the ceremony occurred and con
struction officially began.
From the beginning of construction in late June, 1969,
until the plant was completed in May, 1972, things went
so smoothly that the various problems are hardly worth men
tioning.

There was a labor dispute at the outset of con

struction, and contract negotiations concinued with GSU,
but for the most part, construction proceeded w e l l O n
September 22, 1970, LEC leaders made their first on-site
inspection of the plant.

Bonner hailed it as a milestone

in the history of the p r o g r a m . I n April, 1971, Bonner

^ LEC, 1971 Annual Report, 11.

LEC, 1971 Annual Report, 5.
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announced that the plant was fifty percent complete,
and two months later, he prematurely announced that the
plant was nearing completion.
The engineering firms that built the plant were Bovay
Engineers of Houston, and Burns and McDonnell of Kansas
City.

Bovay had had a long relationship with LEC.

When

the co-ops were first thinking about a G&T in 1960, Bovay
did the feasibility studies.

Over the years, Bovay had

done a considerable amount of work for LEC on a provisional
basis, that is, for no compensation until a loan was
granted.

Bovay's history of a good working relationship

endeared that company Cand its founder and President,
Harry E. Bovay, Jr.) to LEC, and to Robinson and Roemer in
particular.

Later, when Roemer became Edwin Edward's

Commissioner of Administration, Bovay became the chief
engineering firm of the Edwards Administration.

But, in

1970, it was Bovay that ran the show at the LEC plant.

The

other firm. Burns and McDonnell, was a veteran in powerplant design, and was the principal designer of the plant.
Art Hartung was in charge of the firm's operation at New
Roads.Bovay,

and Burns and McDonnell worked together,

dividing the engineering responsibilities of the plant—

Ibid., April, 1971, 4.
Ibid., July, 1971, 5.
LEC, 1971 Annual Report, 9; Rural Louisiana, May,
1972, 10-A.
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and the fee, $ 1 , 2 3 7 , 0 0 0 . The boiler manufacturer was
the Riley Stoker Company (now the Riley Company), of
Skokie, Illinois.

Riley also built the steam generators.

The cost for both was in the vicinity of 5.5 million
dollars.

The total cost of the plant was $32 million,

and its output was about 230,000 kilowatts, only thirty
to forty percent of LEC’s needs at the time of completion
On May 31, 1972, the plant was declared commercial,
and on a sunny June 10, a fair-like dedication ceremony
was held under a big tent near the plant in New Roads.
Three thousand people attended, and so did all the politi
cians who hoped to bask in the political limelight of the
event.

Edwin Edwards, having just been inaugurated two

months before, was the center of attention.
even Norm Clapp, attended.

Hamil, and

Possibly the biggest surprise

was that Ellender showed up to tell the crowd that he was
delighted that the plant would be capable of producing
power at such a low cost, and that LEC had been able to
come to some agreement with the companies over transmission
facilities.

Ellender, running for his seventh term in the

Senate, certainly would not miss such an opportunity to
claim all the credit he could for the new facility.
was, though, in the last few days of his life.

He

He died of

16 Ibid.. 13.
17

Ibid., 13.
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a heart attack on July 27 at his office in Washington.
The man to succeed him in the Senate, J. Bennett Johnston,
also attended the dedication, as did other lesser-known
figures, such as Congressman John Rarick, Congressional
Candidate Gillis Long, and Commissioner of Agriculture
Dave Pearce.

As Louisiana political events go, this was

a major affair
The ceremony was covered by a local Baton Rouge tele
vision station, which interviewed all the dignitaries and
most of the LEC officials.

The Baton Rouge Morning Advo

cate also did a story that made the top of the front page,
that included a photograph of Hamil, Edwards, and Ellender.
The incident at the ceremony that deserves the least
attention (but the incident that the Morning Advocate
dwelled upon the most) was an ironic one : during Robinson's
all-important opening speech, there was a power failure.
Robinson had to complete his speech with a battery-powered
bull horn.

The embarrassment must have been evident in

some red faces.

The facilities around the plant, strangely

enough, were hooked into the GSU system rather than the
power system of the new plant, causing Roemer to speculate

New York Times, New York Times Obituary Index, 19691978 (New York Times PubHsHïng~T^pâïty7~TWBüJ7"lZôrrTri
Sec. II, 33.

Baton Rouge Mofnihg Advocate, June 11, 1972, 1, 6.
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(although somewhat jokingly) that GSU was to b l a m e . B u t
such an incident, with its all-too-coincidental feature,
must have raised some discerning eyebrows.

Was GSU sending

a signal that they were still there, still in control as
transmitter of the power?

Or was it some kind of symbol?

A romantic might see it as the end of an era of antagonism,
and, with the return of power thirty minutes later, the
dawning of a new cooperative age.
Edwards made the best of it.
to speak, the power returned.
Edwards took the credit.

Whatever the cause,

Just as it was time for him
And, to nobody's surprise

He went on from that glorious

beginning to compare himself to the plant.
sparks.

"We both generate

Possibly one irony deserves another.

After all had said their piece, everyone ate jambalaya
and barbecue beef and went home.

The plant, though, con

tinued to run at nearly full capacity for the next three
to four years, generating nearly forty percent of the power
needed by the LEC system.
Just prior to the dedication ceremonies (.sometime in
early May) the LEC board decided that the plant needed a
name.

Bonner came up with the name Cajun, intending to

dedicate it to Edwin Edwards, the one person who Bonner
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felt did more than any other Louisiana political figure to
aid the p r o g r a m . I t might also have been in Bonner's
mind that this newly elected governor would probably have
eight more years in office to assist LEC in future endeavors,
endeavors that would soon dwarf that little 230 megawatt
plant.

Edwards, of course, would want more than a simple

namesake in exchange for his support, but such a gesture
might endear him to LEC.

Bonner then decided that alone,

the name Cajun lacked flair, and suggested that the name
be Big C a j u n . T o many supporters, Edwards had often been
referred to as the Big Cajun, (just as McKeithen had been
referred to as Big John) in obvious reference to Edwards'
standing among his fellow Acadians.

At the dedication

ceremony, Edwards stated his approval of the name : "How
could I turn down an invitation to speak at the dedication
of a plant called Big Cajun No. 1?"^^
Hamil approved of the name Big Cajun, and at the
ceremonies he called it "colorful and distinctive."

But

he went on to suggest that the LEC board might consider
changing its name from LEC to Big Cajun, Inc.^^

Hamil felt

Telephone interview with Mark Bonner, September 2,
1983; Rural Louisiana, May, 1972, 1-A. This is the first
reference to Big Cajun in Rural Louisiana.
Telephone interview with Mark Bonner, September 2,
1983.
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that the name Louisiana Electric Cooperative was too easily
confused with the public relations group, the Association
of Louisiana Electric Cooperatives, particularly since both
groups were made up of many of the same people.

Also, the

acronyms, ALEC and LEC made the whole thing even more con
fusing.

Bonner agreed.

If it did nothing else, a new

name would straighten out the post office; each group too
often received the other's mail.

So, it was done.

In

November, 1972, Bonner announced in Rural Louisiana that
Louisiana Electric Cooperative would be renamed Cajun
Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. (not the Big Cajun that
Hamil had suggested), and the always present acronym was
adopted: CEPCO.^^

But in this case, CEPCO did not stick,

except for use on occasional letterheads, correspondences,
and publications, while the name Cajun Electric did.

So,

there is still some confusion between Cajun the plant
(usually referred to as Big Cajun), and Cajun the organiza
tion (usually Cajun Electric).

ALEC, of course, kept its

old name and purpose, and, in the spirit of growth and
development, built a new building in Baton Rouge in
September.

May 31, 1983.
Rural Louisiana, November, 1972, 6. The board of
directors officially adopted the name in December. Cajun,
"Minutes," January 30, 1973, ALEC files. Baton Rouge.
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Also in September, SLEMCO came back into the fold,
or at least partially so, by rejoining ALEC.^^

Among all

the reasons for this occurrence, probably the most im
portant was the intervention of the ubiquitous David Hamil,
always ready to force a compromise between warring factions
by applying pressure at just the right point.

As in the

compromise between the companies and LEC in June, he used
his club of friendship to pound out this agreement.
had known Gajan from his first stint in office.

Hamil

After all,

SLEMCO was the largest co-op in the nation at that time,
and Gajan was probably the most influential co-op leader
in the state.

The two had met both socially and profes

sionally on several occasions.

Relating to the reunion,

Hamil states that he did not cause it, but that he did
encourage it.^^
Another factor in all this is that the ten-year con
tract that SLEMCO signed in 1962 had just come to an end.
The new ten-year contract that they had to sign with GSU
was less generous than the earlier one.

So, a move to

Interview with Hamil, May 31, 1983; Interview with
U. J. Gajan, Lafayette, Louisiana, November 16, 1981.
U. J. Gajan to Allen Ellender, January 29, 1963,
copy in ALEC files. Baton Rouge. This letter discusses
the 1962-ten year contract.
4, 1983.

Interview with Earl Broussard, Baton Rouge, March
Broussard is public relations director for GSU.
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Cajun for cheaper electricity was characteristic of Gajun,
SLEMCO had had several studies done and even considered
buying a part of a CLECO plant under construction, but,
"we looked at [the alternatives] very closely," Gajun
recalls, "and based upon the study that we made, right or
wrong, it showed that we'd be better off with Cajun.
wanted us to join, so we agreed,

. .

Cajun

This was late

in 1975, and his decision must also have been influenced
by the fuel situation that had changed drastically with
the Arab boycott of 1973.

By then, few were questioning

how much electricity would cost, only that there would be
enough for the future.

In the Cajun minutes of September

23, 1975, it was entered that Gajan had inquired about
j o i n i n g . I t was not until April 26, 1977, that he was
accepted as a member of the Cajun board, and the great
schism was patched up.

Even Robinson agreed, having his

agreement placed in the record seconding the motion for a
unanimous v o t e . T h e only lagging problem was SLEMCO's
1972 ten-year contract with GSU.

But finally with some of

his characteristic muscle-flexing, Hamil was able to bring
GSU and Cajun to an agreement on that.

The GSU-SLEMCO

Interview with Gajan, November 16, 1981; Cajun
"Minutes," October 28, 1975.
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contract was assigned to Cajun.

It ran out in 1982.^®

Merle Burgin's experience had given him an insight
into the future.

Well before the 1973 Arab oil embargo,

well before the Federal Power Commission decided that gas
was a fuel too pure to burn in boilers, and before gas was
priced out of sight, Burgin was pushing for a switch from
natural gas to coal.

It must have been difficult to make

Louisiana residents consider coal as a fuel source.

Why

should this state, sitting on one of the largest gas re
serves in the world, ever consider shipping coal from the
north to fuel its power plants?

"I could see the hand

writing on the wall," he states today, "there wasn't going
to be any gas.

I knew they couldn't continue to burn

natural gas in power plants.

It's wrong to take [as] fine

a fuel as natural gas is and use it in a power plant that
can burn coal, or something else not as e x o t i c . O f
course, Burgin was from Kansas, and natural gas was more
exotic to him than to his all-local board members at Cajun.
But several things helped Burgin get his point across and
bring around his skeptical Louisiana friends.
The coal that Burgin wanted to use was Great Plains
lignite.

The transportation costs, though, from Wyoming

Ibid., July 25, 1977.
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or Montana to Louisiana were prohibitive before 1972.

But,

as Burgin had predicted, things changed drastically as the
decade progressed.

As gas prices increased in 1972, and

then went through the roof during the 1973 oil embargo,
the price of Great Plains lignite, plus shipping, dropped
below those high gas prices.

In 1973, the cost of natural

gas to Cajun was about the same as the cost to buy and
transport lignite from the Northern P l a i n s . A s

the

Seventies progressed, not only did coal become increasingly
cheaper than gas, but gas became impossible to get.

"I

called Texaco one time," Burgin recalls, "and I said, what
would you say to me if I told you I wanted to buy firm
gas for two 500 megawatt units?

They said, we'd tell you

to go find some other source of e n e r g y . S o

gas was

generally out of the question as a fuel for the future.
Moreover, in late 1973, the Federal Power Commission
ruled that, because of the shortages created by the oil
embargo, interstate gas (the only gas that the FPC has
jurisdiction over) would be curtailed and sent north for
priority use.

Just as Burgin had predicted, "I knew they

couldn't continue to burn natural gas in power plants.

Trosclair, Big Cajun, 9. Rural Louisiana, August,
1974, 3; ibid., Febîïïaïy7T^72, 9.
Interview with Burgin, August 5, 1982.
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But Texaco was able to deliver on its contract for the most
part.

Burgin recalls that several times they tried to pur

chase the contract, and even one time came up with the
excuse that their wells had frozen.

But because of some

curtailment of Louisiana gas, Gajun was forced to buy stand
by fuel oil to keep the plant at 100 percent capacity, and
that also drove up the price of generation, making coal
even more attractive.

Robinson stated in Cajun Electric's

1974 Annual Report that over a three-year period prices
climbed from 2.5 mills per kilowatt hour with natural gas
to nearly thirty mills with the use of fuel oil.^^

This

was a bleak situation, and it appeared that the future held
an even worse prospect.
In early 1972, the Southwestern Electric Power Company
took the first big step in the South and purchased a large
tract of coal-producing land in W y o m i n g . S W E P C O is an
investor-owned company located in Shreveport, serving north
west Louisiana and parts of Texas and Arkansas.

Because of

its early entrance into the field of coal generation, SWEPCO
gained an advantage over all other power companies in

Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., 1974
Annual Report (n.p., n.d.). 2.
Telephone interview with W. G. Brandon, March 4,
1983. Brandon is the Vice-President at Southwestern Elec
tric Power Company in Shreveport. SWEPCO's purchase of
Wyoming coal was first announced at a Cajun board meeting
on October 24, 1972. Cajun, "Minutes," October 24, 1972.
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Louisiana, and today serves its customers with the lowest
rates in the s t a t e . B u r g i n and Cajun were only a short
step behind.
The coal itself has some properties worth discussing.
It is lignite, a soft coal, but, in this case, with a very
low sulphur content.

This makes it more desirable than

Kentucky, Illinois, or West Virginia bituminous coal.
Lignite (at least this lignite) does not require expensive
scrubbers to keep the plant from polluting the air.

It

had not been used before because of the tremendous expense
of transporting it such long distance from the Northern
Plains.

But now, in 1973, it was f e a s i b l e . B a s i c Elec

tric, the plant that Burgin supervised and helped build,
was constructed directly on a lignite deposit, eliminating,
of course, the problems and cost of transportation.

Basin

paid only thirteen to seventeen cents per million BTU's.
It would cost Cajun, according to Bovay's studies, some
sixty cents after transportation costs were a d d e d . T h a t
translates to a cost per mined ton of about five dollars.
Transportation costs would be an additional $10.50.^^
Lignite is a poor quality coal, and it also has a high
moisture level that would later produce severe problems.
45 See Appendix XXI.
46 Interview with Burgin, October 5, 1982; Trosclair,
Big Cajun, 9.
Trosclair, Big Cajun, 9.
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But, as Burgin has stated, "it can be burned in a power
plant."

But probably the most important factor was that

there was plenty of it.

"There's enough coal up there

to take care of our needs for hundreds of years," Burgin
stated in 1974.^^

So, western lignite seemed the thing.

But to install two five-hundred megawatt plants, no
matter how good the idea was, would be expensive, costing
something in the vicinity of six hundred million dollars.
After the difficulty LEC had in obtaining fifty-four
million dollars from REA, how could Cajun have such a
large amount approved?

Nixon managed to take care of that

on the day of his innauguration when he declared that all
REA loans "will be made as guaranteed and insured loans
under the authority of . . . the Rural Development Act of
1 9 7 2 . It was a real dumping of the whole REA program,
but a "new REA Act," signed May 1, 1973, fell right into
the hands of programs like Cajun's that needed large
amounts of money to continue their plans.

REA, today,

refers to it as a broadening of the program because it
allows REA borrowers to borrow increasing amounts of money.
Most of the assistance would be in the form of loan
guarantees.

REA would simply guarantee the money needed.

Trosclair, Big Cajun, 9.
NRECA, People— Their Powe ,
.
lished in its complete form here, 178-188, under the title
"Rural Electrification Act of 1935 with Amendment as Ap
proved through August 4, 1977" [U.S. Code, Title 7, Chapter
31].
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and Cajun (and other co-op borrowers) would go into the
private sector and borrow what they needed.

The standard

interest rate was set at five percent, with some two per
cent money available for sparsely settled areas.
Many of the ideas for this new program came from
Bonner.

He suggested to NRECA the final format of the

bill that was finally passed in January, just ten days
after Nixon killed the original bill.

Bonner could not

simply stand by and allow nature to take its course.

He

knew that if REA, or NRECA, did not come up with a workable
compromise, Nixon would.

Bonner also made his usual pil-

gramages to Washington to testify before various committees
In 1974,

NRECA recognized him for his efforts by present

ing him with an award.

Robert Bennett, from NRECA, de

livered the award, stating that: "Mark Bonner is the man
who lit the match to mobilize the rural electric leadership
that eventually succeeded in convincing Congress to restore
the direct loan program of the Rural Electrification Ad
ministration after it had been abolished by the X-Jhite House
In addition to the guaranteed loans that would be pro
vided by REA for borrowing in the private sector. Congress
created the Federal Finance Bank on December 29, 1973.

In

2; ibid., May, 1972, 1.
Ibid., February, 1974, 5.
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August of the next year, FFB agreed to lend money to REA
borrowers with government guarantees.

This further ex

panded Cajun's borrowing power.
It seemed as though Cajun's luck had turned.

There

were no more powerful company lobbyists to stand in their
way, no more all-powerful senior senators.

Cajun had

reached an agreement with the companies, and now borrowing
was outside the interest of Congress since no hands would
be dipping into the federal treasury.

It also looked as

though Cajun had gotten around the energy crisis and taken
the first steps toward the fuel of the past— and the future
--coal.

Now all they had to do was bring all these variables

together and make it all work, and of course, they had the
man to do it: Burgin.
It is easy to guess when Burgin began thinking about
coal as a fuel for Cajun.

In his 1974 report, he wrote

that coal had been considered three years e a r l i e r . B u t
probably he was thinking about it much earlier than that.
Bonner first mentions coal in Rural Louisiana the month
before the dedication of Cajun #1, when he wrote, "LEC is
studying the possibility of using coal to generate its
future plants.

That's why Big Cajun #1 is located on the

United States Department of Agriculture, Rural
Electrification Administration, Rural Lines--USA; The Story
of Cooperative Rural Electrification (Washington, B.C.,
USGPO, 1981), 26.
CEPCO, 1974 Annual Report, 9.
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Mississippi River where coal could be barged in cheaply.
If it is true that the plant was located in New Roads for
that reason, then coal had been looked at as a possible
fuel for the future as early as the late Sixties, even be
fore the first loan was released.

But most likely, Burgin

brought the idea for a coal plant with him from Basin Elec
tric in 1969,
Even before the first plant was dedicated in June,
1972, Bonner began preparing his reading public for the
new project, even though it would be three years before it
was announced.

As early as August, 1971, eleven months

before Big Cajun #1 would go on line, Bonner wrote that
"Louisiana's consumption of electricity is tripling every
10 years, even faster in some areas of the state.

This

means that the co-ops in the state must immediately plan
to add to the generating facilities of LEG or come up with
some suitable alternative.
beginning, not the end."^^

. . .

The G&T is just the

In May, 1972, one month before

the plant was dedicated, Roemer was quoted in Rural Louisiana:
"I urge that we expedite our economic and engineering studies
leading to early additions to our 230,000 kilowatt plant in
New Roads, or the building of others elsewhere.

Rural Louisiana, May, 1972, 4-A.
Ibid., August, 1971, 2.
Ibid., May, 1972, 5-A.
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What Burgin, Robinson, and the Cajun board had in mind
was to build two 550 megawatt plants at the New Roads site
under the name Big Cajun #2,

The first of the two units

was to go on line sometime in 1979, and the second in 1982.
On September 22, 1973, the board completed the loan applica
tion to REA for the expansion.

At the same meeting a

feasibility study from Bovay for the coal-fired units was
accepted, and Burgin announced that he had contacted some
coal companies in the West and that prospects looked
promising.
Burgin's first contact was with Peabody Coal Company
of St. Louis, in early 1974.

Peabody gave Burgin a commit

ment that was satisfactory, but they unexpectedly backed
out of the d e a l . S u n Oil seemed willing to deal with
Burgin, and in September, 1974, he told the board that they
looked the most p r o m i s i n g . B u t Sun decided, as Burgin
recalls, to tie the cost of their coal to the price of
Middle Eastern oil.

It was Burgin's response that the

cost of coal should have some relationship to the cost of
producing it.

"That was quite a session," he remembers.

He went on to contact Kerr-McGee, Carter Coal Company (an

Interview with Burgin, October 5, 1982.
Cajun, "Minutes," September 24, 1974.
Interview with Burgin, October 5, 1982.
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Exxon subsidiary), Arch Minerals, Decker Coal, and several
others.

It quickly became apparent to Burgin that Cajun

Electric, despite its needs and plans, was just not big
enough to deal with these giants of the coal industry.
The obvious thing to do, and something Louisiana co-ops
had had experience doing, was to join together with other
groups in similar situations, form a co-op (in this case
a super co-op, as this type of organization is called) that
was big enough to get the job done— in this case, buy coal.
To Burgin, it was necessary to have a negotiating position,
"a big enough demand so that we can go to a [coal] company
and say, we want you to build a mine and dedicate it to us
--all the output of that m i n e . T h e

hope was that this

would cost the company less, and then cost Cajun less.

So,

the strategy was to join with other generating groups like
Cajun to create a consortium large enough, and with a
demand big enough, to buy large amounts of western coal.
Burgin first contacted the manager at Basin Electric
who was having a similar problem, and the two men discussed
the idea on the telephone.

In the spring of 1974, Burgin

met with a representative from Basin, Ken Hollum, in a
hotel in San Francisco, and there they decided to set up
what became Western Fuels.

They called the manager at Tri-

State G&T in Denver, Lynn Garwood, and eventually that

63
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group joined.

Between the three, they needed something

between twelve and twenty million tons of coal per year,
enough to make the big companies listen,
While all of this was going on, Robinson had his own
answer to the problem of bringing ;the coal companies to
the negotiating table.

But Robinson differs from Burgin

in outlook: his answer was political.

He went to Edwards,

probably the only man in Louisiana with enough influence
over the oil companies in the state (the oil companies, of
course, own the coal companies) to make them listen.
Edwards was accommodating.

"I told them to form the let

ters in the language and terminology that they thought
would best serve their purposes, and I would send them out
with my signature, which I did."^^

According to Robinson

these letters were responsible for the contracts that
Cajun eventually s i g n e d . E d w a r d s ,
sure.

though, is not so

To him, the reason Cajun was not able to sign a

contract was not that their market for coal was too small,
but that, in the midst of the energy crisis of 1973, the
demand nationwide was too great.

"I don't think that these

companies out west paid any attention to [the letters].

I

Ibid. Cajun needed about four million tons of coal
per year. Cajun, "Minutes," September 24, 1974.
Interview with Edwin Edwards, Baton Rouge, June 3,
1982.
Interview with A. A. Robinson, New Roads, Louisiana,
September 11, 1980.
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don't think they were concerned at all whether they ef
fected a deal with Louisiana unless it was to their long
and short range interests.

People were beating their

doors down trying to buy what coal they had since it was
low sulphur coal, and they did not feel they had to bend
over backwards to work with anybody.

But at that time,

in mid-1973, Cajun needed a coal contract to move forward,
and no one knew how long the energy situation would last.
In fact, to most the 1973 price hikes and shortages were
just the beginning.

Fuel costs at that time might have

been as low as they would ever be again.

The strategy was:

take what you can before it is all gone.
Burgin returned from San Francisco with what he
thought at the time was the solution to the coal problem.
Western Fuels.

On May 28, 1974, he presented the idea to

the board, but they did not like it and voted it down.
The opposition was led by J. S. Robbins, the manager at
Jeff Davis.

He saw Western Fuels as "poorly organized,"

and he feared that Cajun would get locked into contracts
that would be binding and cause problems for the future.
Western Fuels went on to organize without Cajun.

But

Robinson liked the idea of Western Fuels, and he had the
power to build a majority coalition among the Cajun board

Interview with-Edwards, June 3, 1982.
Cajun, "Minutes," May 28, 1974; ibid., September
24, 1974.
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members to join.

"I saw we needed to be in it," he recalls,

"especially if we were going to add these other units."

He

agreed with Burgin that Cajun was too small to deal with
the big coal companies.

"Cajun may be a big little co-op,

but when you butt heads with Mr. Exxon and Mr. Shell, they're
big boys, but Western Fuels is a big boy, and Western Fuels
can deal with Shell on their own l e v e l . S o ,

Robinson

marshaled his influence to build a coalition that would
agree to join Western Fuels.

Finally, on September 24,

1974, the board voted to join.

This decision was reached

over the strenuous objections of Robbins, who made certain
that his side of the argument was entered into the minutes.
After the May, 1974, vote opposing Western Fuels,
Burgin had set out alone to find a fuel source for the
plant and had worked out a contract with Shell.

After the

September agreement to join, he turned the Shell contract
over to Western Fuels.

It looked as though Big Cajun #2

would have a coal supply.
But simply having the coal was not enough ; it had to
be transported some 1,700 miles from Montana, where the
Shell mine was located.

Burgin and the board members

looked at several possibilities.

They could haul the coal

Interview with Robinson, September 24, 1974.
Cajun, "Minutes," September 24, 1974.
71 Ibid., September 24, 1974.
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by train to Minneapolis, transfer it to barges, and ship it
down the Mississippi to New Roads, but Burgin feared that
ice in the river might curtail winter deliveries.

A second

option was to have the coal shipped by train the entire
distance from Montana, but that proved too costly.

The

third plan, and the one most viable, was to ship the coal
by train to St. Louis, and then by barge to New Roads.
The only problem was that a transfer point, or terminal,
would have to be built at St. Louis.

The terminal would

have to be built by the barge company, and the cost of
building it would be included in the cost of hauling the

coaiy2
The transportation deals were concluded much earlier
than the coal supply problem was solved.

While Burgin

was contacting coal companies as early as late 1972, he
was also talking to representatives of the BurlingtonNorthern Railroad, the only railroad to serve the Northern
Plains and to connect as far south as St. Louis.

By June,

1973, Burgin had signed a letter of intent, and a contract
soon followed.

The plan was that Cajun would provide the

railway cars to carry the coal, a total of 770 cars, 110
for each of seven trains.
The barge contract went nearly as smoothly, even

Interview with Burgin, October 5, 1982 ; Cajun Elec
tric Power Cooperative, Inc., 1976 Annual Report Cn.p., n.d.),
12-13.
73

Ibid., 13.
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though railroad and barge companies have reputations for
being mortal enemies who avoid working together whenever
possible.

The Burlington-Northern people, though, told

Burgin that they had had some success working with American
Barge Company (ABCL Western of St. Louis).

Bids were sub

mitted, American came in low, and a deal was struck.

They

agreed to deliver four million tons of coal per year to
Cajun.

The completion date for the terminal was set for

October, 1 9 7 8 . At the closing of the contract, Burgin
recalls telling the American Barge officials how important
it was that the coal be delivered on t i m e . H e would
later regret those words.
Meanwhile, Bonner was locked into another tooth and
nail fight in the Louisiana Legislature.

In the 1973

special session, a Senate bill was introduced that would
have nullified all intrastate gas contracts and required
renegotiation with the new price to be based on the price
of gas as of July, 1973.

The purpose of the bill was to

aid Louisiana gas producers who were dying a slow death
under long-term contracts at very low prices.

Or, some

might say, Louisiana's gas producers wanted to take full
advantage of the shortages by raising prices to as many
consumers as possible, even those who had signed long-term

Interview with Burgin, October 5, 1982; Cajun Elec
tric Power Cooperative, Inc., 1977 Annual Report (n.p.,
n.d.), 18.
Interview with Burgin, October 5, 1982.
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contracts.

Nevertheless, the bill whizzed through the

Senate with Edward's support and only four dissenting
votes.

On Friday, November 30, Edwards apparently had

reconsidered the measure, and walked down to the House
Chamber floor to have the bill returned to the calendar
so that he might consider a change of heart over the
weekend, thereby keeping the bill from being passed by the
House on that day.

The next Monday, December 3, Bonner

and a group of co-op leaders brought their influence to
bear.

They met with Edwards and pointed out that Louisiana's

municipalities were specifically exempt from the bill, and
that the investor-owned utilities received their gas pri
marily from interstate pipelines.

So, only the co-ops

would be hurt by the passage of the bill; specifically,
they would lose that now lucrative gas contract with Texaco
that Robinson had signed in 1968.

Bonner and his group

convinced Edwards that they were right, and he had the
section dealing with the mullification of gas contracts
deleted from the bill.

Bonner reported in the December

issue of Rural Louisiana that Edwards had said, "I'd rather
be right than consistent.

Senate Bill #9. Official Journal of the Procedures
of the Senate and House oF"Representatives, and the Legis
lative Calendar. Forty-second Extraordinary Session of
the Legislature, 1973, 113-125. For a synopsis of the bill,
see also the Legislative Calendar, included in this volume,
390-391.
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Finally, when it looked as though there would be
smooth sailing ahead, Bonner made the formal and official
announcement of Cajun #2 on February 24, 1975.^^

With the

Shell coal contract in hand, the rail and barge connections
made, and the loan guarantee about to be released, what
possibly could stand in the way?

What stood in the way

were Indians and environmentalists; neither group liked
the idea of digging up the Northern Plains for the coal.
The Shell contract signed by Burgin in 1974 gave
Cajun (through Western Fuels) everything it could possibly
want.

The quality of the coal was good, producing about

9,500 BTUs per pound.

Also, Shell agreed to produce the

four million tons of coal per year that Big Cajun #2 would
need; and the price was right, at about five dollars per
ton.

Shell had even allowed escape c l a u s e s . T o many on

the Cajun board, the whole project had been made feasible
by this lucrative contract.
But problems resulted when, in 1974, the Sierra Club
filed suit in Federal District Court in Washington, D.C.
against the Department of Interior to have the Northern
Great Plains region declared a province.

This would mean

that the coal producers, principally Shell and Exxon, would

Telephone interview with Mark Bonner, September 14,
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have to supply environmental impact statements of that
specific area, and that could delay the operation for as
much as two years.

But the court ruled on February 14,

1974, that the Department of Interior had, over the past
ten years, made three impact statements that had included
all or parts of that region, and another one was not
n e c e s s a r y . B u t the court also decided that until the
case was finally resolved there should be an injunction
against any mining in the r e g i o n . T h i s ,

of course,

suspended Shell's operations, and that concerned the
Cajun board.

Even though Cajun #2 was not to go on line

until 1979, it was necessary to have a workable fuel
contract in hand before REA would release the loan guaran
tee, and that was expected any time.

The Sierra Club suit

could well slow down the entire operation.
The Sierra Club appealed their case to the U.S. Court
of Appeals in Washington on December 4, 1974, where the
court agreed with their plea and reversed the decision of
the U.S. District Court on June 16, 1975.^^

The Department

of Interior, then, appealed that decision to the Supreme
Court, and on April 28, 1976, the case of Kleppe v. Sierra

Federal Supplement, Vol. 421 (West Publishing Company,
St. Paul, Minn., 1977), 638-652.
Federal Reporter, Second Series, Vol. 509 (West Pub
lishing Company, St. Paul, Minn., 1975), 533.
Ibid., Vol. 51
Minn., 1975), 856-893.
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Club was argued.

On June 28, Justice Lewis Powell delivered

the opinion of the court that there was no need (or that
the law did not require) an environmental impact statement
of that area.

Justices Marshall and Brennen concurred, and

each filed opinions on the case.^^
Bonner dealt with the case by maligning the Sierra
Club in Rural Louisiana.

He called them a "noisy and ap

parently financially well-heeled handful of environmental
industrialists,

[and] anti-growth intellectuals."

He went

on to complain that they were "idealists.
But Cajun's biggest problem with the Shell coal deal
was with a more formidable foe than the Sierra Club,

The

land where the coal was to be mined was on the Crow

Indian

Reservation on the Montana-Wyoming border.

The Crows had

sold the mineral rights to Shell, but, according to Burgin,
the Indians had gotten the worst of the deal.

They

ap

parently realized it and filed suit to abrogate the con
tract.

The case was thrown out of Federal District Court

in Washington for lack of jurisdiction.

It was later re

introduced into the Montana state judicial system, but the
final disposition of the coal leases became the decision of
Secretary of Interior Thomas S. Kleppe who served under

Supreme Court Reporter, Vol. 96, October term (West
Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn., 1978), 772.

Interview with Burgin.
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Jimmy Carter.

But he allowed the question to go unanswered.

Cajun, of course, needed answers, and finally, in 1978,
they agreed with Shell to give up the fight against inac
tion and abrogate the contract.
On top of all this, the Montana Legislature, in the
spring of 1975, passed a thirty-percent severance tax on
all coal leaving their state.

That would turn Cajun's

good deal at $5.00 per ton into a bad deal at $6.50.^®

The

cards seemed stacked against Cajun.
Between 1975 and 1976, the Cajun board members must
have feared a return to the horrid days of the Sixties when
they were up to their necks in litigation, when LEG was
nothing more than a series of court cases.
deal, as lucrative as it was, had no future.

The Shell coal
Opposition

from the Sierra Club and the Crow Indians, and then the
final straw, the Montana severance tax, was enough to send
them looking for other sources of fuel--anywhere but Montana.
Burgin, in the name of Western Fuels, again began negotiating
for western coal.

By late 1975, he had had some promising

discussions with Kerr-McGee.

Their holdings were in Wyoming,

in the Powder River Basin near Gillette, and not affected

Cajun, "Minutes," March 23, 1976; Telephone inter
view with Mark Bonner, September 14, 1983; Rural Louisiana,
June, 1980, 3.
Rural Louisiana, June, 1980, 3; Cajun, "Minutes,"
June, 19HD',' 3.
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by the Sierra Club, the Crow Indians, or the nefarious
state of Montana.

At first, the Kerr-McGee deal was to

be simply an alternative supply of fuel to satisfy REA,
and to supply the plant until the Shell deal could make
its way through the courts.

But as things got worse, as

it looked as though Shell would never be able to deliver,
and then when Montana applied its severance tax, the KerrMcGee deal began to look better and better.

In July, 1976,

Burgin announced the Kerr-McGee contract to the Cajun
b o a r d . I t was the Kerr-McGee mine that would allow the
release of the REA loan guarantee ; and it was the KerrMcGee mine that would finally supply Big Cajun #2 when it
went on line in 1980.
The most important contract to be awarded for Cajun
#2 was for construction of the boiler.

In August, 1974,

Burgin commented in the Cajun minutes that there had been
little interest in the construction of the boiler for Cajun
#1, but now, for Cajun #2, several companies were eager to
submit bids.

There months earlier he had met with

several boiler manufacturers, including the Riley Stoker
Corporation.

Riley Stoker’s construction of the small gas-

fired boiler for unit #1 had been more than satisfactory,
but Burgin, as he recalls today, was apprehensive about

Ibid., August 27, 1974.
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awarding them the bid for the coal-fired unit.

He had

hoped to take the bid of Babcock and Wilcox, the company
that built the boilers at Basin Electric.

They had spent

two years in design testing, and even then, they had had
some difficulty making the system work properly.

There

were few companies in the country that had experience
working with lignite, and Riley Stoker was not one.

But

they had asked to submit a bid, and, according to Burgin,
the board felt some loyalty to them for having done such
a commendable job on the first unit that they were allowed
to bid.

Today, Burgin regrets the decision.

never have been on the bid list."

"They should

But they were included,

their bid came in low, and it was taken.

Riley Stoker

agreed to build the boiler for just under seventy-six
million d o l l a r s , B y 1977, that cost was raised to over
seventy-eight million.
By early 1976, everything was in line.

A coal contract

was signed, the awkward transportation system was arranged,
and the contracts were awarded.

There had been some dif

ficult negotiations with the three investor-owned companies
to buy the power and then wheel it back to the thirteen
co-ops, but only GSU had been hard to please, and even they

Interview with Burgin, October 5, 1982; CEPCO, 1976
Annual Report, 24.
Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, 1977 Annual Report
(n.p., n.d.),16.
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had agreed to sign a contract as soon as some problems were
smoothed over.

The loan guarantee had not yet been re

leased from REA, but all the criteria had been met.

It

seemed only appropriate, then, that the Cajun board should
celebrate their victory with ground breaking ceremonies.
Those ceremonies took place sometime in April, 1976.
(Bonner did not include the date in his article in Rural
Louisiana about the function.)

Of those attending, there

was the always present Edwin Edwards, who again stole the
spotlight.

The chairman of the Public Service Commission,

Louis Lambert, also a t t e n d e d . B u t is was not quite the
gayla event that the dedication ceremonies for the first
plant had been.

No crowd of 3,000 was invited, and no one

ate jambalaya and barbecue.

Also, there was none of the

optimistic peering into the future that had characterized
the earlier ceremony.

In his editorial for that April,

Bonner expressed a they-said-it-couldn't-be-done attitude
of gloating success.

He seemed to be topping off the en

tire era that began in 1960 with a few words to those who
had stood in the way of the progress, in the way of the
dream.

"To the calamity howlers, the preachers of doom.

It was entered into the minutes : "On the strength
of a letter from GSU to Cajun agreeing to further negotia
tions regarding the contract, REA has gone forward with the
release of funds for Cajun Two." Cajun, "Minutes," April
26, 1977.
Rural Louisiana, April, 1976, 7.
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the fearful and 'no growth' advocates," he wrote, "I
'a plague upon your house!
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CHAPTER 11
PROBLEMS AND CRITICISMS
From the groundbreaking ceremonies to the completion
of the first unit of Big Cajun #2, that is from April,
1976, to spring, 1980, construction proceeded almost as
smoothly as had construction of the first plant.

Of course,

it took longer ; two plants were being built simultaneously,
and together they were five times larger than Cajun #1.
The plan was to push hard for completion of one unit, and
then complete the second about a year later.
After the groundbreaking ceremonies came the loan ap
proval.

On June 22, 1976, Hamil signed the loan guarantee

for $629 million.

A previous loan of eleven million dollars

had allowed some construction to begin before the June 22
approval.^

Of course, Hamil's signature only provided a

guarantee ; the money had to come from other sources , but
that posed no problem.

The Federal Financing Bank agreed

in the early months of 1977 to lend $400 million of the
$629 million, or about sixty-three percent.

This money

Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., "Minutes,"
August 31, 1976, 8; Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.
1977 Annual Report Cn.p., n.d.), 8.
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was to be loaned at three different intervals throughout
1977 and early 1978 at an average interest rate of 7.714
percent for thirty-five years.

The remainder of the $629

million came from the New Orleans Bank for Cooperatives,
an organization set up for the specific purpose of pro
viding funds for federally insured loans.

In addition,

Cajun established a seventy million dollar line of credit
with the Bank for Cooperatives to pay monthly construction
costs, and sold seventy-five million dollars worth of taxfree bonds through the Pointe Coupee Police Jury to pay
for the plant's pollution control facilities.^
With all this accomplished, and with what seemed to
be a thriving project and unlimited credit, Burgin and
the Cajun board had already begun looking to the future.
Burgin's ability to foresee the future, the natural gas
shortages, the impossibly high rates, the government's
restriction against gas as a boiler fuel, and the promising
futn-^e of lignite--all had given him a lot of power on the
Cajun board when it came to looking ahead.

In 1976, Bonner

wrote: "[E]ven before the energy crisis hit in 1973, CEPCO
manager Merl Burgin envisioned a fuel crisis and eventual
loss of our cheap natural gas to generate power.
don't know.

How, I

Even before the Arabs began their blackmail,

he was roaming the West in search of low-sulphur coal to

^ 1977 Annual Report,
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assure a future supply of electricity for rural Louisiana.
That's why we are a jump ahead of every utility in the
s t a t e . B u r g i n had good reason to see a greater need for
the future.

Demand for electricity in Louisiana was grow

ing rapidly.

His studies showed that within eight years

of the completion of the second unit at Big Cajun #2, the
state's thirteen co-ops would need nearly twice as much
generating power as the Cajun plants could provide.

To

meet the demand, he planned to build a third unit at Big
Cajun #2 to be completed in 1982.

This would bring Cajun

Electric's total generating capacity within the vicinity
of 1,840 megawatts.

And that, he wrote in his 1978 report,

would keep Cajun above the estimated demand for only about
three years.

Next, he hoped to build a plant on the lig

nite fields of north Louisiana.

That plant was to be com

pleted in the mid-Eighties, followed by a second north
Louisiana plant in the late Eighties.^

On top of this,

Cajun had made some early noises about buying a portion of
GSU's Riverbend nuclear plant.

That plant is to generate

940 megawatts when it is finished, and in 1976, GSU offered
Cajun up to 200 megawatts, a little over twenty percent of
the plant.

Such a purchase would delay the need to build

Report (n.p., n.d.), 2, 15; Rural Louisiana, August,1978,
8; ibid., April, 1979, 9.
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It would also transfer all of the headaches of construction
to GSU.

But the main advantage would be diversity.

By

making use of as many types of fuels as possible, Cajun
stood a better chance of dealing with the anticipated
energy problems of the future.
wisdom of the Seventies.

This was the conventional

As it turned out, Cajun brought

thirty percent of Riverbend, or 282 megawatts, and GSU
purchased forty-two percent of the third unit at Big Cajun
#2.

GSU had also seen the need to diversify.
All of this expansion and growth had been Burgin's

dream, but in 1978 he was within one year of the mandatory
retirement age of seventy, a condition of employment that
he himself had earlier insisted be made company policy.
The board wanted to bring in a new manager for the year
before Burgin left, allowing him to learn the ropes under
Burgin's direction.

But that condition of employment re

ceived a poor reception from prospective applicants ; hardly
anyone applied.

Finally, Jim Smith, the manager at SLECA,

asked for the job and was hired.

But Smith, according to

Burgin, did not want to follow him around for a year, and
asked the board to allow him to step into the position
immediately.

He was granted his wish, and Burgin left his

1978 Annual Report, 15; Rural Louisiana, October,

1979, ir
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post in September, 1978, about one year early— with pay
until age seventy, of course.

"So, he came in and I

stepped out, and you might say we were never in the office
at the same t i m e . A f t e r nine years, Burgin's influence
had ended.

It was not a bitter end, but it was an uncom

fortable one.
Burgin's term at Cajun was during the good times that
fell between two bad periods in the program's history.
He took the job just weeks after the fights with the private
utilities ended, and he left just before fuel and transpor
tation costs drove consumer rates through the roof.

Prices

began to rise in the mid-Seventies, and by the time Burgin
left in 1978, they were high, but by 1980 fuel and trans
portation costs had skyrocketed out of sight.

Federal de

regulation of the railroads in 1980 drove transportation
costs up forty-four percent.

That hope in the mid-Seventies

for a twelve-to-fifteen dollar price per ton for delivered
coal became a disappointment of over thirty dollars by
1980.^

Today, three years later, the cost is over forty

dollars per ton.^

Rail charges alone went from seven dollars

Interview with Merle Burgin, August 5, 1982, New
Roads, Louisiana. Bonner announced Burgin's retirement in
Rural Louisiana in April, 1980, 11.
3.
^ Interview with Mark Bonner, September 21, 1983, Baton
Rouge ; interview with Burgin, August 5, 1982; Rural Louisiana,
January, 1981, 3.
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per ton in 1976, to just under thirteen in 1980,^ while
barge rates doubled from 3.39 to 6.84.^^

Fuel oil, used

in Cajun #1, went from three dollars per barrel in 1974
to almost thirty-eight dollars in 1980,^^ while natural
gas rose from twenty-three cents per thousand cubic feet

Seventies when Cajun was still buying power from the com
panies, the cost was .6 cent per kilowatt hour.

By 1979,

later, Cajun was producing power for 3.5 cents per kilowatt
hour.

Of course, all of this increase was transferred to

the consumer.

In 1974, the average consumer on the co-op

system paid twenty-two mills per kilowatt hour.

The aver

age price charged consumers on the investor-owned utility
system was twenty-six mills, with GSU and New Orleans
Public Service paying as much as twenty-nine.

By 1980,

Cajun's prices were up to forty-six mills, while the aver
age company prices were just under that, at forty-five.^^

9 Rural Louisiana, March, 1980, D.
10

Ibid.. D.

Ibid., Ja
3; ibid., February, 1980, 3.

13 Ibid., January, 1981, 5; ibid., February, 1980, 3.
14 Ibid., February, 1980, 3.
Ibid., January, 1981, 5.
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By 1983, Cajun's prices had gone up to eighty-one mills
per kilowatt hour, while the investor-owned average rose
only to s i x t y . F o r Cajun, that is a seventy-six percent
increase from 1980 to 1983, while the companies' consumer
rates rose by only thirty-three percent.

Some of this

increase for Cajun between 1980 and 1983 had to do with
other problems, but much of it was a result of increasing
fuel and transportation costs.
The early Eighties brought these increases, but these
years also brought headaches of a different kind.

Design

and engineering problems at the plant nearly brought the
entire program to its knees.

The first sign of trouble

came when the boilers were being tested just prior to the
May 1, 1980, completion date.

The problem was in the

boiler system, more specifically, in the boiler tubes.
Because of an apparent slag build-up in these tubes caused
by a high sodium content in the coal, the tubes got too
hot.

The result was an explosion in the system that shut

down operations for over a y e a r T h e r e were two immediate
results.

One was that a man-made mountain of coal began to

pile up near the plant that could not be used, but had to
be paid for.

Second, contracts with the companies ran out.

See Appendix ICXI.
Interview with Burgin, August 5, 1982. Bonner
first mentions the design problems at Big Cajun in "Rural
LoUisiaha, January, 1981, 5.
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and Cajun had to purchase power from just about anywhere
at any price.

The consequence was that prices to the

consumers went from thirty-eight mills per kilowatt hour
at the end of 1979 to sixty-six mills in 1981.^^

Cajun was

able to absorb some of the cost, but it was the consumer
who had to bear the brunt of the expense.
There were other design problems.

Coal, before it is

burned for boiler fuel, must be pulverized into face-powder
fineness, and then blown into the furnace.

The mechanism

used to crush the coal is called a ball mill.

It is sixteen-

to-twenty feet in diameter and thirty feet long, and filled
about one-third full with steel balls.

Hot air is blown

through the turning ball mill, picking up coal dust, and
transferring it into the furnace.

The problem has been

that the plant's eight ball mills, four on each plant, have
not worked properly.

It is difficult to grind lignite; its

consistency is something akin to cordwood, according to
Burgin.

It also has a high moisture level, and that, in

Louisiana's high humidity, causes additional problems.

Un

til early 1983, several, if not all, ball mills were down
at one time or another, allowing the plant to operate at
only partial capacity--if at all.

Again, the coal continued

to pile up, and Cajun had to pay top dollar for supplemental
power to keep the system on line.

In January, 1983, six of
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the eight mills were working, and by May, 1983, all eight
were on line.
Who was at fault?

Riley Stoker, who built the boiler

system and the ball mills, has more often than not received
the most criticism for apparently not having the experience
necessary to build such a system.

But some of the blame

needs to be given to the Cajun board members for awarding
the contract for such a large project to a company for rea
sons of loyalty rather than for experience and ability.
Furthermore, the one person who had the expertise to know
which company could best do the job was Burgin.

Today, he

states that he had opposed allowing Riley Stoker on the bid
list because the company was inexperienced in such proj ects.
But his opposition, it seems, was not loud enough to be
heard, because few did.

If Burgin did make his opinion

known, then the board is, again, at fault for not listening.
But with all this fingerpointing, someone had to receive
the blame for it all.

It was Bovay that had set itself up,

by its own design, as chief engineer, the one with the
authority--and the responsibility.

So, with costs rising,

coal accumulating, consumer groups forming, and tempers
flaring, Cajun fired Bovay in 1981, and handed the entire
program over to Burns and Roe, the other engineering firm
that built the plant.

They were charged with taking care

Interview with Burgin, August 5, 1982; testimony of
John Schwab before Foster Campbell's Senate Investigation
Committee of Dixie Electric, Zachery, Louisiana, January 17,
1983. Schwab is the principal attorney at Cajun, Dixie,
and ALEC.
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of the problems and building the third unit that was
scheduled for completion in the summer of 1983.

The only

retribution dealt Riley Stoker was that its bid was not
taken for the third unit.

The boiler contract went to

Babcock and Wilcox of London, the company that built Basin
Electric, and the company that Burgin had wanted to build
the first two units in the first place.
The third unit went on line as scheduled in mid-summer,
1983, with few problems.

The cost for all three plants was

1.3 billion dollars, and they produced 1,620 megawatts of
power.

Two hundred eighty-two megawatts will be added to

that when the Riverbend Nuclear Plant goes on line in 1984,
unless it is further delayed.

The projected load for the

summer of 1983 was 1,300 megawatts.

With the two units of

Cajun #2 on line, plus the output of Cajun #1, Cajun Elec
tric was able to meet that demand with a 200-plus megawatt
reserve,

it is a requirement of the Southwest Power Pool,

to which Cajun belongs, that systems maintain a twenty per
cent reserve for emergency purposes, and Cajun fell short
of that requirement.

But by the mid-summer peak, the third

unit came on line, boosting Cajun's capacity to 1,620
megawatts.

Interview with Burgin, August 5, 1982; interview
with Mark Bonner, September 21, 1983; interview with Mark
Bonner, July 29, 1982, Baton Rouge.
Testimony of Schwab, January 17, 1983; 1978 Annual
Report, 15.
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Future plans are to build Cajun #3, sometimes called
Oxbow, in north Louisiana on the lignite fields there.
Four thousand acres have been purchased near Coushatta,
and a loan guarantee for one billion dollars is currently
under consideration at REA in Washington.

This idea had

its beginning when Burgin considered it as early as July,
1976.

Plans were announced in August, 1977.

The plan is

to build two 540 megawatt units there.
There is no indication that demand for electricity
has fallen off in Louisiana; in fact, it has continued to
rise.

In 1978, Cajun Electric estimated in its annual

report that the 1983 needed capacity would be 1,310 mega
watts, only 10,000 kilowatts over actual demand for 1983
So, it appears that if it is the objective of Cajun to
continue to serve the needs of its consumers statewide, it
must continue to grow.

The only alternative is again to

purchase power from the companies.
All of Cajun's design and engineering problems turned
into financial problems which, in turn, caused consumer
bills to rise.

This left Cajun open to controversy and

criticism from those who felt that the rate increases could
and should be regulated.

So, for the last time, Bonner

Cajun, "Minutes," July 27, 1976; Rural Louisiana,
August, 1977, 7; 1978 AnhUal Report, 15; Rural Louisiana,
August, 1979, 11.
1978 Annual Report, 13, 15.
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entered the ring against those who would stop the forward
movement of the co-ops.

But this time, ALEC, and the co-ops

it represented, came away divided and weak, rather than
united and strong.
Of all the goals (or dreams) of this movement, prob
ably the most important has been to attain independence-from the federal government, from the state government,
and from the private utilities.

In 1972, it became apparent

that dependence was a necessity of life for Cajun, that
interconnection with the companies was the only way that
self-generation (the greatest of all measures of independence)
could be attained.

But part of the 1969 compromise initiated

by Hamil was for LEC to come under the regulatory umbrella
of the Louisiana Public Service Commission.

In 1978, with

Hamil's influence limited to his cattle ranch in Colorado,
Bonner again began taking steps toward independence--out
from under the PSC.
It is the standard doctrine of ALEC and Cajun that the
co-ops (and therefore Cajun) should not be under the PSC
because they, themselves, are self-regulating.

The co-ops

and Cajun are non-profit organizations with unpaid board
members who are elected by the people they serve.

There

is no profit motive, there are no stockholders to pay a
previously established percentage of the profits, and there
is no reason to raise prices beyond what it coats to pro
duce the electricity.

Also, REA, by determining loan
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repayment schedules and how much to lend, is itself a
regulatory agency.

Furthermore, the people who elect the

board members have the power to remove them in open elec
tions, and that in itself is the ultimate system of regu
lation.

Many, such as Bonner, see it as a decidedly

American system of regulation, and therefore the best
system.

So, why should the PSC stick its nose in all this

when it is the job of the directors, above all else, to
keep prices as low as possible?

In addition, if the PSC

should deny Cajun a rate increase, Cajun would be tied up
in expensive court appeals that the consumer would have to
pay for.^^
This all makes sense, but there is an argument on the
other side.

On May 1, 1978, Bonner had a bill introduced

in the State Senate to remove the co-ops from PSC regula
tion.

The bill was well presented by Edgar Mouton and

Claude Duval, among others.

It slid through both houses,

and was quickly signed into law on June 15. It was a healthy
victory.

In the Senate, the vote was thirty-six to on e .

But it was that one vote that has given Bonner, Cajun, and
ALEC fits since then.

Foster Campbell (the one vote).

Senator from Bossier Parish, has worked since that day to
bring Cajun back under the PSC, and he has developed

Senate Bill 557. 1978 Legislative Calendar, Fourth
regular session, 1978, 703.
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something of a following.

To him, the co-ops and Cajun

have the ability to regulate themselves, but they have not
done it.

To Campbell, the record at Cajun is miserably

poor; the breakdowns and high rates are the result of mis
management by a group that is unable to make decisions on
the disposition of a billion dollar enterprise.
they're just in over their heads.

"I think

What you have is two

or three managers over there telling these board members
what they ought to do.
managers?

Who's checking on those three

That's a lot of power.

a million p e o p l e . H e

They're responsible for

also feels that if three-fourths

of the state's consumers are protected by the PSC, then
so should the rest; and he points to the fact that the
unregulated one-fourth has had higher rates than the regu
lated three-fourths.

Campbell also argues that REA is not

a true regulator of the co-ops, that it allows them a free
hand in slmost every aspect until default, and thus, he
says, regulation is too late.

Furthermore, he does not

see local co-op boards as self-regulating.

In some areas,

the by-laws of the co-op make it nearly impossible to re
move board members from office, leaving these men unregulated,
and unreceptive to consumer wishes.

All of these illnesses,

to Campbell, would be cured by PSC regulation, but he is
not willing to stop there.

"I think the time has come when

Interview with Foster Campbell, March 4, 1983, Baton
Rouge.
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we just probably don't need the REA's anymore.
companies will do the job better.

The private

I think [the co-ops]

ought to be bought out in Louisiana.

I'll be willing to

stake what I believe on that."^^
Campbell has made some points in light of the problems
at the Cajun plant and the subsequent transformation of
those problems into higher and higher consumer rates.

This,

along with a modest but growing following (that increases
as rates increase) from such groups as Dixie Watch and
others, has drawn some attention to Campbell.
lature, his influence is also growing.

In the legis

In the past, he

has won support for his anti-co-op bills from such diverse
figures as Victor Bussey of the AFL-CIO, and Governor David
Treen.

Even Edwin Edwards, a close friend of Campbell, has

stated that PSC regulation for the co-ops would end the
squabbling and not be much more than an inconvenience to
Cajun.

But he has also stated that it it is the desire of

Cajun to stay out from under the PSC, then he will give his
support.
Campbell's one-man crusade against Cajun began in
1978, but it was not until 1981 that he was ready to intro
duce a bill to place the co-ops back under the PSC.

His

bill did well that year, partly because that was at the

28 Ibid.; interview with Edwin Edwards, June 3, 1982.
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height of Cajun's troubles, and electric bills were rising
rapidly.

It passed the Senate on June 16, with a respectable

twenty-three to twelve vote.

But in the House, the story

was different; the bill received a rousing thumbs-down vote
of eighty-seven to z e r o . T o
victory.

Bonner, this was a great

He had put together a coalition of groups that

"normally wouldn't even sit down and talk together."

He

also received a commitment from Governor Treen to veto the
bill should it reach his desk.
In 1982, Bonner again rallied his forces, and this
time Campbell's bill died a quick and painless death in
c o m m i t t e e . B u t at the end of that session, Campbell re
ceived permission from Senate President Michael O'Keefe to
do a statewide study of Louisiana's co-op system, to go
from co-op to co-op and hold hearings, to ask questions
about their o p e r a t i o n s C a m p b e l l held these meetings just
prior to the 1983 legislative session, and although he
visited only four or five co-ops, in addition to visiting
Big Cajun and holding one or two hearings at the State
Capitol, he received enough notice and publicity to launch

29 Senate Bill 20. 1981 Legislative Calendar, Seventh
regular session, 1981, Vol. II, 698.
Interview with Mark Bonner, S
Senate Bill 720. 1982 Legislative Calehdar, Eighth
regular session, 1982, 793.
Telephone interview with Foster Campbell, September
26, 1983; interview with Mark Bonner, September 21, 1983.
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an effective political attack on the co-op system in the
1983 legislative session.
At these investigations and hearings Campbell was able
to browbeat co-op leaders and to get his point across to
the public and the media that he felt the co-op system in
the state at the least needed regulation, and at most,
total elimination.

He was accompanied on this crusade by

a small committee made up of various public service com
missioners and state senators, but Campbell was always at
center stage, taking co-op leaders to task for everything
from (what he considered to be) paying their lawyers too
much, to attending national meetings in Las Vegas with
co-op money.

Campbell barred no holds, and took no prisoners ;

his attacks were headlong, even ruthless.
a l e c 's

quered.

reaction was to divide and prepare to be con

Bonner mobilized for battle, but the ALEC board

decided not to go head-to-head with Campbell.

Instead,

they would send representatives to the hearings (principally
John Schwab, Cajun's sagacious attorney) and cooperate with
the study, concede to Campbell all he wanted and needed.
To Bonner, this was unconditional surrender.
don't win a fight that way," he says.

"You just

In Louisiana politics,

"if someone jumps on you, you jump on him twice as hard.
But the ALEC board did not see it that way and directed
Alice Howard, the public relations director at Cajun, and

Interview with Hark Bonner, September 21, 1983.
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Paul Wood, the manager at Dixie, to coordinate the defense
against Campbell's steamroller.

They felt that to deny

Campbell information, or to appear uncooperative before
these open public hearings would have simply raised addi
tional questions and added to Campbell's arsenal of alle
gations.^^

This is especially true since the tone of his

hearings was that he was a public advocate, himself on
the Bossier co-op line, who was simply trying to find out
what was going on in an organization of which he is part
owner.

Throughout the hearings, he continually reminded

the audiences: "I just want to know what's going on at my
co-op.

I've got a right to know.

Whether or not Bonner was right, the hearings and
the information Campbell attained through the process of
conducting them propelled him into the 1983 legislative
session stronger than he had been before.

ALEC, on the

other hand, went into the session not ready to do battle,
but divided and weak.

They may also have appeared beaten

and bloodied from the "investigation," and not a good
candidate for support in a big fight.

Campbell, on the

other hand, had a bandwagon on the roll, and was a good
candidate to receive support from those who like to be on
the winning side.

Senate Investigation Committee of Dixie Electric,
January 17, 1983, Zachary, Louisiana; Senate Investigation
Committee of Cajun Electric, Harch 11, 1983, Baton Rouge.
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In such circumstances, both sides entered the 1983
session.

Campbell was pessimistic.

As late as March, he

stated that the odds against passage of his bill were too
g r e a t . B u t he went on to introduce the bill just as he
had done in 1981 and 1982.

He was able to get the bill

through the Senate, but it became stalled in House com
mittee under the weight of A L E C s influence there.

At the

same time. Governor Treen introduced a bill that passed
the House to require the co-ops to call meetings to inform
their members of impending rate increases.

In the Senate,

Treen's bill became bogged down in committee, and it looked
as though both bills would die on opposite sides of the
legislature.

But Treen and Campbell coordinated their ef

forts to come up with a compromise bill whereby co-op
consumers could by petition require their local co-op
board to call an election to decide whether or not to go
under PSC regulation.

This local option bill passed both

houses and was signed into l a w . A c c o r d i n g to Bonner,
there was a misunderstanding on the floor of the Senate.
He says that several senators saw the bill as a compromise
between all parties, that it was a compromise that ALEC
s u p p o r t e d . C a m p b e l l states adamantly that this is not

Interview with Campbell, March 4, 1983.
1983; interview with Bonner, September 21, 1983.
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The bill is certainly not what Campbell wanted; he
seemed more excited over his victory than over what the
bill will do.

But he states that his crusade has not

ended, that he wants to see the government leave the
electricity business.

In 1984, many of the old gas and oil contracts that
the investor-owned utilities signed in the early Seventies
will expire, and the companies will have to sign new con
tracts at much higher rates.

This could cause their con

sumer prices to rise as high as, or higher than, the
state's co-op consumers are now paying.

Campbell insists

that all of this will not happen, that investor-owned rates
will always be lower than Cajun's rates, that Cajun has
made mistakes from which it can never r e c o v e r . C a j u n
leaders, of course, feel that they were the first to bite
the bullet, that they had made the expensive commitment to
coal early, that their costs are fixed for the immediate
future, and that the companies' consumers will see rate
increases before the end of 1984 that will turn all of

Telephone interview with Campbell, September 26,
1983.
40 Ibid.
41 Interview with Campbell, March 4, 1983.
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this around.

Today, SWEPCO has the lowest rates in the

state because it committed to coal earlier than anyone
else.^^

Cajun was only a few years behind.

The other

investor-owned companies are still using fuel oil and
natural gas in their boilers, or are bogged down in ex
pensive nuclear plant construction.

It is Cajun's argument

that this disparity in rates will end very soon.
If this is true, it will take the wind out
sails.

Despite his victory

he has done little more than
He says

in the

of Campbell's

last legislative session,

yip at the heelsof Big Cajun.

that "[occasionally] I've gotten more than just

their heels, sometimes I start grabbing at the seat of
their p a n t s , a n d certainly in the last legislative ses
sion he did at least that.

But if the rates of

woned companies do not soonrise to equal co-op

the investorrates, or

if worse, co-op rates continue to rise seemingly out of
control, Campbell will be able to grab more than just seats
of pants.

He has already begun another crusade to stop

further expansion of Cajun Electric, to halt plans for the
north Louisiana lignite plant that has been scheduled to
meet the demand of the late E i g h t i e s W i t h o u t the ability
Testimony of Schwab, January 17, 1983; interview
with A.
A. Robinson, May 19, 1982, New Roads, Louisiana; inter
view with Mark Bonner, July 29, 1982, Baton Rouge.
43 See Appendix XXI.
44 Interview with Campbell, March 4, 1983.
Telephone interview with Campbell, September 26, 1983.
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to grow, how will the co-ops obtain the electricity needed
to meet future demand, buy it from the companies again?
Can the companies even provide it?

Will they provide it?

These are questions that must be answered before political
decisions are made deciding the future of a public service
that has a demand to meet.
The future of the Louisiana co-op system, though, is
not in doubt; the co-ops will continue to exist.

Even if

Campbell should get his way and the co-ops should be placed
on the block for some grand going-out-of-business sale,
there would probably not be any buyers ; the buyout price
would be exorbitant, since it would include the assumption
of a huge debt, and the purchase from the consumer-owners
of equity that has built up in the system over the years.
But in what manner the Louisiana co-op system will live on
is not so certain.
fear the worst.

Some current and former co-op leaders

Over the last thirty years, Bonner has

been the glue that has held much of the system together.
Now that he has retired, some feel that Cajun will simply
take over ALEC, the huge giant will swallow its creator
in one resounding gulp.

In 1981, Cajun built its new

facility right next door to the old ALEC building on Air
line Highway in Baton Rouge.

Bonner could look out his

Interview with Edgar Chaney, July 28, 1982, Jeanerette,
Louisiana; interview with Mark Bonner, July 29, 1982; inter
view with Mark Bonner, September 21, 1983; interview with
Rickie Pietre, January 17, 1983, Houma, Louisiana.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

office window and see what he considered "them, looking
down at me," both literally and figuratively.^^

Others

fear that the local distribution co-ops will simply become
branch offices of Big C a j u n . S h o u l d this happen, it
would be ironic that Big Cajun, the system the distribu
tion co-ops created in the early Sixties to bring them the
independence that they so desired, should be the entity
to remove that independence in the mid-Eighties.
Whatever the future holds for Louisiana's co-ops, one
thing is certain, a change is about to occur.

The old

guard, those men who have been, for fifty years, the
standard-bearers and front line troops of the state's co-op
system, is about to hand over the reins of power to a new,
younger group.

It is, at this point, impossible to tell

whether or not these new leaders will continue to push for
the old goal of independence, and whether or not the co-op
spirit will continue on with them.

But it is certain that

Louisiana's co-ops and their subsidiaries, ALEC and Cajun,
are at a turning point in their history.

This is a history

of people, and as the people change, so must the history.

Interview with Mark Bonner, September 21, 1983.
Interview with Edgar Chaney, July 28, 1982; inter
view with Robinson, May 19, 1982.
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Appendix XXI
Residential Customers
Mills per KWH
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Source 1 Product of Senator Foster Campbell's Senate Investigation of
Co-ops, compliments of Senator Foster Campbell.
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